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Recent surges of the IoT market and the unregulated manufacturing of devices
have created a network of vulnerable devices that can be leveraged to launch global-
scale attacks, causing massive amounts of damage worldwide. As a result, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified ensuring security of these
devices as a critical challenge for national security, requiring immediate attention for
government agencies that deploy them, including the Department of Defense.
This research identifies two primary sources where breach of confidentiality occur
in IoT and proposes an architecture of a security agent capable of protecting these
areas. Prior research has demonstrated that many devices lack the computational
capacity to perform meaningful encryption of their data, and that even variations in
encrypted Wi-Fi frames can be used to extract information about the devices. The
proposed security agent, Internet of Things Active Management Unit (IoTAMU),
provides confidentiality for these two areas via the following capabilities: (1) authen-
tication, (2) firewall, (3) encryption, and (4) spoofing. By acting as a proxy between
the IoT devices and the gateway router, IoTAMU encrypts the traffic between itself
and the Remote Interface (RI) (e.g., smart phone) of the devices, and spoofs net-
work packets to hide the underlying network patterns, substantially decreasing the
likelihood of unwanted leakage of knowledge to the public. This research provides
an implementation of the firewall, encryption, and the spoofing functionalities of the
agent. The experiments measure the effectiveness of IoTAMU’s ability to uniquely
modify the observed network signatures of each device via spoofing, and its potential
effect on network congestion.
To test the spoofer’s effect, an Identical Device Model Classifier (IDMC) is devel-
iv
oped, which measures the similarities of the observed network signatures of each pair
of devices and recognizes identical-model devices. After performing Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) on the device signatures, a Similarity Score (SS) metric is
derived by calculating the ratios of euclidean distances between the principal compo-
nent scores of each pair of devices. The IDMC correctly identifies all identical-model
devices in baseline network settings without the spoofer, achieving 100% precision,
recall, and specificity at high threshold (SS>0.9). When the spoofer is enabled,
none of the identical pairs are identified at high threshold, and up to 66% identical
pairs are identified at lower thresholds (SS>0.8, 0.7). Overall, the spoofer is able
to sufficiently modify the observed network signatures of each device; the observed
differences between each pair increase overall (p-value = 0.01132) at 120 spoofed
samples, making it more difficult to identify similar devices. Finally, the experiments
in this research show the spoofer has a negligible effect on network congestion. As
the number of spoofed samples increases, there is a linear increase in the number of
additional packets created and its throughput, averaging an increase of one packet
per second and 1.546 kbps per sample of network signature spoofed. Furthermore,
there are no dropped packets across all trials, and the calculated network latency
times remain relatively consistent as more packets are added into the network.
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DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF A SECURITY AGENT
FOR INTERNET OF THINGS
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
The IoT industry is currently one of the fastest growing in the world, projected to
surpass global spending of $1 trillion by the year 2022 [1]. However, this rapidly ex-
panding market is saturated with unregulated devices without the necessary security
measures to protect user information [2]. Information leakage caused by vulnerabili-
ties can have privacy implications for individual users, and can escalate to compromise
of assets and personnel for organizations. As more of these devices are deployed in
operational settings of critical national organizations such as the Department of De-
fense (DoD), immediate investigations to develop defensive measures to protect their
confidentiality are warranted.
1.2 Problem Statement
Prior IoT research has demonstrated vulnerabilities that exist in these devices and
the potential information that can be extracted from them. Two major weaknesses
that expose information are the focus of this research. First, many of these devices
lack the hardware capacity to perform meaningful encryption, meaning any insiders
with access to the internal network may have unauthorized access to the data [2].
Second, data mining on the unencrypted fields of encrypted Wi-Fi frames can lead to
unintentional information leakage [3]. As the amount of resources and the machine
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learning capabilities of the adversaries grow, the information that can be extracted
from encrypted wireless traffic will continue to increase [4]. These vulnerabilities
have dangerous implications for personal households and organizations that deploy
IoT. Although significant strides have been made in the field of IoT security, limited
progress has been made in improving the confidentiality of these devices, especially
for wireless communications. Therefore, this research seeks to answer whether a
Plug-and-Play (PNP)-style security agent can be developed with minimal changes to
an existing network, that can offer modification of the observed patterns of wireless
traffic and encryption of the wired traffic without imposing a significant burden on
the network.
1.3 Research Objectives
This research proposes the architecture of Internet of Things Active Management
Unit (IoTAMU), a security agent capable of encryption and spoofing. It seeks to
demonstrate its soundness of design by conducting all experiments on a network set
up with IoTAMU serving as the gateway for all IoT devices, and via a implementation
of the firewall and encryption functionalities. Then, it attempts to illustrate an
area of information leakage from Wi-Fi traffic patterns that can be concealed by
a spoofer. This research aims to evaluate the spoofer’s ability to hide the device-
specific signatures by modifying the observed patterns of unencrypted fields of each
device’s encrypted Wi-Fi frames (e.g., lengths of payload, direction, time between
sent/received packets; hereafter referred to as network signatures). Finally, spoofing’s
potential negative effect on network congestion is investigated. In summary, this
research has the following main objectives:
1. Measure the accuracy of a classifier in identifying devices of identical models
from their network signatures.
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2. Determine the effectiveness of a spoofing algorithm in changing the observed
network signatures of pre-existing devices.
3. Examine the impact on network congestion from the additional traffic created
by the spoofer.
1.4 Hypothesis
It is hypothesized that a security agent can be developed in the form of a PNP-
style device to provide additional confidentiality via encryption for IoT networks.
Additionally, it is hypothesized that the observed network signatures of the devices
can be uniquely modified to be unrecognizable via spoofing, without contributing to
a substantial congestion of the network.
1.5 Approach
First, a controlled network is set up to model realistic internal and external sub-
nets where the IoT and their RI (i.e., smart phone) reside. IoTAMU is then installed
in the smart home (internal) network and connects to various Wi-Fi IoT devices. Its
encryption and spoofing capabilities are evaluated separately. Encryption function-
ality is tested using two different laptops posing as an IoT device and its RI that
exchange User Datagram Protocol (UDP) messages via IoTAMU. Then the spoofing
functionality is tested by collecting the network traffic with and without the spoofer
enabled for comparison. To measure the performance of the spoofer, an identical
device model classifier is developed, which works by measuring the similarities in the
observed network signatures of the devices via Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
Lastly, the spoofer’s impact on network congestion is measured by incrementally in-
creasing the load of spoofed traffic.
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1.6 Assumptions/Limitations
The limitations and the assumptions made throughout this research are summa-
rized below:
• The network modeled in this research is assumed to be representative of a
realistic smart home network.
• The behavior of the observed network signatures of the IoT devices are assumed
to be similar in other network environments.
• The devices are limited to three different types of devices and three identical-
model pairs.
1.7 Contributions
This research contributes to the field of IoT and Wi-Fi security via the following
four contributions:
1. IoTAMU: An architecture of a PNP-style IoT security agent capable of au-
thentication, firewall, encryption, and spoofing is presented. The presented
architecture helps isolate the vulnerable devices and offer additional protection
while minimally disrupting the existing network.
2. Remote Computing for IoT: This research demonstrates applications of
utilizing dedicated external agents to provide additional computing resources
for less powerful devices. IoTAMU’s capabilities developed in this research
provide added layers of security for IoT devices.
3. Identical Device Model Classifier (IDMC): IDMC provides a methodol-
ogy to measure the similarities in the observed network signatures and identify
identical-model devices.
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4. Network Signature Modification Algorithm: This research presents an
algorithm to uniquely modify the observed network signatures of the devices
based on the distributions of previously observed signatures.
1.8 Thesis Overview
The rest of this research is organized in five chapters. Chapter II provides a
summary of the current state of IoT security, the Wi-Fi protocol, and other related
work. Then, in Chapter III, the design process of the IoTAMU is described and its
encryption capability is demonstrated via an independent Proof-of-Concept (POC)
experiment. It is followed by a description of the methodology used to evaluate
the spoofing capability of IoTAMU in Chapter IV. Next, Chapter V presents and
analyzes the results from the experiments. And lastly, Chapter VI highlights the
major conclusions drawn from this research and provides potential future work.
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II. Background and Literature Review
2.1 Overview
This chapter provides an overview of the current challenges facing IoT security in
Section 2.2. Next, it describes the Wi-Fi protocol and how it contributes to vulnera-
bilities in IoT. It also provides an overview of the encryption schemes and PCA used
in this research. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of related research efforts in
IoT security.
2.2 Internet of Things Security
The IoT represent the new wave of embedded technologies with the added func-
tionality of remote connectivity. Examples of IoT include the sensory devices in
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks used for remote con-
trol, medical devices with Internet connectivity for remote monitoring, and baby
monitors used in smart home networks. Since its inception, the IoT industry has
been one of the fastest growing in the world, projected to reach $1 trillion by the
year 2022 [1]. However, the rapid growth of the industry is rivaled by the increasing
number of vulnerabilities found on these devices. Examples of vulnerabilities that
have been discovered are listed in public websites such as Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) [5]. There are many vulnerabilities in its hardware and soft-
ware implementation; Section 2.2.1 follows the work of Park et al. [2] to provide a
high-level overview of the different classes of security risks associated with IoT.
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2.2.1 Classes of Vulnerabilities Found in IoT
2.2.1.1 Insecure Storage and Communication
One of the main vulnerabilities in IoT is insecure storage and communication.
The devices often lack the hardware capacity to perform expensive computations
required for encryption; even if encryption is supported, many schemes use lightweight
algorithms that can be bypassed with relative ease. In fact, a 2014 study by HP found
that 70 percent of IoT devices used in the study communicated without encryption [6].
This vulnerability compromises both confidentiality and integrity of the device by
allowing an adversary to eavesdrop on the network communication, and manipulate
the data to their advantage, respectively. Strong encryption is able to mitigate these
risks through the encryption of the message itself and Message Integrity Check (MIC),
which verifies that the message has not been altered [7]. Cloud services such as Google
[8] and Amazon [9] provide remote computing resources that can aid in securing the
devices, including data encryption. However, using third party services introduce the
problem of disclosure of sensitive information discussed in Section 2.2.1.2, and other
vulnerabilities associated with cloud networks, which is out of scope of this research.
This research focuses on mitigating the breach of data confidentiality on devices with
limited/lack of encryption.
2.2.1.2 Collection and Disclosure of Sensitive Information
IoT devices both knowingly and unknowingly collect information on their sur-
roundings. A couple of most prominent examples include medical devices [10], which
collect information about patients, and embedded SCADA systems [11], which collect
information about various processes being monitored. If the devices are not properly
secured, sensitive information stored on these devices is vulnerable to attacks from
malicious actors, which can result in information leakage. The implications of the in-
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formation leakage can range from invasion of privacy to a national security threat, if
the compromised device served a critical function such as those in a SCADA network.
Unfortunately, it is not just the data directly stored and exchanged on the devices
that are vulnerable. One of the main challenges in dealing with IoT is their varying
interactions within the network, which can lead to information leakage for which
the user may not be aware. Examples of information leakage in IoT include device
fingerprinting, and pattern-of-life modeling as seen in the work of Beyer et al. [3]
discussed in Section 2.6.
2.2.1.3 Poor Authentication Mechanism
One of the most common vulnerabilities leveraged by an adversary is a device’s
poor authentication mechanism. Many devices are allowed to operate with pre-
installed default admin credentials. In addition, even if the users are required to
change the credentials before operating, many devices do not support setting secure
passwords through password policies that limit the number of characters or the type
of characters allowed in the password. This vulnerability allows a malicious actor to
take control of the device, allowing them to gain access to any stored data or use the
device as a pivot into the internal network to launch further attacks.
2.3 Wireless Protocols
2.3.1 Wi-Fi
Wi-Fi is one of the most common communication protocols used by the IoT [12].
The IEEE 802.11 (hereafter referred to as 802.11) standard specifies wireless local
area network protocol for the physical and the link layers in the TCP/IP network
architecture [13]. As seen in Figure 1, a wireless network consists of the following
components: (1) wireless hosts, (2) wireless communication links, (3) base station, and
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(4) external network [7]. Within the network, wireless devices (i.e., hosts) connect
to the external network via different wireless communication link technologies by
associating with a base station or an Access Point (AP). While an AP connects to
the external network via a router, many modern APs designed for home networks
integrate a router. When the AP is set up in a secure network, it is assigned a Service
Set Identifier (SSID), the name visible to the hosts in proximity, a channel number
that defines the frequency range of communication, and a secret passphrase. If a
client (i.e., host) wishes to associate with an AP in a secure network, the client must
first authenticate itself to the AP with the passphrase.
Figure 1: An architecture of a wireless network.
The unit of data exchanged in a network is represented by a 802.11 frame (Fig-
ure 2). Only the following fields are of interest in this research: destination Media
Access Control (MAC) address (Address 1), source MAC address (Address 2), and
Basic Service Set Identifier (BSSID), which is the MAC address of the AP’s wireless
interface (Address 3). A MAC address is a 48-bit number that uniquely identifies the
device that is assigned by the manufacturer.
In a protected network, the payload of the 802.11 frame remains encrypted. The
encryption scheme used in the network setup of this research is Wireless Protected
Access 2 (WPA2). Under WPA2, the payload is encrypted using the Pairwise Tran-
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Figure 2: The 802.11 frame (numbers indicate the length of field in bytes).
sient Key (PTK), crafted using the WPA2 Preshared Key (PSK) (derived from the
passphrase and SSID), MAC address of AP, MAC address of client, a nonce created
by the AP, and a nonce created by the client. Figure 3 depicts the initial WPA2
4-way handshake between the client and the AP, in which the components of the
PTK are exchanged. Once the client and the AP are authenticated and associated,
they each derive the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) from the preinstalled PSK. Then,
the AP sends a nonce to the client, with which the client derives the PTK. Next, the
client sends its nonce to the server with the MIC encrypted with the PTK. Using the
client nonce, the server generates the PTK and uses it to verify the encrypted MIC
received from the client. If the MIC checks out, the AP installs the PTK and sends
a confirmation message to the client, to which the client responds with an acknowl-
edgement to complete the 4-way handshake. In this research, it is assumed that the
only encryption that is performed in the IoT network is that of Wi-Fi, substantiated
by [14] discussed in Section 2.6.
Each wireless station has a Wireless Network Interface Controller (WNIC) through
which it sends and receives wireless traffic. In a traditional setting, the WNIC is in
managed mode, only picking up wireless traffic addressed to itself. However, there
are two other modes in which the WNIC can be set to pick up additional traffic:
promiscuous mode and monitor mode. In promiscuous mode, the WNIC captures all
traffic associated with the BSSID of the associated AP. Similarly in monitor mode,
the WNIC captures all wireless traffic regardless of the BSSID associated with the
traffic. In this research, the WNIC is set to monitor mode to capture all wireless
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Figure 3: The WPA2 4-way handshake between the client and the AP.
traffic [15].
The security provided by the WPA2 standard is a significant improvement over
that of its predecessor, Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [16]. However, there are still
studies that demonstrate the effectiveness of WPA2 password cracking attacks that
allow an adversary to gain access to the network such as those of [17][18]. The WPA3
standard currently in development by the Wi-Fi Alliance is able to mitigate some of
the vulnerabilities that exist in WPA2, including dictionary attacks [16]. However,
discussion of specific protocols used in the WPA3 standard is out of scope of this
research.
2.3.2 Other Wireless Protocols
In addition to Wi-Fi, there are other wireless protocols frequently used by IoT de-
vices for communication, including the IEEE 802.15.1 (Bluetooth) [19] and 802.15.4
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(Zigbee) [20] standards, and the ITU-T G.9959 recommendation (Z-Wave) [21]. Vul-
nerabilities similar to those discussed here are present in these protocols and pose a
challenge when securing the IoT devices [22][23]. In Bluetooth, device-specific infor-
mation such as the device name, services, and technical specifications are exchanged,
which can be used in device fingerprinting. Likewise, ZigBee and Z-Wave devices
advertise identifiers similar to the MAC addresses in Wi-Fi which uniquely identifies
the device.
2.4 Public Key Encryption (PKE) and Symmetric Key Encryption (SKE)
There are two main encryption schemes being used in networking: Symmetric Key
Encryption (SKE), and Public Key Encryption (PKE) [7]. Whereas SKE uses the
same key to encrypt and decrypt messages, PKE uses one key to encrypt and another
key to decrypt.
Figure 4: An overview of the Public and Symmetric Key Encryption.
PKE consists of a public and a private key pair, and the decryption and encryption
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algorithm. A private key is kept secret by the user who generated the key, and
the associated public key is distributed to the public. Messages can be encrypted
using either a public or a private key, but they must be decrypted using the other
corresponding key. Popular PKE algorithms include Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA)
and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). An example of this exchange is depicted
in Figure 4. Here, Bob wants to exchange a secret message with Alice. In this
scenario, Bob has already shared his public key with Alice. Bob first encrypts his
plaintext secret message using his private key, converting into a ciphertext. After Alice
receives the ciphertext, she decrypts it using Bob’s public key. She then composes
a secret response and encrypts the message using Bob’s public key. Upon receiving
the encrypted message, Bob decrypts it using his private key to read Alice’s secret
message.
Unlike PKE, SKE consists of one symmetric key and the decryption and encryp-
tion algorithm. Therefore, for the recipient to read the encrypted message, they must
have access to the same symmetric key used for encryption. Popular SKE algorithms
include Blowfish and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This research uses AES
in the implementation of the encryption capability for IoTAMU. In the SKE scheme
depicted in Figure 4, Bob uses a symmetric key shared with Alice to encrypt his
secret message. Once Alice receives the ciphertext, she decrypts the message with
the symmetric key. Then, she generates a response and encrypts the message using
the same key. Finally, Bob decrypts the encrypted response with the symmetric key
to read Alice’s message.
On top of confidentiality, PKE is also used for digital signatures and certificates
to prove the identity of the originator of the message. Because a private key is unique
to an entity, a message encrypted with a unique private key undeniably proves the
identity of the originator. Therefore, a digital signature created using the private key
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of the sender provides authenticity and non-repudiation for the message.
An important application of digital signatures is found in digital certificates signed
by a Certificate Authority (CA). Digital certificates are used as a means to validate
the identity of the sender. It contains the public key of the sender, the information of
the issuer (CA), as well as the digital signature of the issuer. If the receiver trusts the
issuer of the digital certificate and validates the digital signature of the issuer using
the issuer’s public key, then the receiver can trust the sender’s public key contained in
the certificate. An example of this mechanism is seen in the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol, where the authenticity of a web server is validated via the use of
digital certificates [24]. The authentication component of IoTAMU developed in this
research is modeled after this protocol.
2.5 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
PCA is a dimension reduction technique that transforms a set of potentially corre-
lated features into a smaller set of orthogonal features, otherwise known as principal
components [25]. It is a linear transformation where each coordinate (i.e., principal
component) points to the direction of highest variance in the data, such that each
coordinate is orthogonal to one another. Performing PCA on a set of data has a few
important merits. First, it reduces the dimension of a large feature set down to a
manageable size. Second, it helps extract the parts of features that retain the great-
est amount of information (i.e., variation) between the samples. Lastly, because it is
a dimension reduction technique, it allows visualization of a high dimensional data;
this allows clustering of similar samples, giving it a characteristic similar to that of
unsupervised machine learning techniques such as k-means clustering.
Traditionally, before the derivation of the principal components, the data is cen-
tered around the origin and normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the
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standard deviation for each feature. As illustrated in Figure 5, the first principal
component is derived by finding a line through the origin, where the distance from
the projection of each point onto the line to the origin is maximized, or where each
point’s orthogonal distance to the line is minimized. This method can also be ex-
pressed by the problem of maximizing the variance around the origin by choosing a
vector v such that the following condition is satisfied








where n is the number of points, xTi is the transpose of the xi matrix describing the
ith point, and xTi v is the length of the projection of point xi onto v. Each subsequent
principal components are derived by choosing a line through the origin orthogonal to
the previous principal components that satisfies the above conditions. The maximum
number of principal components that can be derived is the smaller of the number of
samples or the number of features. Once all of the principal components are derived,









where the new data x̂i is represented by the projections of the original data xi onto
k principal components. The set of projections of each original data onto the kth
principal component are known as the Principal Component Score (PCS); the newly
derived data can be visualized by plotting the PCSs of the first two or three principal
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components. Steps one and two in Figure 5 shows the derivation of the PCS for
principal components one and two from points x1, x2, and x3. Then, in step three,
each point is visualized in the newly transformed space. Whereas the example in
Figure 5 depicts the derivation of the principal components in a 2-dimensional space,
PCA becomes a powerful visualization tool on higher-dimensional data by allowing
the multi-dimensional data to be represented in a 2 or 3-dimensional space.
Furthermore, through the creation of the principal components, PCA allows for
the abstraction of the numerous features in the original data. This becomes useful
in a system where little is known about which features are important in the system’s
overall behavior and how they interact. Therefore, it facilitates a shift in focus from
determining which features are important in the behaviors of different systems, to how
the overall behaviors of systems differ. The classifier implemented in this research
takes advantage of this characteristic of PCA to measure the closeness of the network
signatures (comprised of 36 features) of pairs of devices.
A scree plot is a bar graph that depicts the percent variation of each component;
it is useful in determining the number of subset of principal components to select for
analysis. The percent variation of data accounted by each principal component can
be calculated by taking the value derived in (1) and dividing by the sum of variance









where k is the kth principal component. In practice, selection of the first set of
principal components whose sum of percent variations account for 70% to 90% of the
total is recommended for analysis [25]. For this research, the midway point (80%) is
selected as the threshold for selection of principal components.
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Figure 5: Derivation of the principal components in a 2-dimensional space.
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2.6 Related Research
Recognizing IoT security flaws, many security experts have researched numerous
attack surfaces of IoT. Current efforts, including the Internet of Things Project by
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [26], provide valuable resources
to help manufacturers and end users secure their devices. However, as discussed
in Section 2.2.1.1, due to physical limitations of the devices, meaningful security
measures that often require large computational power such as encryption remain
elusive for many devices. Unfortunately, this leaves security, in large part, to those
who deploy them.
Sectors that deploy IoT, such as the U.S. government, have identified the vul-
nerabilities and have recommended mitigation policies and guidelines with limited
success. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an entity that audits and
researches various issues pertaining to the U.S. government, including the use of IoT
devices within the DoD. Their 2017 report highlighted multiple risks associated with
the IoT including poor built-in security of the devices, limited encryption, and pos-
sible exploitation from supply chain [27]. In addition, the report concluded that the
DoD’s current policies on information systems and cybersecurity are neither effec-
tively implemented nor adequately address the growing security concerns with the
IoT. In the following year, the GAO identified establishing a cybersecurity strategy
for IoT as one of the DoD’s most critical challenges. Although the DoD’s senior lead-
ership has recognized the problem, no tangible actions have been taken at the time
of the 2018 report [28]. Most recently in Septempter of 2019, the Internet of Things
Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2019 has been reintroduced in the U.S. Senate to
revitalize the failed Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017 and
the Internet of Things Federal Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2018. But, at the
time of this research, it has yet to pass the Senate [29].
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Numerous studies so far have demonstrated the vulnerabilities that exist in IoT
devices. Examples include those that exist in network cameras as seen in [30–32].
In particular, Ostrom and Sambamoorthy [31] showcased a series of attacks that can
be launched against IoT cameras via Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poi-
soning, a common technique used to eavesdrop on network traffic between hosts [15].
More recently, a study by Park et al. used passive network sniffing to demonstrate
the pervasiveness of the vulnerability to eavesdropping 10 years after Ostrom and
Sambamoorthy’s work, by extracting the video feed from unencrypted data packets
of a network camera [14].
Likewise, a 2015 study by Valasek and Miller demonstrated the risks of using
the infotainment system found in modern vehicles [33]. Their study demonstrated
a remote control attack that was able to successfully gain control of a vehicle while
the driver was onboard. This finding led to the recall of 1.4 million vehicles by the
automobile company [34].
In addition, the unintentional information leakage from an aggregate collection
of data has the potential to reveal knowledge about its surroundings. Strava’s fit-
ness tracker application uses GPS information to determine the exercise patterns of
the user. However, an analyst was able to show that by cross referencing publicly-
available maps and the location data from the application, undisclosed information
regarding U.S. military installations such as security guards’ patrol routes could be
inferred [35]. In addition, a recent study at Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
illustrated that by only using the unencrypted fields found in Wi-Fi frame headers,
an adversary is able to sniff a network of over-the-counter IoT devices to accurately
collect pattern-of-life information [3]. The authors were able to recognize certain
patterns of encrypted Wi-Fi traffic to fingerprint the different devices present in the
network, and determine the specific duration and time the user was present in the
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smart home.
The threat posed by information leakage becomes more complex when statistical
tools are utilized. Following the study by Beyer et al., Aragon improved the device-
type classifier using several machine learning techniques including Random Forests,
K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [4]. Aragon’s
classifiers were relatively successful in correctly identifying the device types with above
∼ 80% precision for the smart home Wi-Fi devices. However, the classifier relied too
heavily on the vendor information extracted from the first three bytes of the MAC
address, resulting in a significant drop in performance (∼ 50% precision) after removal
of the vendor information.
Similarly, Atkinson et al. used Random Forests on passively sniffed Wi-Fi traf-
fic to infer different characteristics about a user (e.g., age, sex, hobbies, etc.) [36].
In their study, the authors downloaded some of the most popular applications from
different genres, and created a list of characteristics one could infer from the usage
of the application. After ensuring their machine learning classifier was able to clas-
sify the applications from sniffed traffic, the authors created a list of personas for the
users based on different combinations of applications detected. Although the machine
learning classifier suffered significantly in a live environment, it nonetheless demon-
strated the feasibility of an adversary being able to infer various characteristics about
a user based only on sniffed encrypted Wi-Fi traffic.
Over the years, several solutions have been proposed to mitigate the threats that
exist in IoT networks. Examples of these approaches include using Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) to develop Local Area Network (LAN) management schemes [37]
[38], deploying edge gateways to encrypt the network traffic [39][40], and injecting
spoofed network packets to modify the observed network signatures [3]. Although
the SDN approach is often used to prevent a rogue device that has been compromised
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from further infecting a network, it does not protect the confidentiality of a network
from an adversary passively eavesdropping.
Data confidentiality of IoT can be protected through the use of an encryption
agent. Doukas et al. presented a model which connected an external gateway to each
IoT device. The gateway was paired with a cloud server that allowed the model to
encrypt and decrypt the traffic before reaching the intended recipient [39]. Similarly,
Hsu et al. developed a framework which utilized the enhanced capabilities of exist-
ing edge nodes on the network (e.g., router), to provide additional security for IoT,
including encryption.
The aforementioned AFIT study demonstrated the effectiveness of injecting spoof-
ed packets in disguising the smart home network [3]. In order to defeat the information
leakage found in their study, the authors developed a spoofer on a Raspberry Pi that
periodically sent out crafted network packets to mimic the devices present in the
smart home. By sending packets of varying length and MAC addresses, they were
able to both prevent their device classifier from correctly predicting the type of device,
and hide the pattern-of-life information of the user.
Beyer et al., developed an algorithm that relied on packet generation from hard-
coded information such as the packet length. However, this creates network signatures
that are different than those of the underlying network, which can be isolated using
data mining techniques. In the field of knowledge hiding in disguised data sets, Huang
et al. demonstrated that disguising existing data with values sampled from a uniform
distribution is an ineffective method that can be reversed through statistical analysis
[41]. Instead, they illustrate that injection of noise that retains the overall distribution
of the existing data is a more effective technique for knowledge hiding. Following their
research, the spoofer for IoTAMU is implemented by generating artificial frames that
mimic the signatures of the underlying network.
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Table 1 provides a summary of the related research. Despite ongoing efforts in
the field, no standout solution has been proposed that can be widely deployed in the
near future. This research investigates the data confidentiality deficiencies present
in IoT networks and seeks to develop an easily configurable model to enhance the
confidentiality of an IoT network by synthesizing the encryption and spoofing agents
discussed in this section. Ultimately, this thesis explores the feasibility of a PNP-style
security agent that can be used to secure both the wireless and wired communications
used in operations that rely on IoT, with minimal disruption of the existing network.


















Atkinson et al. (2018) [36] X X
Miettinen et al. (2017) [37] X X X
Demetriou et al. (2017) [38] X X X
Doukas et al. (2012) [39] X X
Hsu et al. (2018) [40] X X X
Beyer et al. (2018) [3] X X X X
Aragon (2019) [4] X X X
Park et al. (2019) [2] X
Park et al. (2019) [14] X X X X X
Park (2020) X X X X X
Vuln: vulnerability assessment
2.7 Background Summary
This chapter begins with a discussion of the high-level vulnerabilities that exist
in IoT. It also provides an overview of the Wi-Fi protocol commonly used as the
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standard communication protocol for IoT. A brief description of the SKE and PKE
schemes, and PCA are also provided. The chapter concludes with a survey on recent
research efforts that highlight the different types of vulnerabilities that exist in IoT,
as well as potential solutions to secure exposed networks. Although a wide spectrum
of solutions have been proposed, many approaches require changes to the existing
protocols, which is difficult to implement in large networks such as those of the DoD.
This thesis contributes to the field of IoT security through the development of a





To mitigate the vulnerable wireless communications innate in many IoT devices,
this research develops and examines the effectiveness of a novel security agent ar-
chitecture: IoTAMU. It serves as a proxy deployed in between a traditional smart
home router and IoT devices to secure their communication. This is accomplished
by using encryption to protect the traffic flowing between the agent and the RI of
the IoT, and using spoofing to conceal the wireless traffic between the agent and IoT
devices. IoTAMU performs automatic classification of active and passive states to
generate the network signatures of each device. New network signatures are generated
from those of existing devices, which is used by IoTAMU to spoof packets to mask
the underlying communication of the devices. The Identical Device Model Classifier
(IDMC), capable of classifying identical model devices, is developed to measure the
effectiveness of the spoofer’s ability to modify the observed signatures of the devices.
This chapter describes the functionality of IoTAMU in a smart home network, list of
tools used, network setup of the research, the architecture of IoTAMU, and a series
of pilot studies that helped guide its design decisions.
3.2 Internet of Things Active Management Unit (IoTAMU)
IoTAMU is a security agent developed to mitigate the eavesdrop vulnerabilities
found in IoT devices. Figure 6 illustrates IoTAMU’s impact in a hypothetical smart
home network. Most often, a router serves as the default gateway in a smart home
network and connects all devices to the external network. In this model, the commu-
nication between the IoT device and the RI may or may not be encrypted. Even if
wireless encryption such as WPA2 is assumed, an eavesdropper sniffing on the net-
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work may be able to intercept the data by cracking the WPA2 key, if the application
data itself is not encrypted. Unfortunately, as demonstrated by Park et al., it is still
common to find IoT devices that send traffic in cleartext [14]. Furthermore, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.6, encrypted IEEE 802.11 frames contain unencrypted fields (e.g.,
MAC address, packet length) that allow an adversary to infer various information
about the network based on the observed traffic patterns, including but not limited
to device fingerprinting, activity identification, and pattern-of-life modeling.
Figure 6: Depiction of a typical smart home network with and without IoTAMU.
With the introduction of IoTAMU, the security agent acts as a central gateway for
all IoT, effectively isolating them from the rest of the hosts present in the network.
This direct communication between the IoT devices and IoTAMU can be accom-
plished by setting the IoTAMU as an AP and having the IoT devices associate with
it. Additionally, its two primary capabilities, encryption and spoofing, secure the
application level data and mask the network traffic patterns, respectively, to secure
the IoT network.
In a typical communication between an IoT device and its RI, there are two sides
of wireless communication that are vulnerable to passive sniffing: communication
between an IoT and its associated AP and that of the RI and its associated AP.
Spoofing and encryption capabilities of IoTAMU respectively provide an additional
layer of security for each side of wireless communication.
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IoTAMU spoofs crafted 802.11 frames to conceal device-specific patterns of net-
work signatures that can be observed in wireless communications between an IoT
device and its AP (i.e., IoTAMU), preventing information leakage from unencrypted
fields of encrypted 802.11 frames using data mining techniques. However, if encryp-
tion of data is not directly performed by the IoT device, its application-layer data
remains unencrypted and is vulnerable to eavesdropping from those with access to the
wireless network. When packets are received at IoTAMU’s wireless interface, their
application-layer data are encrypted and forwarded to the RI. Once the RI receives
the packet, a decryption agent residing in the RI (in the form of a background process)
decrypts the payload and forwards it to the intended application. Packets generated
from the RI are encrypted by the same agent before being forwarded to IoTAMU,
where they are decrypted and forwarded to the IoT device. Therefore, payloads in
wireless communications between the RI and its AP are encrypted and secured against
eavesdropping from those with access to the wireless network. Implementations of
IoTAMU’s capabilities are described in Section 3.6.
3.3 Tools
Table 2 provides the list of open source tools used in this research. Wireshark
and the aircrack-ng suite are used for network reconnaissance and analysis. Python,
iptables, ebtables, hostapd, and Scapy are used to implement IoTAMU. Finally, R is
used to generate the network statistics and analyze the experimental results.
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Table 2: List of Tools Used
Name Version Description
Wireshark 3.2.0 Software used for packet analysis [42]
airodump-ng 1.5.2
Software used to capture
network traffic [43]
airmon-ng 1.5.2
Software used to configure the wireless
card for passive network sniffing [43]
Python 3.5.2
Programming language used to
implement functions of IoTAMU [44]
Scapy 2.4.3
Python package used to inject
network packets [45]
R 3.5.0
Programming language used for
statistical analyses [46]
iptables 1.8.3
Software used for network layer
packet filtering [47]
ebtables 1.8.3
Software used for link layer
packet filtering [48]
hostapd 2.9
Software used to enable the AP
functionality on IoTAMU [49]
3.4 Devices
Table 3 provides the list of devices used in this research. The IoT devices are se-
lected to maximize the variety in each type of devices (e.g., camera). When possible,
devices from different manufacturers are selected for analysis. Otherwise, different
models from the same manufacturers are selected. Two devices of the same manu-
facturer and model are used for the purpose of classifying identical-model devices. In
this research, two different configurations of IoT device and RI pairs are used. In the
first configuration, Phone1 acts as the RI for the actual IoT devices; in the second
configuration, two laptops are used to pose as an IoT device (Laptop1) and its RI
(Laptop2). IoTAMU is implemented on Laptop3. Lastly, three routers are used to
set up simulated internal and external networks with respect to the IoT devices.
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LB100 IoT light bulb
LIFX
Wireless Light Bulb





Smartphone used to remotely control























Router that bridges the Internet,





Router that connects the RI




Router that connects the internal/
external network to the Internet
Alfa Card AWUS036NHA
WNIC used to sniff
Wi-Fi traffic
Device specs: Laptop1 – Intel i5-7300U CPU, 8 GB RAM; Laptop2 – Intel i7-6700HQ CPU,
16 GB RAM; Laptop3 – Intel i7-4910MQ CPU, 8 GB RAM
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3.5 Network Setup
Figure 7 depicts the network setup, and examples of the packet flow from the RI
to IoTAMU via direct communication and via cloud server. At each hop, any changes
in the Internet Protocol (IP) address and port number from Network Address Trans-
lation (NAT) on Router1, Router2, and Router3 are highlighted in red. The NAT
table in the figure summarizes these changes, with the changes for packets routing
from the RI to the cloud server on the left and those routing from the cloud server
to IoTAMU on the right. This research simulates an external and an internal (smart
home) network via three subnets: (1) 192.168.1.0/24, (2) 172.16.0.0/24, and (3)
10.0.0.0/24. A fourth subnet 192.168.0.0/24 is used to enable a connection to
the Internet as select IoT devices need to connect to cloud servers to establish a
connection with the RI. In a direct communication from an RI to an IoT device, the
packet flows from the RI, Router2, Router1, and IoTAMU before reaching the IoT
device. If a cloud server is utilized by the IoT device, the packet is routed to the
server from the RI via Router2, Router1, Router3, and the Internet; then routed to
the IoT device from the server via Router3, Router1, and IoTAMU. A summary of
the MAC and IP addresses of all devices set up in the network is provided in Table 4.
Figures 8 and 9 depict configuration 1 and 2 of the two IoT device and RI pairs
used in this research. In configuration 1, Phone1 is used as the RI to interact with
the actual IoT devices; in configuration 2, Laptop1 and Laptop2 are posed as an
IoT device and its RI, respectively. Configuration 1 is used in experiments 1 and 2
(see Sections 4.8.2 and 4.8.3), and configuration 2 is used in the POC experiment
of IoTAMU’s encryption functionality (see Section 3.6.3.1) and experiment 3 (see
Section 4.8.4).
29
Table 4: Network Address of Devices





































































WD: wired, WL: wireless






















































Figure 8: The network setup using Phone1 as the RI to interact with the actual IoT
devices (Configuration 1).
Figure 9: The network setup using Laptop1 as the IoT and Laptop2 as its RI (Con-
figuration 2).
The first subnet 192.168.1.0/24 is the internal network where the IoT devices
and IoTAMU reside. Router1 acts as the gateway router for the smart home network
with one of its interfaces (eth0), with a static IP address of 192.168.1.1, repre-
senting the LAN interface for the simulated internal network (the routing table for
Router1 is shown in Figure 10). The interface is directly connected via an Ethernet
cable to the interface on IoTAMU, which has a dynamic IP address of 192.168.1.2
assigned by DHCP1, the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server residing
in Router1 (Figure 11). In addition, IoTAMU has a WNIC which is set as the AP
for the IoT devices. The WNIC has a static IP address of 192.168.1.254. Connect-
ing to the AP are the IoT devices whose IP addresses are dynamically assigned by
DHCP1. In an actual deployment of IoTAMU, the gateway router (Router1) as well as
IoTAMU should have NAT functionalities enabled to prevent external devices from
communicating directly with the internal devices. However, for ease of access and
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analysis in this research, NAT has been turned off on the internal side of the network
setup.
Figure 10: Routing table for the three interfaces on Router1.
Figure 11: DHCP servers residing on Router1.
AP functionality of IoTAMU is implemented using hostapd. To enable this, wlan0
interface is first set to AP mode by editing the /etc/network/interfaces config
file, and creating the hostapd.conf file to be used as an input for hostapd. Both
configuration files are provided in Appendix A. The AP is set up to use the WPA2
encryption scheme with a passphrase for security. Either a bridged or a NAT-enabled
wireless network can be configured via hostapd. Although a NAT-enabled network is
better for security, IoTAMU is set up as a bridged network for ease of access to the
connected devices and analysis for the purpose of this research.
IoTAMU is implemented on the Lenovo Thinkpad (Laptop3) model W541 I7-
4910MQ running on Kali version 2018.4 as its operating system. It must be initialized
on startup via the script provided in Appendix B for AP and firewall, Appendix C




python3 [proxy server.py|proxy server2.py]
python3 spoofer.py [csv file containing network signatures]
where proxy server.py and proxy server2.py perform decryption on packets orig-
inating from the RI, and encryption on those from IoT devices, respectively. For the
remainder of this research, it is assumed that the first script is always running, and
the latter two are only enabled when specified.
The second interface on Router1 (eth1) represents the Wide Area Network (WAN)
interface connecting to the external network (172.16.0.1). It is connected to the
WAN interface with a dynamically assigned IP address of 172.16.0.2 on Router2
via an Ethernet cable. To mimic the WAN address being assigned by an Inter-
net Service Provider (ISP) for a typical smart home network, the IP address of
Router2’s WAN interface is assigned by a second DHCP server residing in Router1
for the 172.16.0.0/24 subnet. Router2 also acts as the AP to associate with the RI
via a wireless connection. In this research, the internal subnet created by Router2
(10.0.0.0/24) acts as the external network. IP addresses of the smartphone (Phone1)
and the laptop (Laptop2) that acts as the RI are dynamically assigned by DHCP3 re-
siding in Router2.
Finally, the third interface on Router1 (eth2) with the IP address 192.168.0.2
enables the connection to the Internet from the simulated internal and external
networks. The interface is connected via an Ethernet cable to a LAN interface
(192.168.0.1) on Router3, which connects to a local ISP. Because the particular
model of router does not have a routing table that can be modified, NAT is enabled
on eth2 of Router1 to correctly route the packets destined for the simulated network
from the Internet.
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The APs in Router2 and IoTAMU operate in the 2.4 GHz band under the IEEE
802.11n standard, with SSIDs “NETGEAR20” and “IoTAMU”, respectively. In ad-
dition, they are set up on channels one and six, respectively, to minimize their inter-
ference and model two distinct networks. Router3’s AP, which is not a part of this
research, is set up on channel 11 to prevent interfering with those of Router2 and
IoTAMU.
3.6 IoTAMU Architecture
There are four components to IoTAMU: (1) authentication, (2) firewall, (3) en-
cryption, and (4) spoofer. Its architecture and how each component interacts with
the rest of the network is depicted in Figure 12. This research primarily focuses on
the spoofing component of IoTAMU, as other components can be easily implemented
using existing protocols. The following sections describe each component in detail.
Figure 12: The proposed architecture of IoTAMU.
3.6.1 IoTAMU: Authentication
The purpose of the authentication component is to ensure that the encryption
agent in IoTAMU is only communicating with the intended decryption counterpart
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in the RI (e.g., smartphone, laptop). As previously discussed in Section 2.4, digi-
tal certificates provide great utility in authenticating the communicating hosts. For
IoTAMU, the certificates should be signed by a common CA as configured by the
network administrator. Because there are well established implementations of this
mechanism publicly available, such as that of [50], the implementation of the authen-
tication functionality is not included in this research.
3.6.2 IoTAMU: Firewall
IoTAMU also acts as a firewall between the IoT devices and the rest of the
network to ensure only the intended devices are communicating. One way to ac-
complish this is through filtering the connections that did not originate from the
internal network on the wireless interface. Figure 13 shows a snippet of code from
Appendix B that provides the implementation of the firewall using iptables [47] via
whitelisting only connections of interest. IoTAMU’s firewall first sets all incoming
connections to be dropped. There are three different chains of filters configurable
by iptables. First is the INPUT chain which deals with connections destined for lo-
cal sockets, second is the OUTPUT chain which deals with connections created by
local sockets, and last is the FORWARD chain which deals with connections that are
not destined for a local socket but are forwarded to their destinations by the local
machine. Since the firewall should not directly receive or send any packets, all con-
nections in the INPUT and OUTPUT chain are set to DROP. Initially, FORWARD chain’s
policy is set to DROP, which is then overwritten by another rule allowing connections
generated from an internal IP address (192.168.1.0/24) to go through.
Other filtering options include using specific IP addresses and port numbers. Al-
though the IP addresses may change over time, the port numbers associated with lis-
tening sockets on IoT devices are often fixed; this information can be used to provide
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tighter control over the network flow. Unfortunately, this method does not prevent
an adversary from creating a series of spoofed packets to brute force a response from
one of the devices. However, it becomes increasingly difficult for the attacker to gain
useful knowledge on the network as more layers of rules specific to the devices in
the network are added. Therefore, it behooves the network administrator to have an
in-depth understanding of their devices as best practice for better protection against
malicious actors.
Figure 13: An example implementation of the firewall using iptables.
3.6.3 IoTAMU: Encryption
One of the primary functions of IoTAMU is encryption. This functionality pro-
vides additional security for IoT devices with weak/no encryption available. There
are two different ways of accomplishing this: (1) creating a separate secure connec-
tion between IoTAMU and the remote server and (2) only encrypting a portion of
the packet (e.g., application layer data), while maintaining the original connection
between the IoT device and the RI. The first method can be implemented using
existing protocols such as Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology or TLS. To
demonstrate IoTAMU’s capability as a PNP-style agent with minimal overhead, this
research implements the second method as a POC using Python’s cryptography pack-
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age [51]. The full implementation of the encryption function of IoTAMU is available
in Appendix C.
However, it should be noted that the encryption functionality may not work as
intended for devices that communicate via cloud servers. If any data is processed in
the cloud, encrypting the data via IoTAMU prevents the cloud server from recognizing
the data.
3.6.3.1 Proof of Concept Experiment: Encryption
This section demonstrates the encryption functionality of IoTAMU as an inde-
pendent proof-of-concept experiment. To intercept and parse the raw packets coming
into the two network interfaces of IoTAMU, another Python script is used (see Ap-
pendix E) which is called by the main encryption scripts (proxy server.py and
proxy server2.py) as a module. When a packet is received at an interface, it de-
termines whether it is a UDP packet, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packet,
or neither (e.g., Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets). If it is the first
two with a payload, the script proceeds to encrypt the payload, replace the original
payload, recalculate the checksums, then forward the packet to the intended recipient;
if not, the packet is forwarded without any change. The network and transport layer
checksums are recalculated and modified in the packets to account for the modified
payloads from encryption. Because the encryption script effectively creates a second
packet to be sent with the encrypted data, the original unencrypted packet needs to
be dropped by the kernel after it is received at the interface. If encryption is enabled,
packets received on the wireless interface can be dropped by disabling the ACCEPT
rule in Figure 13, allowing the default DROP rule for the FORWARD chain to drop the
packet. However, because a bridged network is used in this research, the packets
received on the wired interface must be dropped at the link layer. Therefore, for this
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proof-of-concept demonstration, this is implemented using ebtables by setting the
drop rules for the packets with the appropriate MAC address in the FORWARD chain
(Figure 14). In an actual deployment of IoTAMU, the use of ebtables is unnecessary
and commenting out the ACCEPT rule in Figure 13 suffices as IoTAMU should be set
up as a NAT-enabled network.
Figure 14: Drop rule set using ebtables.
The encryption functionality of IoTAMU is implemented using SKE. Modeled
after the encryption standards in TLS, AES is selected as the encryption algorithm
[24]. Because the implementation of the symmetric key exchange mechanism is out
of scope of this research, a 256-bit key and a 128-bit Initialization Vector (IV) are
hard coded on IoTAMU and the RI (see Appendix C); the actual keys are arbitrarily
chosen as they are irrelevant to the purpose of this experiment.
Its functionality is tested using two laptops posing as an IoT device and its RI
using configuration 2 of the network setup (Figure 9). Laptop1 (client) is connected
to IoTAMU (Laptop3), and Laptop2 (server) is connected to Router2. The two
Python scripts used for the client and server sides of the communication are available
in Appendix F. As seen in Figure 15, Laptop1 first sends a plaintext UDP message to
Laptop2. When the message passes through IoTAMU, the plaintext message is en-
crypted using the shared symmetric key and IV, then the modified packet is forwarded
to the RI. After receiving the message, the RI decrypts the ciphertext and sends an
encrypted acknowledgement message back to the client. Finally, the message is de-
crypted at IoTAMU, and the communication is completed when the client receives
the plaintext acknowledgement. As discussed in Section 3.2, although the messages
exchanged over Wi-Fi between the IoT device (Laptop1) and IoTAMU remain in
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cleartext, those exchanged between the RI (Laptop2) and its AP are encrypted and
protected against eavesdropping.
Figure 15: The flow of messages in the POC experiment testing IoTAMU’s encryption
functionality.
3.6.4 IoTAMU: Spoofer
The second primary function of IoTAMU is spoofing. By spoofing crafted wireless
frames, IoTAMU is able to deter device fingerprinting and pattern-of-life modeling of
the user. Beyer et al. performed an investigation of these capabilities via spoofing. In
their study, they were able to defeat their classifier and demonstrated the feasibility
of this technique being used to secure a wireless IoT network by spoofing hard-coded
packets based on the observed network signatures of specific devices.
This research extends their work through the development of the following func-
tionalities: (1) automatic classification of active and passive states of IoT devices,
(2) automatic generation of observed network signatures of the devices, and (3) ar-
tificial packet generation and spoofing algorithm that hardens the network against
data mining by uniquely modifying the observed network signatures of each device.
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The following sections describe a series of pilot studies that influenced the design and
implementation of each function.
3.6.4.1 Passive Network Sniffing
Before the spoofing algorithm can be implemented, the network patterns (e.g.,
MAC addresses, packet length) generated by the IoT devices must be analyzed. Using
the passive network sniffing capability provided by the aircrack-ng suite, a preliminary
network reconnaissance is performed.
First, an Alfa WNIC is connected to Laptop3 and set to monitor mode using
airmon-ng (Figure 16) with the command
airmon-ng start wlan1
Next, any interfering processes are killed via
airmon-ng check kill
As seen in Figure 17, an initial scan of the network using the command
airodump-ng wlan1mon
identified the SSID of interest (IoTAMU) as well as its BSSID (A4:C4:94:3E:20:9C).
Then, the network packets associated with the AP’s BSSID are captured on channel
six and saved for analysis (Figure 18) via
airodump-ng wlan1mon -c 6 -o pcap -w base --bssid a4c4943e209c
where -c specifies the channel (6) -o specifies the output file format (pcap), -w
specifies the output file prefix (base), and --bssid specifies the BSSID of the AP
(a4c4943e209c).
To isolate the traffic from each IoT device, separate captures are performed for
the following devices: Camera1, CameraTest, Camera3, LightBulb1, LightBulbTest,
LightBulb2, Switch1, SwitchTest, and Switch3. Each device type is composed of
two identical models and one other model to test whether the similarities in network
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Figure 16: Command used to set the WNIC to monitor mode.
Figure 17: Command used to identify the AP beacons that are broadcasting.
signatures of identical models can be identified. As shown in Table 5, the network
traffic of each device is captured for one minute; the duration is divided into three
equal time frames to sequentially capture the device’s passive state, active state, and
passive state, consisting of 20 seconds each. During each device’s active state, the
device is activated once and the remainder of the time frame allows it to return to its
passive state. Here, an ‘activation of device’ for switches and light bulbs is defined
as turning them on (devices are set to off before each run), and that of cameras is
defined as streaming the video feed for 10 seconds. Although not precise, the time
frames of the three states are generalized in 20-second windows to serve as ground
42
Figure 18: Command used to capture the wireless frames associated with the AP
with BSSID IoTAMU.
truth that can help define the device state classifications discussed in Section 3.6.4.3.
As shown in Table 5, during each capture, the sniffer is first run for 20 seconds to
capture the device’s passive state. At 20 seconds, the device is activated to capture
its active state. Finally, the device is allowed to return to its passive state and the
sniffer is stopped at 60 seconds.
Table 5: Timeline of Network Capture for Each Device
Time(sec) Device State Action
0 Passive Start sniffer
20 Active Activate device
40 Passive -
60 - Stop sniffer
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3.6.4.2 Preprocessing Data
After the network sniffing is complete, the captured pcap-formatted file needs to
be parsed for analysis. As seen in Figure 19, human-readable fields in the wireless
frames include the time, source and destination MAC addresses, protocol, and length.
It also specifies the type of frame including beacon, acknowledgement, and data.
This research focuses on the DATA frames where the source and the destination MAC
addresses of the packets are those of Router1, IoTAMU, or the IoT devices.
Figure 19: An example of the captured network traffic viewed in Wireshark.
To filter the capture file, a Python script (see Appendix G) extracts the following
packet information: (1) packet number, (2) time at which the packet was sniffed, (3)
direction (i.e., incoming/outgoing from IoT device’s perspective), (4) length, and (5)
Inter-arrival Time (IAT) of the incoming and outgoing packets. An IAT is defined
as the time in between the previous incoming/outgoing packet to the next arriving
incoming/outgoing packet, respectively. The script is run using the following com-
mand:
python3 preprocess.py [outputfile in csv format] [device name]
where [device name] is one of those listed in Table 4 (e.g., Camera1).
When the script is run, the packet information is parsed and filtered based on the
MAC addresses of the devices and separately saved in a csv file format. An example
of a preprocessed output for Switch1 is shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: A snippet of the preprocessed file for Switch1.
3.6.4.3 Device State Classification
While observing the network traffic patterns acquired after the preprocessing step,
it was hypothesized that the devices exhibit different traffic patterns in their active
and passive states. It was further hypothesized that the differences between the
two states among different devices would be valuable in device model classification.
The analyses in Sections 3.6.4.3 and 3.6.4.4 are performed using R version 3.5.0 (see
Appendix H).
Two different graphs are plotted for each device to determine the differentiating
factors between the two states (Figures 21 and 22). The first is a histogram of the
number of packets sent over time with a one second bin width; the second is a scatter
plot of the lengths of packets sent versus time in seconds. One particular example
where the activation window is well differentiated can be seen in Figure 21. In this
example from Camera1, around the 20 second mark both the number of packets sent
over time and the lengths of packets increase drastically. However, it can be observed
that there is around a five second window where small but significant increases for
both plots are observed before the sharp jumps in magnitude at times between 22 to
27 seconds. This window coincides with the loading time in the application after the
video feed is activated (i.e., play button is pressed in the application). Because the
device is actively exchanging data during this window, it is classified as ACTIVE for
the purpose of this research.
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Figure 21: Histogram of the number of packets sent over time (top) and scatter plot
of the length of packets sent (bottom) by Camera1.
In the second set of examples from LightBulb1 seen in Figure 22, the activation
window appeared to be indifferentiable from the rest. Because of the similarities in
the traffic patterns throughout, it is assumed that the IoT device’s state is stored in a
cloud server and its state is periodically checked by the device, rather than resulting
from direct communication with the RI. Further investigation of the protocol is out
of scope of this research. Although there is a lack of a definite activation window, it
can be construed as there being multiple periodic activation windows throughout.
When the devices are activated, all of their respective traffic patterns share the
following characteristics: presence of packets with increased payload length and in-
crease in the number packets sent over time (or shorter IAT). Although both of these
characteristics are important markers of the device’s activation states, because each
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Figure 22: Histogram of the number of packets sent over time (top) and scatter plot
of the length of packets sent (bottom) by LightBulb1.
histogram bin provides a discrete time interval, the number of packets sent is used
in this research to identify the device state information. If the number of packets
sent over time is used, two questions remain to be answered – how wide should the
bins be and how should the threshold that defines each state be set. Upon inspection
of the spread of the histograms, 0.5 second bin width is empirically determined as
an acceptable range that retains precision and the characteristics of the two different
states.
The second question is answered with the assumptions that the default state of the
devices is passive and that there would be significantly less packets exchanged during
this state. This assumption allows the use of outliers to define active states. Using
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each bin of the histogram as a data point, the outliers are defined by the inequality
Outlier > 1.5× IQR + Q3
IQR = Q3 −Q1
(4)
where IQR represents the interquartile range and Q1 and Q3 represents the first and
third quartiles of the data. Q1 and Q3 are found by taking the median of the first and
second half of the data, respectively. The resulting 0.5 second windows of the outliers
are labeled as the ACTIVE states of the device. Figure 23 shows the histograms of
Camera1 and LightBulb1 with bin widths of 0.5, where their respective active states
are highlighted in red. In the figures, the distinct active state window for Camera1 is
accurately labeled; all valid windows for LightBulb1 where packets were exchanged
is labeled as ACTIVE. The performance for LightBulb1 is deemed acceptable as it
was assumed that the device periodically communicated with the cloud server to
update its state. Furthermore, because the ultimate goal is identical device model
classification, even if portions of time frames are misidentified, as long as it remains
consistent across the like-model devices, it has little impact in the overall classification
algorithm.
3.6.4.4 Identical Device Model Classifier (IDMC)
As discussed in Section 2.6, previous efforts in classifying device type has produced
limited success. However, these results are to be expected from a highly diverse pool
of samples as that of IoT. Therefore, instead of device types, this research focuses on
investigating the feasibility of classifying identical model devices (i.e., devices with
same manufacturer and model number).
There are limited sources of variation that can be observed from encrypted wireless
frames, which include the source and destination MAC addresses, direction (from
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Figure 23: Histograms of the number of packets sent over time for Camera1 (top)
and LightBulb1 (bottom).
perspective of a particular device), length of the packets, and IAT. One of the easiest
sources of information in these packets is the first three bytes of a MAC address,
also known as the Organizational Unique Identifier (OUI). Unique sets of OUI are
specific to each vendor, prescribing a range of MAC addresses that can be assigned
to a device. Therefore, the manufacturer of a device can be easily determined by
looking up the OUI of the device via online tools such as that of Wireshark [52].
Although it is an important feature for identifying potentially identical devices, it can
be easily modified, and should not be the primary source of information. Therefore,
this research focuses on the variations in packet length and IAT that have been proven
as important features in classification studies on encrypted Wi-Fi traffic [4][36][53]. It
should be noted that the OUI can vary even if the devices are from the same vendor,
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and in some cases, identical models. For example, Switch1 and SwitchTest are
identical model devices with different OUIs. But, using the OUI lookup tool provided
by Wireshark does result in identical entries for both (BelkinIn Belkin International
Inc.).
Before variations in packet lengths are considered, the packets are divided into
four different states: (1) active, outgoing, (2) active, incoming, (3) passive, outgoing,
and (4) passive, incoming. The analyses in Section 3.6.4.3 have already shown that
the devices exhibit different traffic patterns in their active and passive states. It can
also be assumed that the outgoing and incoming traffic patterns are different because
they are generated by different devices (i.e., RI or IoT device). Then, the packets are
categorized based on their lengths in 200-byte increments up to 1600, to account for
a Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of 1500 bytes.
In addition, the variability introduced by the difference in activation windows
from human error and environment factors must be considered. For example, wireless
signals may be deformed or weakened, causing the device to retransmit the data, or
the video feeds may not be started and stopped at exact experimental parameters.
These factors cause an unintentional increase in traffic load that may change the
overall outcome of the classification. Therefore, rather than using the actual packet
counts as a statistic, the density of each packet-size window is calculated for each






Finally, the average IAT for each state is calculated by taking the mean of IAT
times in each state. For example, mean IAT for the active, outgoing state of a
device is calculated by first filtering its preprocessed file for the rows with OUTGOING
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entries and times that fall within the calculated ACTIVE histogram bins (as defined in
Section 3.6.4.3), then taking the mean of the IAT column. The calculated statistics
for each device is summarized in Table 6. Each feature (i.e., each row in the table) is
labeled using the following scheme:
Packet Density: [Packet Length][State] ex. [200][ActiveOut]
Averange IAT: [State]IAT ex. [ActiveOut]IAT
Using the computed statistics as the feature set, PCA is performed to identify
clusters of like devices. It was hypothesized that the network signatures from same
device models will be clustered significantly closer than others. The prcomp function
in the stats package for R is used to perform PCA. Table 7 shows the PCS values
derived from PCA, and Figure 24 shows the scree plot summarizing the percent
variations for each principal component. The first three components, accounting for
a total of 78% of variation, are used for visualization of the data in a 3-dimensional
plot shown in Figure 25. In the plot, the same colored points represent the same device
types (e.g., camera), and the same colored triangle shapes represent identical device
models (e.g., Belkin camera model F7D7602v2). As expected, the 3-D plot identifies
three distinct clusters composed of the same device models, with the identical switch
models (gray triangles) almost overlapping one another.
Next, a Similarity Score (SS) metric is devised to quantify the closeness of each
pair of devices. The SS for devicei and devicej is defined as




To calculate the SS, the euclidean distance between the PCSs of a pair of devices
(PCSdevicei) is first measured using the Pythagorean formula. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.5, the scores of the first principal components whose sum of percent variations
exceed 80% of the total are used to calculate the distances. In this particular case,
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Table 6: Summary of Packet Densities and Average IATs for Each IoT
C1 CT C3 LB1 LBT LB2 S1 ST S3
200ActiveOut 0.5066 0.1394 0.06122 0.9737 1 0.7541 0.2615 0.3429 0.7895
400ActiveOut 0.02203 0.002286 0.02041 0.02632 0 0.04918 0.1231 0.1 0.01754
600ActiveOut 0.03965 0.003429 0.04082 0 0 0 0.06154 0.05714 0.03509
800ActiveOut 0.008811 0.01714 0.02041 0 0 0.03279 0.03077 0.01429 0
1000ActiveOut 0.004405 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.01538 0.01429 0.1579
1200ActiveOut 0 0.01029 0.04082 0 0 0 0 0 0
1400ActiveOut 0 0 0.02041 0 0 0.1639 0 0 0
1600ActiveOut 0.4185 0.7874 0.7959 0 0 0 0.5077 0.4714 0
200ActiveIn 1 1 1 1 1 0.5455 0.9211 0.825 0.5192
400ActiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.02632 0.025 0.25
600ActiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0.03636 0.05263 0.05 0
800ActiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000ActiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0.07273 0 0.025 0.07692
1200ActiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1400ActiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0.03636 0 0 0.03846
1600ActiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0.1091 0 0.075 0.1154
ActiveOutIAT 0.04186 0.0118 0.01008 1.518 1.638 0.9672 0.3505 0.209 1.03
ActiveInIAT 0.06484 0.01699 0.01874 1.813 2.088 1.075 0.1592 0.1283 1.131
200PassiveOut 1 1 0.03132 0 0 0 0 0 0
400PassiveOut 0 0 0.01139 0 0 0 0 0 0
600PassiveOut 0 0 0.2342 0 0 0 0 0 0
800PassiveOut 0 0 0.1189 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000PassiveOut 0 0 0.07687 0 0 0 0 0 0
1200PassiveOut 0 0 0.06762 0 0 0 0 0 0
1400PassiveOut 0 0 0.03132 0 0 0 0 0 0
1600PassiveOut 0 0 0.4285 0 0 0 0 0 0
200PassiveIn 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
400PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
600PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
800PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1200PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1400PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1600PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PassiveOutIAT 1.815 1.547 0.03821 0 0 0 0 0 0
PassiveInIAT 3.796 3.43 0.05244 0 0 0 0 0 0
the first four components that sum to 91.2% are used. Calculated distances between
the selected PCSs from each pair is then divided by the maximum distance among
all unique pairs and subtracted from 1, resulting in a value ranging from 0 to 1. This
value is the similarity score, where a value closer to one indicates a higher resemblance
52
Table 7: PCS of Each Device (Pilot Study)
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9
C1 -1.14 3.581 -0.6427 -1.447 0.07939 1.173 -0.2782 -0.01733 -1.11e-16
CT -1.701 3.347 -0.8112 -1.864 0.4517 -1.112 0.2521 0.008741 -9.437e-16
C3 -7.499 -3.248 0.9035 -0.2354 -0.01025 0.07332 -0.01436 -0.0003797 6.384e-16
LB1 1.499 0.7236 2.848 1.19 0.1447 0.02927 0.08631 0.3893 1.277e-15
LBT 1.71 0.6869 3.454 1.088 0.2523 -0.09896 -0.01095 -0.347 4.441e-16
LB2 3.12 -2.806 -1.354 -0.9193 2.73 0.1094 0.0006459 0.001694 -1.388e-15
S1 0.04711 0.2703 -2.305 2.866 -0.4113 -0.3743 -0.7763 0.002643 -1.11e-16
ST 0.5916 -0.1862 -2.114 1.873 -0.9178 0.3162 0.9242 -0.04451 2.498e-16
S3 3.373 -2.369 0.02134 -2.551 -2.319 -0.1156 -0.1835 0.006791 -2.776e-16
PC: principal component
Figure 24: The percentage of variation accounted by each principal component.
in the pair’s network signature. Table 8 provides a summary of the SS for each pairs
of devices. As hypothesized, the scores for the same model devices with values 0.9324,
0.9418, and 0.8895 (highlighted in bold) are significantly higher than those of others.
3.6.4.5 Spoofer Implementation
One of the first steps in implementing the spoofer is generating the packets to
be spoofed. As discussed in Section 2.6, this research creates artificial packets that
mimic the signatures of the underlying network to defeat data mining through sta-
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Figure 25: Visualization of the first three principal components of the nine IoT de-
vices.
Table 8: Summary of Similarity Scores for Each IoT Pair
C1 CT C3 LB1 LBT LB2 S1 ST
CT 0.9324
C3 0.1475 0.1869
LB1 0.4767 0.4357 0.09465
LBT 0.4367 0.3962 0.06858 0.9418
LB2 0.3091 0.2945 0.02671 0.4548 0.4253
S1 0.4807 0.4552 0.1555 0.4968 0.4398 0.4776
ST 0.5073 0.4833 0.1595 0.5377 0.4815 0.5842 0.8895
S3 0.3225 0.3099 0 0.4706 0.4553 0.8040 0.3505 0.4589
tistical analyses. Generating the packets from the existing signatures first requires
a training stage where the current network must be monitored. This is completed
in Section 3.6.4.4 where Table 6 containing the packet densities and average IATs
of the devices is generated. Next, using the R script provided in Appendix I, the
entries for IAT are transformed into log scale to better capture the variance from fea-
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tures that are orders of magnitudes smaller. Then, a covariance matrix is calculated
from the data, which is in turn used to generate a pool of samples that resemble the
signatures of the original data using the mvrnorm function from the MASS package
in R. Because the new data is generated from random sampling from a multivariate
normal distribution, negative numbers may be produced. For the IAT entries, undo-
ing the log transformation rescales the negative numbers into positive numbers. For
packet density features, if a negative number is generated for a certain feature (e.g.,
200ActiveOut), a value twice the magnitude of the minimum within the feature is
added to the original data. Since the relative distances between the values within
each feature does not change from this operation, the rescaling does not affect their
variance. Lastly, because the packet length statistics capture the density within each
state (as defined in Section 3.6.4.4), values for each state are rescaled such that their
sum is equal to one. This is accomplished by taking the original value and dividing
by the sum of the values in the state it belongs (e.g., ActiveOut). Nine samples of
the Artificially Generated Packet Signatures (AGPS) are shown in Table 9.
The spoofer functionality of IoTAMU, implemented in Python version 3.5.2 (see
Appendix D), uses the AGPS to inject spoofed packets to conceal the existing net-
work signatures. Algorithm 1 displays pseudocode describing the implementation of
the spoofer. The spoofer takes as input the table of AGPS in CSV file format. It first
creates a thread for each sample that is being spoofed. Each sample is defined by a
unique set of network signatures (i.e., packet length density information, average IAT
for different states). Then, they are assigned a MAC address of one of the existing
devices in the network and either a passive or an active state with probabilities 90%
and 10%, respectively. This is done to designate the devices’ predominant state as
passive. For each of the incoming and outgoing directions, the following information
is configured. First, the duration of the segment to be spoofed is chosen at ran-
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dom between 5 and 15 seconds (defined as Duration). This value is then divided
by the IAT for the particular state and direction to calculate the number of packets
in the segment (defined as NumberOfPackets). Then, the number of times the seg-
ment is repeated is chosen between 5 and 15 (defined as NumberOfRepeat). Finally,
NumberOfPackets different packet lengths for a segment are chosen and stored in a
list (PacketList), by sampling from a list of packet lengths windows (i.e., 0 to 200,
200 to 400, etc.), using the density statistics from the AGPS as their respective prob-
abilities. PacketList, IAT, and NumberOfRepeat are passed on to two subthreads
(one for each direction) that perform the actual spoofing via Scapy. After spoofing
each packet in PacketList, the subthread sleeps for the duration of the IAT, and the
list is repeated NumberOfRepeat times. Once the subthreads are joined, the thread for
the particular AGPS sleeps for a random duration between 5 to 10 seconds, and the
process is repeated with a selection of a passive or an active state. All duration pa-
rameters and passive/active state probabilities are empirically determined from pilot
studies; optimizations of these parameters are out of scope of this research. Ulti-
mately, the goal of the spoofer is to uniquely modify the observed network signatures
for each device to decrease the likelihood of unwanted leakage of information.
3.7 Summary
This chapter discusses the architecture of IoTAMU and the network setup of
this research. It also describes how each component of IoTAMU is implemented
in detail. Proposed components of IoTAMU provide applications of how PNP-style
remote computing agents can be utilized to provide additional security. In addition,
its spoofing functionality offers a prototype mechanism that can be used to conceal the
device specific patterns of unencrypted fields in encrypted wireless communications.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudocode Implementation of Spoofer
1: function main(NetworkSignatures)








10: State← [PASSIV E|ACTIV E] with probability (90%, 10%)
11: for Direction in [INCOMING,OUTGOING] do
12: Duration← random(5, 15)
13: NumberOfPackets← Duration/IAT
14: NumberOfRepeat← random(5, 15)
15: PacketList←
16: repeat(Sample(200, 400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600) with proba-
bility (density statistics for State and Direction from Signatures))








25: function Spoof(PacketList, IAT,NumberOfRepeat)
26: repeat









Table 9: Summary of Artificially Generated Packet Signatures
Samples
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
200ActiveOut 0.3941 0.5047 0.3954 0.3186 0.3973 0.4197 0.4664 0.4565 0.4369
400ActiveOut 0.05263 0.09548 0.0545 0.07073 0.06237 0.05618 0.08411 0.06421 0.06613
600ActiveOut 0.1148 0.06482 0.1134 0.1215 0.1084 0.1069 0.08011 0.09385 0.09722
800ActiveOut 0.01299 0.003034 0.01254 0.008207 0.01062 0.01224 0.005634 0.01045 0.009892
1000ActiveOut 0.02561 0.02116 0.02569 0.03338 0.02633 0.02394 0.02304 0.02183 0.02357
1200ActiveOut 0.09734 0.1559 0.1003 0.1366 0.1133 0.1002 0.1414 0.1093 0.1148
1400ActiveOut 0.002695 0.0009194 0.002642 0.002794 0.002444 0.002433 0.001453 0.001989 0.00208
1600ActiveOut 0.2999 0.154 0.2955 0.3081 0.2793 0.2784 0.1978 0.2419 0.2494
200ActiveIn 0.67 0.8024 0.6772 0.776 0.7091 0.6742 0.7709 0.6925 0.7084
400ActiveIn 0.2505 0.1218 0.2442 0.1726 0.217 0.243 0.1542 0.2219 0.2115
600ActiveIn 0.01424 0.01351 0.01406 0.008614 0.01312 0.0149 0.01331 0.01546 0.01436
800ActiveIn 0.01697 0.01623 0.01678 0.01134 0.01585 0.01763 0.01604 0.01819 0.01708
1000ActiveIn 0.005523 0.005523 0.005523 0.005523 0.005523 0.005523 0.005523 0.005523 0.005523
1200ActiveIn 0.01642 0.01569 0.01624 0.01079 0.0153 0.01708 0.01549 0.01764 0.01654
1400ActiveIn 0.0157 0.01496 0.01551 0.01007 0.01458 0.01635 0.01477 0.01691 0.01581
1600ActiveIn 0.01068 0.009947 0.0105 0.005055 0.009563 0.01134 0.009753 0.0119 0.0108
ActiveOutIAT 1.687 1.458 1.488 0.02692 0.7857 2.884 1.125 4.795 2.101
ActiveInIAT 1.517 1.349 1.431 0.2313 1.064 1.923 1.217 2.392 1.647
200PassiveOut 0.5174 0.6587 0.5266 0.6809 0.5681 0.5151 0.6288 0.5279 0.5551
400PassiveOut 0.4826 0.3413 0.4734 0.3191 0.4319 0.4849 0.3712 0.4721 0.4449
600PassiveOut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
800PassiveOut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000PassiveOut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1200PassiveOut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1400PassiveOut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1600PassiveOut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
200PassiveIn 0.9672 0.9824 0.9677 0.9664 0.9694 0.9695 0.9778 0.9732 0.9725
400PassiveIn 0.03277 0.01765 0.03232 0.03362 0.03063 0.03054 0.02219 0.02676 0.02753
600PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
800PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1200PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1400PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1600PassiveIn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PassiveOutIAT 2.794 1.186 2.527 0.2258 1.563 3.477 1.272 3.93 2.454




The experiments in this research seek to evaluate the effectiveness of injecting
packets generated using AGPS in modifying the observed signatures of devices. Fur-
thermore, they attempt to measure the negative impact of the additional packets
generated in contributing to network congestion. Ultimately, the experiments evalu-
ate IoTAMU’s ability to obscure the existing patterns of network signatures to deter
information extraction from the encrypted fields in the current Wi-Fi standards. This
is accomplished by measuring IDMC’s performance in a controlled IoT network, and
comparing with its performance in a spoofed network. In summary, this research has
the following main objectives:
1. Measure the accuracy of a classifier in identifying devices of identical models
from their network signatures.
2. Determine the effectiveness of a spoofing algorithm in changing the observed
network signatures of pre-existing devices.
3. Examine the impact on network congestion from the additional traffic created
by the spoofer.
The results of this research help identify an area of information leakage from encrypted
Wi-Fi communications and provide a potential solution to mitigate this vulnerability.
4.2 System Under Test
The System Under Test (SUT) and Components Under Test (CUT) for this re-
search is depicted in Figure 26. This research examines the effect of IoTAMU on
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different observable network statistics. The CUT for this experiment are the IDMC
and the spoofer. Section 4.3 summarizes the assumptions made throughout the ex-
periment. Next, the Wi-Fi traffic collected, or the uncontrolled variable in this ex-
periment, is described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 examines the different experimental
parameters including the physical layout of the experiment and the number of devices.
Then, Section 4.6 describes the response variables, or metrics, consisting of the identi-
cal device model classification, network latency, the number of packets dropped, total
packet count, and the network throughput. The IoTAMU status and device events,
discussed in Section 4.7, are the main controlled variables for this experiment. Finally,
Section 4.8 concludes this chapter with a discussion of the experimental design.
Figure 26: Diagram depicting the System Under Test and Components Under Test
of the experiment.
4.3 Assumptions
The following assumptions are made throughout the design and the execution of
the experiment.
1. The duration and the sequence of device activation performed in this experiment
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are reflective of a real smart home environment.
2. The relative locations of the devices in the smart home models those in a real
smart home environment.
3. The external and internal networks abstracted in the network setup of the ex-
periment models the actual flow of information between an IoT device and the
RI.
4. Network sniffing in this experiment is conducted on the same device as IoTAMU
using an external WNIC. It is assumed that the network traffic observed under
a more realistic scenario (i.e., using a separate device from farther distance) is
similar to that of the experiment. This assumption is substantiated through
previous work by Beyer et al. [3].
5. The eavesdropper has enough prior knowledge about the network to sniff the
Wi-Fi traffic, including the SSID, and the channel of the AP.
6. The network interference between the devices and from environmental factors
are negligible.
4.4 Uncontrolled Variables
Although efforts are made in the network setup to isolate the Wi-Fi communica-
tions as much as possible, interference from environmental factors that cause degra-
dation of signals remain. However, it is assumed that this interference is negligible
and does not have a significant impact on the experiment results.
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4.5 Experimental Parameters
The following variables are held constant throughout the experiment to limit the
source of variability caused by external factors. Detailed descriptions of the variables
are provided in Section 4.8.
• Device Types: The device types, including their models and manufacturers,
remain constant throughout the experiment (see Table 3).
• Number of Devices: The number of devices remains constant throughout the
experiment.
• Device Location: The location of the devices are held constant throughout
the experiment.
• Event Duration: The duration of each activation event remains constant
throughout the experiment.
• Event Interval: The interval between each activation event remains constant
throughout the experiment.
• Sniffer Location: Sniffing is performed on the same device where IoTAMU is
implemented; its location remains constant throughout the experiment.
• Remote Interface: The device for the remote interface as well as its location
remain constant throughout the experiment.
4.6 Metrics
The overall objective of this experiment is to measure the effects of IoTAMU’s
spoofer on the existing network. Its ability to obscure the existing network signatures
of the devices is indirectly measured through the lowered accuracy of IDMC. Its effect
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on network congestion is determined by measuring the added network latency and
the number of packets dropped from the added traffic. Detailed descriptions of the
response metrics as they pertain to each objective is provided below.
1. Objective 1: Measure the accuracy of a classifier in identifying devices of
identical models from their network signatures.
Identical Device Model Classification: The following metrics are clustered
under “Identical Device Model Classification” (as seen in Figure 26); they are
used to calculate the classification status:
• True Positives (TP): The TP metric quantifies the number of correctly
classified identical model pairs exceeding the SS threshold.
• True Negatives (TN): The TN metric quantifies the number of correctly
classified nonidentical model pairs below the SS threshold.
• False Positives (FP): The FP metric quantifies the number of incorrectly
classified nonidentical model pairs exceeding the SS threshold.
• False Negatives (FN): The FN metric quantifies the number of incor-
rectly classified identical model pairs below the SS threshold.
2. Objective 2: Determine the effectiveness of a spoofing algorithm in changing
the observed network signatures of pre-existing devices.
• Same response variables as those of Objective 1 are used to measure the
change in their values before and after the addition of the spoofer in the
experiment.
3. Objective 3: Examine the impact on network congestion from the additional
traffic created by the spoofer.
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• Network Latency (NL): The NL metric, measured in seconds, repre-
sents the time it takes to send a message from an IoT device and receive
a response back from its RI.
• Packets Dropped (PD): The PD metric quantifies the number of re-
sponses from the RI not received by the IoT device, for each packet gen-
erated by the IoT device. Although either the initial packet generated by
the IoT device or the response from the RI can be dropped, either or both
events count as one drop event for this metric.
• Packet Count (PC): The PC metric is the total number of data packets
observed in the network. It is used to estimate the number of packets
generated by IoTAMU for each sample spoofed.
• Network Throughput (NT): The NT metric is the rate at which data
is sent over the network. It is used to estimate the amount of data that is
generated by IoTAMU per second for each sample spoofed. NT is calcu-
lated by dividing the total amount of observed data from all packets (bits)
by the duration of the capture (seconds).
4.7 Treatments
The main components that are varied in the experiment are the IoTAMU Status,
the order in which the devices are activated (labeled Events), and the SS Threshold.
Table 10 provides a summary of the three treatments and their levels. IoTAMU Status
is defined as the number of samples spoofed by IoTAMU and Events are defined as
the predefined orders in which the devices are activated for each run. The specific
orders of device activation are discussed in Section 4.8.2.1. Data from the three runs
are pooled into one for calculation of overall performance metrics. SS is a measure of
confidence from 0 to one, with a value closer to one conveying a stronger confidence,
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that determines whether the packet signatures observed from two devices are those of
identical models. Its derivation from the euclidian distance of the PCS as discussed
in Section 3.6.4.4 is reproduced below.
SS(devicei, devicej) = 1−
distance(PCSdevicei , PCSdevicej)
maxi,j∈n(distance(PCSdevicei , PCSdevicej))
Two network signatures are considered to be from identical models if their SS value
exceeds a predefined threshold.
Three separate experiments are conducted to meet each of the objectives. The first
experiment measures classifier accuracy; therefore, 0 samples are spoofed by IoTAMU.
The second experiment investigates spoofing effectiveness and uses 11 or 120 spoofed
samples. The third experiment examines network congestion resulting from spoofed
packets; 0 to 120 samples are spoofed in increments of 10. There are no events varied
for the third experiment; all the devices are set to run in their passive states. Instead,
each level of IoTAMU status is repeated three times and the resulting data are pooled
into one for calculation of overall performance metrics. Three different SS thresholds
are used in experiments 1 and 2 to classify identical model pairs: 0.9, 0.8, and 0.7.
These values are chosen around the observed SS values of identical model pairs (see
Section 3.6.4.4).
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Experiment 1: classifier accuracy, Experiment 2: spoofing effectiveness,
Experiment 3: network congestion
4.8 Experimental Design
The pipelines of the three experiments are depicted in Figure 27, which are dis-































Figure 28 depicts the relative locations of the devices in the experiment. These
locations remain unchanged throughout the three experiments.
Figure 28: The relative locations of the devices in the experiment.
4.8.2 Experiment 1: Measuring the Performance of IDMC
The first experiment is conducted to measure the baseline performance of the
IDMC. It is measured through its ability to correctly classify both identical and
nonidentical device models; its overall performance metrics are calculated by pooling
the data gathered from the three runs in this experiment. Network configuration 1
described in Figure 8 is used in experiment 1.
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4.8.2.1 Data Collection Process
First, to set up a baseline network state, the 11 IoT devices are turned on and
activated once from the RI (Phone1) before being left to run in their passive states for
five minutes. This is performed before each run to create a consistent behavior for the
devices. After reaching their steady states, the IoT devices are assigned predefined
orders to be activated for three different runs as shown in Table 11. Similar to the
pilot studies discussed in Section 3.6.4, the devices are manually activated in one
minute intervals. During each run, the sniffer is set to run for 55 seconds before the
first RI application is opened. At the 55th second of each minute, the application is
opened, allowing five seconds of buffer time for the application to load on the RI. At
the 0th second of each minute, the IoT devices are activated in the predetermined
order. Here, ‘activation of device’ for switches and light bulbs is defined as turning
them on (devices are set to off before each run), and that of cameras is defined as
streaming the video feed for 15 seconds. After the activation of the last device in
each run, the sniffer is turned off at the 12th minute. A detailed timeline of each run
is available in Appendix J.
4.8.2.2 Data Analysis
Once the pcap files are created from the network capture, they are passed into the
preprocessing script as described in Section 3.6.4.2. Its outputs (csv-formatted files)
are used to generate the packet signatures in R (see Appendix K). First, the data from
the three runs are pooled into one set to be analyzed. Then timestamps in the data
are recalculated to represent a relative time since the observation of the first packet
during each run. 720 and 1440 seconds are added to the recalculated timestamps for
runs two and three respectively, to stagger the three runs into one time-series data.
To generate the signatures, each packet is assigned a device state (see Section 3.6.4.3),
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Table 11: Order of Device Activation
No. Run 1 Run 2 Run 3
1 SwitchTest LightBulb1 LightBulb2
2 Switch3 SwitchTest Switch2
3 Camera1 Camera2 Camera3
4 LightBulbTest LightBulbTest Switch1
5 CameraTest Switch3 CameraTest
6 Switch1 Camera3 SwitchTest
7 Lightbulb2 Lightbulb2 LightBulb1
8 Camera3 Camera1 LightBulbTest
9 Switch2 Switch2 Camera1
10 Camera2 Switch1 Switch3
11 LightBulb1 CameraTest Camera2
then the packet signatures for each state (e.g., density of packet lengths, IAT) are
generated. Finally, PCA is performed on the signatures to generate the PCS; the first
principal components whose sum of variations account for at least 80% of the total
variation are used to calculate the SS (see Section 3.6.4.4). Three different thresholds
for SS, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9, are used to define a positive classification event. Next, the
number of TP, TN, FP, and FN are first determined by using SS thresholds only,
then they are cross validated with the OUI information for each device. For example,
in the second set of results, device pairs with SS values above the threshold but with
different OUIs will be classified as a negative event (i.e., non-identical models).
4.8.2.3 Performance Metric
Metrics used to determine the performance of IDMC are precision, recall, and
specificity.
• Precision: It is the percentage of IDMC’s positive identical-model classifica-
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tions that are actually positive. Precision is defined by
Precision =
TP
(TP + FP )
× 100 (7)
• Recall: It measures the percentage of all of the identical-model pairs that are





• Specificity: It measures the percentage of all of the non-identical-model pairs
that are identified by IDMC. Specificity is defined by
Specificity =
TN
(TN + FP )
× 100 (9)
4.8.3 Experiment 2: Measuring the Effectiveness of IoTAMU’s Spoof-
ing Capability
The second experiment measures the IoTAMU’s ability to change the observed
packet signatures of IoT devices. Two different methods are used to estimate its
effectiveness. Using the same metrics as that of the first experiment, the first method
measures IDMC’s performance in the spoofer-enabled network. The second method
calculates the change in the pairwise distances between devices from the PCS of the
devices. Network configuration 1 described in Figure 8 is used in experiment 2.
4.8.3.1 Data Collection Process
Data collection is performed using the same methodology as that of the first
experiment with the addition of the spoofer. Two different configurations of the
spoofer are investigated, with three runs performed at each configuration. The first
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configuration spoofs AGPS of 11 samples to test IoTAMU at its minimum settings
(one sample spoofed for each device in the network), and the latter spoofs 120 AGPS
to test its maximum setting (120 is the maximum number of samples that can be
reliably spoofed using the experiment setup, without exceeding the maximum number
of threads or running out of memory). As discussed in Section 3.6.4.5, the AGPS
are created by sampling from a multivariate normal distribution with the covariance
matrix generated from the packet signatures of the existing network. For each run of
experiment 2, a unique set of AGPS is calculated from the packet signatures obtained
during experiment 1. Before the sniffer is started for each run, the spoofer is run for
five seconds to allow it to fully initialize; the rest of the experiment follows the same
sequence of events as defined in Section 4.8.2.
4.8.3.2 Performance Metric
The first set of metrics used for the experiment is the same as those of the first
experiment. Differences in IDMC’s precision, recall, and specificity from those calcu-
lated in the baseline network indicate a change in the packet signatures of the IoT
devices.
Additionally, if the spoofing algorithm is working as intended, it should change the
observed signatures of the IoT devices such that there are greater differences between
each pair. To quantify this change, the following metric is used:
• Pairwise Signature Distance (PSD): PSD measures the euclidean distances
between the PCS of a pair of device signatures. Because the distance values
are used in SS to calculate the degree of similarity between pairs of devices, an
increase in PSD directly translates to greater differences in the observed packet
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signatures. PSD for devicei and devicej is simply defined by
PSD(devicei, devicej) = distance(PCSdevicei , PCSdevicej) (10)
where PCS is the set of PCS of first principal components whose sum of vari-
ations add up to at least 80% of the total variation.
Lastly, the calculated PSD from the baseline network (from experiment 1), and
those with 11 and 120 spoofed samples is used in Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to
determine whether there is a statistically significant difference in their mean distances.
A p-value threshold of 0.05 is used.
4.8.4 Experiment 3: Measuring IoTAMU’s Impact on Network Con-
gestion
Experiment 3 measures the potential negative effects of injecting additional pack-
ets into the network. NL, PD, PC, and NT measured during a simulated commu-
nication between a client and a server are the metrics used in this experiment. As
discussed in Section 4.7, each level of IoTAMU status is repeated three times. Then,
the results from three trials are combined and used in ANOVA to determine whether
there are significant differences in both NL and PD for increasing number of devices
spoofed. Network configuration 2 described in Figure 9 is used for experiment 3,
where Laptop1 and Laptop2 are posed as an IoT device and its RI, respectively.
4.8.4.1 Data Collection Process
This experiment compares the congestion metrics acquired from networks with
increasing amounts of spoofed traffic. A pair of UDP server and client scripts written
in Python are used to help measure the NL and PD (see Appendix L). The 11 IoT
devices used in experiments 1 and 2 are left to run in their steady states throughout
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the experiment. While the spoofer is running, the client (Laptop1) generates a series
of 50 packets with payload content ranging from 0 to 49 (which serve as sequence
numbers), and sends to the server. Upon receiving the packet, the server (Laptop2)
replies with the same payload content to serve as an acknowledgement. The duration
in seconds for the client to send a packet and receive the appropriate response from
the server is recorded as the NL (output of congestion cli.py). A timeout period
of two seconds is set while the client waits for the response to account for any packets
dropped due to network congestion. At the end of the test, total number of dropped
packets is calculated by subtracting the number of received packets from the number
of expected packets (50).
The timeline of events for each treatment is shown in Table 12. To measure the
congestion statistics for the baseline network (i.e., 11 IoT devices running in steady
states with 0 spoofed samples), the sniffer is started and run for 15 seconds before
the server and client scripts are run on the respective laptops. The two scripts are
run via the commands:
python3 congestion srv.py
python3 congestion cli.py
where the server script is run first before running the client script. 15 seconds after
starting the sniffer, the UDP scripts are run, exchanging 50 request and response
pairs; 15 seconds after the scripts are run, the sniffer is stopped, completing the
capture. Subsequent treatments involve spoofing samples in increments of 10 on top
of the baseline network, up to 120 samples. As previously mentioned, the number of
samples that can be spoofed is limited by IoTAMU’s implementation. To create the
120 AGPS to be spoofed, the covariance matrix calculated from the overall packet
signatures acquired in experiment 1 is used. Each treatment spoofing N devices uses
the first N entries from the list of AGPS. This causes an overlap in the signatures
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that are spoofed between the treatments, resulting in a more consistent outcome.
Capturing the data for the spoofer-enabled treatments uses the same method as the
one used to capture the baseline network, with the addition of a five second window
where the spoofer is initialized before the sniffer is started. The pcap-formatted
output files from the sniffer are preprocessed as discussed in Section 3.6.4.2; the
resulting csv-formatted files are used to visualize the PC and the throughput at
increasing number of samples spoofed.
Table 12: Timeline of Events for Each Treatment in Experiment 3
Time(sec)
Number of Samples Spoofed
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
0 - Start spoofer
5 Start capture
20 Start server/client scripts
35 End capture/stop spoofer
4.8.4.2 Performance Metric
After the NL measurements are acquired, ANOVA is performed to determine
whether a statistically significant difference in the mean NL times exists between the
networks with increasing amounts of spoofed samples. Because the network inter-
ference from environmental factors are assumed to be negligible, data from all three
trials are pooled into one. Then, NL, PD, PC, and NT are compared at each number
of samples spoofed to visualize the amount of traffic introduced from each additional
sample and their effect on congestion.
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4.9 Methodology Summary
This chapter provides the methodology used to measure the performance of the
spoofing capability of IoTAMU. The differences in precision, recall, and specificity of
IDMC with and without spoofing enabled is used to measure IoTAMU’s effectiveness.
To quantify the change in network signatures caused by spoofing, PSD is calculated
between each pair of devices. Lastly, IoTAMU’s potential impact on network con-
gestion is estimated though NL, PD, PC, and NT statistics acquired from spoofing
increasing number of devices.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Overview
This chapter presents the results obtained from the experiments as described in
Chapter IV. The following sections discuss the results from each experiment. Sec-
tion 5.2 describes the performance of IDMC in a baseline network. Its performance
with the spoofer enabled is discussed in Section 5.3 to determine the effectiveness of
IoTAMU’s spoofing capability. Lastly, the network congestion metrics are examined
in Section 5.4 evaluate the spoofer’s effect on the existing network.
5.2 Performance of IDMC (Experiment 1)
This section evaluates the performance of IDMC through its precision, recall, and
specificity. The results are calculated using the R script provided in Appendix M.
Figure 29 shows a 3-D scatter plot of the first three PCS of each device. Raw PCS
calculated in experiments 1 and 2 are provided in Appendix N. The three principal
components shown are responsible for 70% of the total variation in the data. Each
device type is assigned a unique color, and the identical models within each type are
denoted as triangles. Three distinct clusters are identified in the graph, each consist-
ing of identical model pairs (i.e., triangles of same color), with identical light bulb
models (blue triangles) almost completely overlapping one another. This indicates a
high probability that the clustered devices are identical models, which is quantified
via the SS.
The overall SS values calculated from the PCS is summarized in Table 13. The
bolded values indicate the scores of actual identical model pairs, (Camera1, CameraTe-
st), (LightBulb1, LightBulbTest), and (Switch1, SwitchTest), with values 0.9532,
0.9968, and 0.9511, respectively. Based on three different thresholds, the SS values
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Figure 29: Visualization of the first three principal components of the 11 devices
(Experiment 1).
are used to calculate the performance metrics.
Table 13: Summary of SS for Each IoT Pair (Experiment 1)
C1 CT C2 C3 LB1 LBT LB2 S1 ST S2
CT 0.9532
C2 0.23 0.1983
C3 0.4596 0.4405 0.2379
LB1 0.6956 0.6835 0.07828 0.5805
LBT 0.6964 0.6842 0.07931 0.5819 0.9968
LB2 0.4512 0.4265 0.03666 0.3384 0.4879 0.4906
S1 0.752 0.774 0.1179 0.2995 0.516 0.5175 0.4392
ST 0.7478 0.7734 0.1232 0.3212 0.5171 0.5187 0.4207 0.9511
S2 0.2807 0.287 0.0738 0.2999 0.1799 0.1826 0.2355 0.3784 0.4136
S3 0.4507 0.4262 0 0.2715 0.4782 0.4804 0.8923 0.4387 0.4125 0.1553
Table 14 shows the corresponding performance metrics at each threshold SS value
with and without cross validation with OUI. While significant changes are observed
in IDMC’s precision across the threshold values, its recall and specificity are consis-
tently high, with 100% recall and >90% specificity throughout. This indicates that
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Table 14: IDMC Performance Metrics at Each Threshold Value
OUI Threshold TP TN FP FN Prec% Recall% Spec%
NO >0.7 3 47 5 0 37.5 100 90.38
NO >0.8 3 51 1 0 75 100 98.08
NO >0.9 3 52 0 0 100 100 100
YES >0.7 3 47 5 0 37.5 100 90.38
YES >0.8 3 51 1 0 75 100 98.08
YES >0.9 3 52 0 0 100 100 100
TP: true positives, TN: true negatives, FP: false positives, FN: false negatives,
Prec: precision, Spec: specificity
IDMC is able to correctly identify all identical models at high SS thresholds, and
lowering the threshold yields more FPs. At the >0.9 threshold, IDMC successfully
identifies all three out of three identical-model pairs with no FP, yielding 100% pre-
cision. As expected, each step of the lowered threshold levels introduces additional
FPs, decreasing both precision and specificity. Precision of IDMC suffers the largest,
dropping as low as 37.5% at 0.7 threshold. However, the significant changes in pre-
cision across the different threshold levels are reflective of the small number of the
actual positive classifications compared to that of actual negative classifications, and
does not necessarily reflect poorly on IDMC’s performance. Overall, IDMC performs
better at higher thresholds, and its 100% performance metrics measured at the >0.9
threshold is indicative of its reliability as a classifier.
The pairs that are identified as FP are (Switch3, LightBulb2) at threshold >0.8,
(Camera1, Switch1), (Camera2, Switch1), (Camera1, SwitchTest), and (Camera2,
SwitchTest) at threshold >0.7. Because all FP pairs are from the same vendors,
validating the classification results with OUI does not produce any changes in results.
The similarities between the two TP-Link devices Switch3 and LightBulb2 are to
be expected, as they are both instantaneously activated devices with two different
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states (on/off) from the same vendor. It is likely that the same protocols are used
to activate the devices, resulting in similar network signatures. Similarly, the four
additional FPs introduced at >0.7 threshold are from the same vendor and are likely
to use similar network protocols. On the contrary, the two different switch models
from Belkin (Switch1/SwitchTest and Switch2) have fingerprints that greatly differ
from each other (SS ≈ 0.4). These results demonstrate IDMC’s ability to differentiate
the nonidentical model devices from the same manufacturer that likely use similar
network protocols.
5.3 Effectiveness of IoTAMU’s Spoofing Capability (Experiment 2)
This section discusses IoTAMU’s ability to modify the observed network finger-
prints of the devices. The changes in observed network signatures across the treat-
ments of Camera1, CameraTest, LightBulb1, and LightBulbTest are illustrated in
Figures 30 and 31. Those of other devices are available in Appendix O. Histograms
on the left under each device show the number of packets observed over time with
bin widths of 0.5 seconds. The time frames classified as ACTIVE, and PASSIVE by
IDMC are denoted in red and blue, respectively. On the other side are scatter plots
indicating the lengths of packets received over time. The first row under each device
shows the distributions observed in the network without spoofing (from experiment
1), and subsequent rows depict networks with 11 and 120 samples spoofed, respec-
tively. The sharp increases in the number of packets sent during the active states
of cameras are retained in the spoofed networks. However, increasing the number of
spoofed samples better masks the underlying network patterns of the devices overall,
each device displaying a unique pattern of added signatures (i.e., different patterns
are observed comparing the plots across the same rows of each device). Furthermore,
the network patterns observed in baseline network are completely masked for all light
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bulb models, Switch2, and Switch3 by the additional frames generated by spoofing
120 samples.
Two different sets of metrics are used to quantify the observed changes in network
signatures: The same metrics as that of experiment 1 are used to observe the decline
in IDMC’s performance in a spoofed network, and PSD is calculated for each pair of
devices to measure the relative changes in network fingerprints. An overall PSD is
calculated for the network by taking an average of all device pairs.
5.3.1 IDMC Performance
Figures 32 and 33 illustrate the relative positions of the devices using the first three
principal components derived from the networks with 11 and 120 samples spoofed,
respectively. Compared to the distribution observed in Figure 29 from experiment 1,
the clusters are less defined. Although the signatures of Switch1 and SwitchTest
remains relatively close in Figure 32, those of other identical-model devices show
significant changes. The observed differences are quantified through SS in Tables 15







































































































































Figure 32: Visualization of the first three principal components in the network with
11 spoofed samples (Experiment 2).
Table 15: Summary of SS for Each IoT Pair (Experiment 2: 11 Spoofed Samples)
C1 CT C2 C3 LB1 LBT LB2 S1 ST S2
CT 0.8712
C2 0.4461 0.5568
C3 0.3588 0.3806 0.4616
LB1 0.2385 0.1675 0 0.1138
LBT 0.5216 0.4385 0.1988 0.4502 0.443
LB2 0.1608 0.146 0.05757 0.09556 0.06243 0.3193
S1 0.7601 0.7099 0.4439 0.5624 0.3025 0.6854 0.2011
ST 0.7786 0.6967 0.3452 0.4409 0.2094 0.6237 0.1431 0.8369
S2 0.7247 0.6322 0.2811 0.4187 0.2355 0.6673 0.1487 0.8085 0.9146
S3 0.2473 0.1932 0.05201 0.1724 0.1451 0.3345 0.05872 0.2987 0.2814 0.2538
Performance statistics for IDMC in both networks are summarized in Table 17. At
the highest threshold, IDMC fails to identify any of the actual identical model devices,
while one FP is identified in the network with 11 spoofed samples. The identified FP
pair (SwitchTest, Switch2) saw an increase of roughly 0.5 in SS compared to that of
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Figure 33: Visualization of the first three principal components in the network with
120 spoofed samples (Experiment 2).
Table 16: Summary of SS for Each IoT Pair (Experiment 2: 120 Spoofed Samples)
C1 CT C2 C3 LB1 LBT LB2 S1 ST S2
CT 0.7209
C2 0.2525 0.2424
C3 0.1841 0.1569 0.1288
LB1 0.4959 0.2932 0.2978 0.2009
LBT 0.4141 0.2326 0.06596 0.0208 0.6355
LB2 0.3229 0.2833 0.04924 0.07434 0.4483 0.4597
S1 0.6427 0.5194 0.314 0.2891 0.594 0.5216 0.3366
ST 0.6802 0.4946 0.2568 0.2436 0.6847 0.6109 0.3968 0.8587
S2 0.3267 0.1688 0.261 0.171 0.551 0.2038 0.2363 0.3288 0.3908
S3 0.1358 0.1052 0.03779 0 0.256 0.1651 0.1779 0.3877 0.3558 0.1815
the baseline network. Similarly, several FP pairs identified in lower thresholds from
the network with 11 spoofed samples saw significant increases in SS, which demon-
strate the spoofer’s ability to sufficiently change the observed network fingerprints
of the devices. Lowering the threshold level increases the number of the correctly
identified positives, but the classifier fails to reach 100% recall. Although spoofing
120 samples does not introduce more FP pairs, the ultimate goal of the spoofer is
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to magnify the differences in the overall observed network signatures. Thus, the de-
crease in recall is a better metric of the spoofer’s performance. Overall, a decline in
performance is observed for IDMC after the introduction of the spoofer.
Table 17: IDMC Performance Metrics at Each Threshold Value
#SpSam Threshold TP TN FP FN Prec% Recall% Spec%
11 >0.7 2 46 6 1 25 66.67 88.46
11 >0.8 2 50 2 1 50 66.67 96.15
11 >0.9 0 51 1 3 0 0 98.08
120 >0.7 2 52 0 1 100 66.67 100
120 >0.8 1 52 0 2 100 33.33 100
120 >0.9 0 52 0 3 0 0 100
#SpSam: number of spoofed samples, TP: true positives, TN: true negatives,
FP: false positives, FN: false negatives, Prec: precision, Spec: specificity
5.3.2 Pairwise Signature Distance (PSD)
PSD measures the relative similarities between the network signatures of each pair
of devices. Differences in its value measured from each level of spoofing can be used
to quantify the changes introduced via spoofing, with positive differences representing
greater observed differences between the network signatures of a pair of devices. The
calculated PSD for the three networks are provided in Appendix P. Figure 34 shows
the distribution of the PSD observed in the baseline network, and the networks with
11 and 120 samples spoofed. Each point within each level of IoTAMU status (i.e.,
number of spoofed samples) represents the PSD for a unique pair of devices. The
identical-model pairs are separately highlighted in different colors (green, orange, and
red). As illustrated in the figure, an increase in the PSD values for the identical model
pairs at each stage of spoofing is apparent. Furthermore, spoofing additional samples
increases the mean PSD, suggesting that greater differences in network signatures
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are observed overall for each pair. Performing ANOVA at a significance threshold of
0.05 shows that the observed difference in mean PSD in the networks with 0 and 11
spoofed samples are not statistically significant (p-value=0.8253). However, spoofing
120 samples is able to bring sufficient changes to the observed signatures compared
to those of the baseline network, producing a statistically significant increase in PSD
with a p-value of 0.01132.
Figure 34: The distribution of pairwise signature distances observed in networks with
different numbers of spoofed samples.
5.4 Experiment 3: IoTAMU’s Impact on Network Congestion (Experi-
ment 3)
To determine IoTAMU’s potential impact on network congestion, NL, PD, PC,
and NT are measured in a controlled environment. The metrics are calculated using
the R script provided in Appendix Q. Figure 35 depicts the measured metrics for each
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treatment. No dropped packets are observed across all treatments; therefore, PD is
excluded from the results. Throughout all trials, the NL remains relatively consistent
with an overall mean of 0.01489 seconds; with the exception of a few outliers, no
significant deviations are observed. This is confirmed via ANOVA, where the null
hypothesis (H0: there is no difference in mean NL times between the treatments), is
failed to be rejected with an overall p-value of 0.283. In other words, there is not
enough evidence that suggest that different mean NL times are observed in networks
with increasing number of spoofed samples. Both PC and NT, however, saw linear
increases as more samples are spoofed by IoTAMU.
In the network with 120 spoofed samples, the observed PC from the additional
network traffic reaches an average of 4181 packets across the three trials over 30
seconds, equating to a rate of 0.9167 (≈ 1) packets per second per sample spoofed




Additionally, the average throughput for the additional traffic reaches 234.0 kbps,









This per-sample average equates to roughly 0.001546% of the theoretical maximum
throughput of the IEEE 802.11n standard (≈ 100 Mbps) [54] and 0.000002209% that
of the more recent IEEE 802.11ac standard (≈ 7 Gbps) [55]. Therefore, the additional
overhead created by each sample is largely negligible and is scalable to a much larger
network. Ultimately, the relatively steady NL times as well as no packets dropped
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across all trials in the experiment indicate that IoTAMU is able to produce the results
found in Section 5.3 without imposing a significant burden on the network.
5.5 Results Summary
This section provides a summary of the three experiments conducted, testing the
performance of the IDMC, IoTAMU’s spoofing capability, and measuring the spoofer’s
impact on the network. Precision, recall and specificity are used to measure IDMC’s
ability to classify identical-model pairs. In the baseline network, IDMC is highly
successful at stringent thresholds, achieving a 100% rate for all metrics at the SS
threshold of 0.9. Although the introduction of FPs at lower thresholds negatively
impacts IDMC’s precision, its 100% recall and high specificity nonetheless demon-
strate its ability to classify devices with identical/similar pairs of network signatures.
With the introduction of spoofing, IDMC suffers a significant decrease in its recall,
identifying no identical pairs at the highest threshold (0.9), and improving to two
out of three at the lowest threshold (0.7). Furthermore, a statistically significant
increase in PSD is observed in the network where 120 samples are spoofed. Finally,
while steady increases in PC and NT are observed, there are no PD nor statistically
significant differences in mean NL times between networks with increasing numbers
of samples spoofed by IoTAMU. These results demonstrate IoTAMU’s ability to suffi-
ciently modify the observed network signatures of the existing devices, while imposing
a negligible amount of additional traffic into the network. The experiments in this re-
search show that IoTAMU’s spoofer is able to uniquely modify the observed patterns
of network signatures of devices, decreasing the likelihood of information leakage from
unencrypted fields of encrypted Wi-Fi traffic.
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Figure 35: The observed congestion metrics for each device at different number of




This section summarizes the research and the results of the experiments in this
research. Section 6.2 highlights the significant conclusions drawn from this research’s
findings, and they are synthesized in Section 6.3 to underline their implications in
IoT security. Lastly, Section 6.4 discusses potential future work for IoTAMU.
6.2 Research Conclusions
This research successfully evaluates the effectiveness of a novel security agent in
improving the data confidentiality of IoT networks via the following contributions: (1)
proposal of the architecture of a PNP-style IoT security agent, (2) demonstration of
utilizing a remote computing node to provide added layers of security for IoT devices,
(3) development of a classifier that can accurately identify identical-model devices
and measure the similarities in network signatures of devices, and (4) development
of a spoofing algorithm that can uniquely modify the observed network signatures of
the devices based on the distributions of previously observed signatures.
First, the soundness of IoTAMU’s design is demonstrated by conducting all ex-
periments for this research on a network set up with IoTAMU serving as the gateway
for all IoT devices. IoTAMU serves as the AP as well as the firewall, routing all
traffic for the devices. Its encryption functionality is also demonstrated via a proof-
of-concept experiment where a simulated communication between an IoT device and
its RI successfully exchanges encrypted and decrypted traffic via IoTAMU.
To test the effectiveness of IoTAMU’s spoofer, IDMC is developed to characterize
and classify the observed network traffic of the IoT devices. At a SS threshold of
0.9, IDMC is able to correctly classify all identical-device pairs in the network with
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100% precision, recall, and specificity. The classifier’s precision suffers from FPs at
lower threshold levels. However, the identified FP pairs are devices from same man-
ufacturers which likely use the same network protocols for communication. IDMC’s
performance at stringent threshold (SS>0.9) installs high credibility in its ability to
measure the similarities in network signatures and classify identical device models.
As hypothesized, IDMC’s performance declines after enabling IoTAMU’s spoofing
capability. At high threshold (SS>0.9), the classifier is not able to identify any of the
positive pairs; its performance improves at lower thresholds (SS>0.8,0.7) identifying
up to two out of three identical-model pairs. Then, the PSDs are measured for
each device pairs to characterize the overall affect of the spoofing algorithm on their
network signatures. Although not statistically significant, spoofing 11 samples on
average yields greater distances between each pair of devices. More importantly,
the distances between the identical-model devices are significantly higher than those
observed in the baseline network. Spoofing 120 samples does produce a statistically
significant increase in the mean distance between devices as hypothesized. These
results successfully demonstrate IoTAMU’s ability to modify the network signatures
of the devices to help prevent information leakage from variations in observed network
traffic patterns.
Finally, measuring the additional traffic created by the spoofer shows a negligible
impact on network congestion. While increasing the number of spoofed samples
linearly increases throughput and number of observed packets, there is no statistically
significant increase in NL. On average, each spoofed sample produces approximately
one packet per second, with a throughput of 1.546 kbps. The additional load of traffic
created by IoTAMU is largely negligible in the current IEEE 802.11 standards, and
is scalable to a much larger network.
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6.3 Research Significance and Synthesis
From light bulbs to smart TVs, IoT devices are replacing more everyday objects
in an ordinary household. While they provide new capabilities, they also increase
the potential attack surface for adversaries. Numerous prior research as well as the
experiments in this research have demonstrated the potential information leakage
from the unprotected fields available to the public in wireless protocols, including
those not studied in this research such as Bluetooth and Zigbee. Because significant
portions of today’s communications are wireless, these studies raise serious concerns
about the privacy of the users.
Ordinarily, an adversary does not necessarily have the motive to target a regular
smart home. Furthermore, the vulnerabilities found in IoT are often device specific,
and a vulnerability found in one particular model will not have any effect in another.
However, the classifier developed for this research helps identify a case where Wi-
Fi leakage from ordinary smart homes can make them easier targets. Consider the
following scenario. A malicious actor is aware of a vulnerability that exists in a
particular Wi-Fi door lock. To find out if such a lock is present in a neighborhood,
the actor first trains the classifier with the network signature of the door lock. Then
the actor can sniff the network traffic for similar signatures from a remote location
by employing a drone or simply wardriving. This reconnaissance technique enables
the actor to cover a much larger area to identify potential targets without drawing
suspicion. In this scenario, modifying the observed network signatures of the devices
becomes the first line of defense against these reconnaissance methods.
Although developed for Wi-Fi IoT, the security agent proposed in this research
has implications for all wireless protocols and devices. Data mining in wireless com-
munications remains a threat as long as the unprotected portions of wireless frames
can be intercepted. Therefore, unless the signals are kept within a perfect Faraday
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cage, an adversary with enough time and motive is able to obtain potentially valuable
information. In case of encrypted Wi-Fi, the primary sources of information come
from the source and destination addresses, length of the payload, and the time the
packet is observed. The specific ways in which these fields vary over time enable cer-
tain knowledge to be inferred. Therefore, uniquely changing the observed traffic for
each device substantially decreases the likelihood of unwanted leakage of knowledge
to the public.
Similarly, the security agent proposed in this research has important applications
in the operations of the Air Force and the DoD. From security cameras to personal
devices owned by DoD personnel, countless facets of their day-to-day operations are
aided by IoT. Leakage of information from any sources can lead to endangerment
of assets, personnel, and ultimately the mission. The capabilities implemented in
IoTAMU enable greater protection of information from both insider threats and out-
siders via isolation of potentially vulnerable devices and modification of the network
signatures to be unrecognizable. As organizations become more reliant on wireless
communications to conduct their operations, it becomes paramount to investigate the
security implications of their publicly-available byproducts.
Deployment of IoTAMU with a few additional security measures can offer greater
protection of information. First is changing the MAC addresses of the devices. The
OUI in a MAC address inevitably provides valuable information about the device. If
possible, changing the first three bytes of MAC addresses to be identical, or random-
izing them for all devices can help harden the network against information leakage.
In addition to changing the observed patterns of network signatures of the existing
devices, IoTAMU can also be used to mimic the signature of a nonexistent device
by spoofing with a MAC address that is not present in the network. This generates
greater complexity within the network and provides an additional layer of security.
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If this feature is to be used to spoof multiple additional devices, spoofing from mul-
tiple antennas with different strengths of attenuators can prevent the adversary from
recognizing the source of the packets by comparing their signal strengths.
Lastly, the proposed architecture of IoTAMU paves the groundwork for the de-
velopment of additional functionalities for IoT devices via remote computing, where
dedicated computing nodes can add custom features for devices with less computa-
tional capacity. The capabilities demonstrated in this research are just few of many
applications of this scheme; further research can provide more advanced layers of
security and functionalities for IoT.
Many prior research efforts have stressed the importance of designing IoT devices
with security in mind, but has led to a limited improvement on the quality of the
devices over the years. This research not only proposes a potential solution to protect
the confidentiality of the devices, but also offers an alternate way to approach the
problem. Instead of relying on the manufacturers to individually secure the devices
using different standards, a deeper investigation of hardening the universal commu-
nication protocols used by the devices could produce more fruitful results.
6.4 Future Work
The architecture of IoTAMU is a prototype, and future work is warranted to better
evaluate its performance. Several areas of future work are described below.
• The encryption functionality tested in this research directly performs encryption
on the received packets via a custom script. Comparing its overhead to that
of a traditional VPN technique could offer additional insight to its design and
implementation.
• Currently, the different functionalities of IoTAMU exist as separate scripts that
are individually run on a laptop. Migrating the functionalities to a dedicated
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unit (i.e., Raspberry Pi), and packaging them into one module could help test
its functionalities in an actual deployment setting.
• All functioning scripts for IoTAMU are written in Python. To minimize the
overhead created from processing, they should be migrated to a lower-level
language such as C++.
• The maximum number of samples that could reliably be spoofed by IoTAMU is
120. Optimizing the implementation to support additional samples could help
obscure the signatures from extended activation events of streaming devices
(e.g., camera).
• The spoofing algorithm in this research only considers the data frames of Wi-Fi.
Incorporating beacon frames into the equation is a more sophisticated approach.
• All experiments in this research are conducted in a relatively controlled environ-
ment with minimal external interference. Conducting additional experiments
in different network environments is necessary to fully test IoTAMU’s perfor-
mance.
• There are only three identical-model pairs tested in this research. Acquiring
more devices and reproducing this research’s results is necessary.
• The spoofing algorithm’s parameters (e.g., duration of a segment, number of
repeats, etc.) are fixed throughout the experiments. Investigating the change
in network signatures using different parameters can provide more insight to
the spoofer’s performance.
• This research is only concerned with devices that use Wi-Fi. The techniques
used in this research can be extended to other wireless protocols such as Blue-
tooth and Zigbee.
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Appendix A. IoTAMU Access Point Configuration Files
1 # This f i l e d e s c r i b e s the network i n t e r f a c e s a v a i l a b l e on your system
2 # and how to a c t i v a t e them . For more in format ion , s e e i n t e r f a c e s (5 ) .
3 # / etc /network/ i n t e r f a c e s
4
5 source / e tc /network/ i n t e r f a c e s . d/∗
6
7 # The loopback network i n t e r f a c e
8 auto l o
9 i f a c e l o i n e t loopback
10
11 # s e t wlan0 in a c c e s s po int mode
12 auto wlan0
13 i f a c e wlan0 i n e t s t a t i c
14 hostapd / etc / hostapd / hostpad . conf
15 address 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 2 5 4
16 netmask 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 . 0
17
18 auto br0
19 i f a c e br0 i n e t dhcp
20 b r i d g e p o r t s eth1 wlan0
etc/network/interfaces
1 ### / etc / hostapd / hostapd . conf
2
3 i n t e r f a c e=wlan0
4 br idge=br0
5
6 # SSID to be used in IEEE 802.11 management frames
7 s s i d=IoTAMU
8 # Driver i n t e r f a c e type ( hostap / wired /none/ nl80211 /bsd )
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9 d r i v e r=nl80211
10 # Country code ( ISO/IEC 3166−1)
11 country code=US
12
13 # Operation mode ( g = IEEE 802.11 g )
14 hw mode=g
15 # Enable 802 .11 n support
16 ieee80211n=1
17 # Channel number
18 channel=6
19 # Maximum number o f s t a t i o n s a l lowed
20 max num sta=15
21
22 # Bit f i e l d : b i t 0 = WPA, b i t 1 = WPA2
23 wpa=2
24 # Bit f i e l d : 1=wpa , 2=wep , 3=both
25 auth a l g s=1
26
27 # Set o f accepted c iphe r s u i t e s
28 r s n p a i r w i s e=CCMP
29 wpa pairwise=TKIP
30 # Set o f accepted key management a lgor i thms
31 wpa key mgmt=WPA−PSK
32 wpa passphrase=IoTAMUPassword !
33
34 # hostapd event l o g g e r c o n f i g u r a t i o n
35 l o g g e r s t d o u t=−1
36 l o g g e r s t d o u t l e v e l =2
37
38 #misc .
39 c t r l i n t e r f a c e =/var /run/ hostapd




43 e a p s e r v e r=1
44 wps s tate=2
45 ap se tup locked=1
46 wps p in r eque s t s=/var /run/ hostapd . pin−req
47 conf ig methods=l a b e l d i s p l a y push button keypad
48
49 ## QoS support
50 #wmm enabled=1
51 ## Use ”iw l i s t ” to show dev i ce c a p a b i l i t i e s and modify ht capab
acco rd ing ly
52 #ht capab =[HT40+] [SHORT−GI−40] [TX−STBC ] [ RX−STBC1 ] [ DSSS CCK−40]
Code/hostapd.conf
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Appendix B. IoTAMU Setup Code
1 #! bin / sh
2 ### hostapd . conf : / e t c / hostapd / hostapd . conf −> . / hostapd / hostapd . conf ;
/ e t c / d e f a u l t / hostapd ;
3 ### / etc /network/ i n t e r f a c e s
4 ### dnsmasq . conf : / e t c /dnsmasq . conf
5 #IoTAMU i n i t i a l i z a t i o n code
6 #uses i p t a b l e s f o r f i r e w a l l and hostapd to s t a r t the AP
7
8 IPTABLES=/sb in / i p t a b l e s
9 EBTABLES=/sb in / eb tab l e s
10
11 INT NET=192.168 .1 .0/24
12 REMOTE=172 .16 .0 .2
13 IOT=192 .168 .1 .17
14
15 ### f l u s h e x i s t i n g r u l e s and s e t chain p o l i c y s e t t i n g to DROP
16 echo ” [+] Flushing e x i s t i n g i p t a b l e s r u l e s . . . ”
17 $IPTABLES −F
18 $IPTABLES −F −t nat
19 $IPTABLES −X
20 $IPTABLES −P INPUT DROP
21 $IPTABLES −P OUTPUT DROP
22 $IPTABLES −P FORWARD DROP
23
24 ### ACCEPT r u l e f o r packets o r i g i n a t i n g from the i n t e r n a l network
25 $IPTABLES −A FORWARD − i wlan0 −s $INT NET −j ACCEPT
26
27 ### DROP r u l e s
28 # used f o r proo f o f concept encrypt ion t e s t
29 # drop packets with the MAC address o f Laptop1 a f t e r rout ing :
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30 $EBTABLES −P FORWARD ACCEPT
31 $EBTABLES −A FORWARD − i eth1 −d C4 : 9D:ED: 2D:AC:83 −j DROP
32
33 ### enable forwarding
34 echo ” [+] Enabling IP forwarding . . . ”
35 echo 1 > / proc / sys / net / ipv4 / ip fo rward
36
37 ### enable AP
38 hostapd . / hostapd / hostapd . conf
Code/iotamu.sh
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Appendix C. IoTAMU Encryption Code
1 #! / user / bin /env python
2 #
3 # Decrypt data r e c e i v e d from the RI
4 #
5 # encrypt ion source : https : // cryptography . i o /en/ l a t e s t /hazmat/ p r i m i t i v e s
/ symmetric−encrypt ion /
6
7 import socket , sys , parse , os , b i n a s c i i , s t r u c t
8
9 from cryptography . hazmat . p r i m i t i v e s . c i p h e r s import Cipher , a lgor i thms ,
modes
10 from cryptography . hazmat . backends import de fau l t backend
11
12 max conn = 3 # Max Connection Queues To Hold
13 b u f s i z e = 4096
14
15 de f main ( ) :
16 #c r e a t e socke t
17 try :
18 s = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF PACKET, socke t .SOCK RAW, socket .
ntohs (3 ) )
19 t = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF PACKET, socke t .SOCK RAW, socket .
ntohs (3 ) )
20 except Exception as e :
21 sys . e x i t (2 )
22
23 s . bind ( ( ” eth1 ” ,0 ) )
24 t . bind ( ( ”wlan0” ,0 ) )
25
26 encryptor , decryptor = i n i t i a l i z e e n c ( )
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27 whi l e 1 :
28 e th pro to = 0
29 i p p r o t o = 0
30 payload = 0
31 try :
32 #c r e a t e another thread to r e c e i v e data going other d i r e c t i o n
33 raw data , addr=s . recvfrom (65536) #data r e c e i v e d from eth0
34 dst mac , src mac , eth proto , i p data = parse . e the rne t f rame (
raw data )
35 i f e th pro to ==8:
36 vers ion , header l ength , t t l , ip proto , s r c i p , d s t ip , data=
parse . ipv4 packet ( ip data )
37 i f i p p r o t o == 17 : #UDP packet r e c e i v e d
38 s r c po r t , d s t por t , length , payload = parse . udp packet (
data )
39 e l i f i p p r o t o == 6 : #TCP packet r e c e i v e d
40 s r c po r t , d s t por t , seq , ack , f l a g u r g , f l a g ac k , f l ag p sh
, f l a g r s t , f l a g syn , f l a g f i n , o f f s e t , payload = parse . t cp packet ( data )
41
42 i f payload != 0 :
43 i f parse . ipv4 ( s r c i p ) != ” 1 7 2 . 1 6 . 0 . 2 ” :
44 cont inue
45 p r i n t ( ”Message r e c e i v e d : ” + s t r ( payload ) )
46 new data = dec data ( payload , decryptor )
47 p r i n t ( ”Message decrypted : ” + s t r ( new data ) )
48
49 #MAC address o f the gateway route r
50 dst mac = b”\xc4\x9d\xed\x2d\xac\x83”
51
52 #cons t ruc t new headers
53 checksum = 0
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54 l ength = 8 + len ( new data ) #c a l c u l a t e new length f o r
Transport l a y e r header
55 p header = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 2H ’ , ip proto , l ength )
56 p header = s r c i p + d s t i p + p header
57
58 i f i p p r o t o == 17 : #new headers
59 #new IP header
60 checksum = 0
61 t o t a l l e n g t h = header l ength + length
62 i h e a d e r = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 2 s H ’ , i p da ta [ : 2 ] ,
t o t a l l e n g t h ) + ip data [ 4 : 1 0 ] + s t r u c t . pack ( ’ !H ’ , checksum ) +
ip data [ 1 2 : 2 0 ] + ip data [ 2 0 : header l ength ]
63 checksum = parse . checksum ( i h e a d e r )
64 i h e a d e r = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 2 s H ’ , i p da ta [ : 2 ] ,
t o t a l l e n g t h ) + ip data [ 4 : 1 0 ] + s t r u c t . pack ( ’ !H ’ , checksum ) +
ip data [ 1 2 : 2 0 ] + ip data [ 2 0 : header l ength ]
65
66 #new UDP header
67 checksum = 0
68 t header = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 4H ’ , s r c po r t , d s t por t ,
length , checksum )
69 checksum = parse . checksum ( p header + t header +
new data )
70 t header = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 4H ’ , s r c po r t , d s t por t ,
length , checksum )
71 i o f f s e t = 14 #o f f s e t to ip l a y e r
72 t . send ( dst mac+raw data [ 6 : i o f f s e t ]+ i h e a d e r+t header+
new data )
73
74 except KeyboardInterrupt :
75 t . c l o s e ( )
76 s . c l o s e ( )
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77 sys . e x i t (1 )
78 s . c l o s e ( )
79 t . c l o s e ( )
80
81 #i n i t i a l i z e r f o r encrypt ion
82 de f i n i t i a l i z e e n c ( ) :
83 backend = de fau l t backend ( )
84 key = b” 11111111111111111111111111111111 ” #Same key i s used f o r RI
and IoTAMU
85 iv = b” 2222222222222222 ”
86 c iphe r = Cipher ( a lgor i thms .AES( key ) , modes .CBC( iv ) , backend=backend )
87 encryptor = c iphe r . encryptor ( )
88 decryptor = c iphe r . decryptor ( )
89 re turn encryptor , decryptor
90
91 #encrypt data
92 de f enc data ( data , encryptor ) :
93 c t ex t = encryptor . update ( data ) + encryptor . f i n a l i z e ( )
94 re turn c t ex t
95
96 #decrypt data
97 de f dec data ( data , decryptor ) :
98 pt = decryptor . update ( data ) + decryptor . f i n a l i z e ( )
99 re turn pt
100
101 #debug func t i on used to t e s t i f encrypt ion i s working
102 de f debug ( ) :
103 encryptor , decryptor = i n i t i a l i z e e n c ( )
104 data = b” 12345678901234567890123456789012 ”
105 encrypted = enc data ( data , encryptor )
106 decrypted = enc data ( encrypted , decryptor )
107 p r i n t ( data )
105
108 p r i n t ( encrypted )
109 p r i n t ( decrypted )
110
111 i f name == ” main ” :
112 main ( )
113 #debug ( )
Code/proxy server.py
1 #! / user / bin /env python
2 #
3 # Encrypt data r e c e i v e d from the IoT de v i c e s
4 #
5 # encrypt ion source : https : // cryptography . i o /en/ l a t e s t /hazmat/ p r i m i t i v e s
/ symmetric−encrypt ion /
6
7 import socket , sys , parse , os , b i n a s c i i , s t r u c t
8
9 from cryptography . hazmat . p r i m i t i v e s . c i p h e r s import Cipher , a lgor i thms ,
modes
10 from cryptography . hazmat . backends import de fau l t backend
11
12 de f main ( ) :
13 #c r e a t e socke t
14 try :
15 s = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF PACKET, socke t .SOCK RAW, socket .
ntohs (3 ) )
16 t = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF PACKET, socke t .SOCK RAW, socket .
ntohs (3 ) )
17 except Exception as e :
18 sys . e x i t (2 )
19
20 s . bind ( ( ” eth1 ” ,0 ) )
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21 t . bind ( ( ”wlan0” ,0 ) )
22
23 encryptor , decryptor = i n i t i a l i z e e n c ( )
24 whi l e 1 :
25 e th pro to = 0
26 i p p r o t o = 0
27 payload = 0
28 try :
29 raw data , addr=t . recvfrom (65536) #data r e c e i v e d from eth0
30 dst mac , src mac , eth proto , i p data = parse . e the rne t f rame (
raw data )
31 i f e th pro to ==8:
32 vers ion , header l ength , t t l , ip proto , s r c i p , d s t ip , data=
parse . ipv4 packet ( ip data )
33 i f i p p r o t o == 17 : #UDP packet r e c e i v e d
34 s r c po r t , d s t por t , length , payload = parse . udp packet (
data )
35 e l i f i p p r o t o == 6 : #TCP packet r e c e i v e d
36 s r c po r t , d s t por t , seq , ack , f l a g u r g , f l a g ac k , f l ag p sh
, f l a g r s t , f l a g syn , f l a g f i n , o f f s e t , payload = parse . t cp packet ( data )
37
38 i f payload != 0 :
39 i f parse . ipv4 ( s r c i p ) != ” 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 7 ” :
40 cont inue
41 p r i n t ( ”Message r e c e i v e d : ” + s t r ( payload ) )
42 new data = enc data ( payload , encryptor )
43 p r i n t ( ”Message encrypted : ” + s t r ( new data ) )
44
45 #MAC address o f the IoT
46 dst mac = b”\x80\x2a\xa8\x9e\x45\x5a”
47
48 #cons t ruc t new headers
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49 checksum = 0
50 length = 8 + len ( new data ) #c a l c u l a t e new length f o r
Transport l a y e r header
51 p header = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 2H ’ , ip proto , l ength )
52 p header = s r c i p + d s t i p + p header
53
54 i f i p p r o t o == 17 : #new headers
55 #new IP header
56 checksum = 0
57 t o t a l l e n g t h = header l ength + length
58 i h e a d e r = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 2 s H ’ , i p da ta [ : 2 ] ,
t o t a l l e n g t h ) + ip data [ 4 : 1 0 ] + s t r u c t . pack ( ’ !H ’ , checksum ) +
ip data [ 1 2 : 2 0 ] + ip data [ 2 0 : header l ength ]
59 checksum = parse . checksum ( i h e a d e r )
60 i h e a d e r = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 2 s H ’ , i p da ta [ : 2 ] ,
t o t a l l e n g t h ) + ip data [ 4 : 1 0 ] + s t r u c t . pack ( ’ !H ’ , checksum ) +
ip data [ 1 2 : 2 0 ] + ip data [ 2 0 : header l ength ]
61
62 #new UDP header
63 checksum = 0
64 t header = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 4H ’ , s r c po r t , d s t por t ,
length , checksum )
65 checksum = parse . checksum ( p header + t header +
new data )
66 t header = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ ! 4H ’ , s r c po r t , d s t por t ,
length , checksum )
67 i o f f s e t = 14 #o f f s e t to ip l a y e r
68 s . send ( dst mac+raw data [ 6 : i o f f s e t ]+ i h e a d e r+
t header+new data )
69
70 except KeyboardInterrupt :
71 s . c l o s e ( )
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72 t . c l o s e ( )
73 sys . e x i t (1 )
74 s . c l o s e ( )
75 t . c l o s e ( )
76
77 de f i n i t i a l i z e e n c ( ) :
78 backend = de fau l t backend ( )
79 key = b” 11111111111111111111111111111111 ”#same key used in RI and
IoTAMU
80 iv = b” 2222222222222222 ”
81 c iphe r = Cipher ( a lgor i thms .AES( key ) , modes .CBC( iv ) , backend=backend )
82 encryptor = c iphe r . encryptor ( )
83 decryptor = c iphe r . decryptor ( )
84 re turn encryptor , decryptor
85
86 #encrypt data
87 de f enc data ( data , encryptor ) :
88 c t ex t = encryptor . update ( data ) + encryptor . f i n a l i z e ( )
89 re turn c t ex t
90
91 #decrypt data
92 de f dec data ( data , decryptor ) :
93 pt = decryptor . update ( data ) + decryptor . f i n a l i z e ( )
94 re turn pt
95
96 #debug func t i on
97 de f debug ( ) :
98 encryptor , decryptor = i n i t i a l i z e e n c ( )
99 data = b” 12345678901234567890123456789012 ”
100 encrypted = enc data ( data , encryptor )
101 decrypted = enc data ( encrypted , decryptor )
102 p r i n t ( data )
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103 p r i n t ( encrypted )
104 p r i n t ( decrypted )
105
106 i f name == ” main ” :
107 main ( )
108 #debug ( )
Code/proxy server2.py
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Appendix D. Spoofer Code
1 #! / user / bin /env python
2 #
3 # FLAG: PARAMETER ( v a r i a b l e s that can be adjusted to b e t t e r mimic l i v e
dev i c e s i g n a t u r e s )
4 #
5 # Spoof network t r a f f i c based on AGPS
6 # USEAGE: python3 sp oo f e r . py [AGPS f i l e in csv format ]
7
8 import socket , sys , csv , random , time , thread ing
9 import numpy as np
10 from scapy . a l l import ∗
11
12 #l i s t o f dev i c e names and r e s p e c t i v e MAC addre s s e s
13 #comment out d e v i c e s not being used f o r a n a l y s i s
14 IoT = {
15 ”Camera3” : ” 28 :AD: 3E: 3 8 : 6F : B6” ,
16 ”Camera2” : ” 30 :8C:FB: 3A: 1A:AD” ,
17 ”Camera1” : ”EC: 1A: 5 9 : E4 :FD:41 ” ,
18 ”CameraTest” : ”EC: 1A: 5 9 : E5 : 0 2 : 0D” ,
19 ” Lightbulb2 ” : ”B0 : 4E : 2 6 : C5 : 2A:41 ” ,
20 ” Lightbulb1 ” : ”D0 : 7 3 : D5 : 2 6 : B8 : 4C” ,
21 ” LightbulbTest ” : ”D0 : 7 3 : D5 : 2 6 : C9 :27 ” ,
22 ” Switch3 ” : ” 70 :4F : 5 7 : F9 : E1 : B8” ,
23 ” Switch2 ” : ” 6 0 : 3 8 : E0 :EE: 7C: E5” ,
24 ” Switch1 ” : ” 1 4 : 9 1 : 8 2 :CD:DF: 3D” ,
25 ” SwitchTest ” : ”B4 : 7 5 : 0E: 0D: 9 4 : 6 5 ”
26 }
27
28 IoTAMU = ” 80 :2A: A8 : 9E: 4 5 : 5A”
29 STATE = [ ” a c t i v e ” , ” pa s s i v e ” ]
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30 DIST = {}
31 #encrypt ion can be enabled f o r payload
32 SA = S e c u r i t y A s s o c i a t i o n (ESP, s p i=0x00000100 , c r y p t a l g o=’AES−CBC’ ,
c rypt key=b ’ iotamukey16bytes ’ )
33
34 # c r e a t e s the ac tua l packet and sends to network
35 de f spoo f ( repeat , i a t , s p o o f l i s t , d i r e c t i o n , dev i c e ) :
36 #generate payloads o f s p e c i f i e d s i z e s
37 g l o b a l SA
38 payloads = [ ]
39 i f d i r e c t i o n == 1 :
40 e t h d s t = IoT [ dev i c e ]
41 e t h s r c = IoTAMU
42 e l s e :
43 e t h d s t = IoTAMU
44 e t h s r c = IoT [ dev i ce ]
45 i p s r c = ” 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 ” #bogus IP
46 i p d s t = ” 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 ” #bogus IP
47 t t l = 1
48 i f a c e = ”wlan0”
49 f o r data in s p o o f l i s t :
50 payloads . append ( ”a”∗data )
51 payloads = payloads ∗ repeat
52 f o r payload in np . random . cho i c e ( payloads , l en ( payloads ) ) :
53 #packet = SA. encrypt ( IP ( s r c=i p s r c , dst=ip ds t , t t l=t t l ) /UDP( ) /
payload )
54 packet = IP ( s r c=i p s r c , dst=ip ds t , t t l=t t l ) /UDP( ) / payload
55 #sendp ( Dot11 ( addr1=eth dst , addr2=eth s r c , addr3=eth s r c , type = 2 ,
subtype = 0) / packet , i f a c e=i f a c e , verbose =0)
56 sendp ( Ether ( s r c=eth s r c , dst=e t h d s t ) / packet , i f a c e=i f a c e , verbose
=0)
57 #debug l i n e s
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58 #e lapsed t ime += time . time ( ) − s t a r t
59 #p r in t ”%s ; ELASPED TIME: %f ; SENT PACKET LENGTH: %d\n” % (
state , e lapsed t ime , l en ( payload ) )
60 time . s l e e p ( i a t )
61 #debug l i n e s
62 #e lapsed t ime += i a t
63 # p r in t ”TOTAL DURATION: %f \n” % ( e l apsed t ime )
64
65 de f g ene ra t e packe t s ( device , seed ) :
66 #dev i ce = name o f dev i ce
67 #d i r e c t i o n = [ 0 | 1 ] ; 0 : outgoing , 1 : incoming
68 #seed = seed f o r random number gene ra to r s
69 #algor i thm :
70 #i n f i n i t e loop ,
71 #1 . get s t a t e [ pa s s i v e / a c t i v e ]
72 #2 . f o r incoming and outgoing s t a t e s
73 #3 . get i n t e r a r r i v a l time (IAT) , length , durat ion [ 1 : 1 0 ( seconds ) ]
74 #4 . spoo f
75 #5 . s l e e p f o r some time
76 whi l e True :
77 r random = random . Random( seed )
78 n random = np . random . RandomState ( seed )
79 sub threads = [ ]
80 #assumed the dev i c e i s a c t i v e 10% of the time
81 s = n random . cho i c e (STATE, 1 , p = ( 0 . 1 , 0 . 9 ) ) [ 0 ]
82 i f s == ” a c t i v e ” :
83 o f f s e t = 0
84 e l s e :
85 o f f s e t = 18
86 #durat ion o f a segment
87 #packets o f s i z e s s p e c i f i e d in the l i s t ” s p o o f l i s t ” i s spoofed
during a segment
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88 durat ion = r random . randrange (5 ,15 ) #PARAMETER
89 #cons t ruc t packets f o r outgoing (0 ) and incoming (1 ) s t a t e s
90 f o r d i r e c t i o n in range (0 , 2 ) :
91 t o f f s e t = o f f s e t + (8 ∗ d i r e c t i o n )
92 d e v i c e d i s t = DIST [ dev i c e ] [ t o f f s e t : t o f f s e t +8]
93 i a t = f l o a t (DIST [ dev i ce ] [ o f f s e t + 16 + d i r e c t i o n ] )
94 i a t = r random . uniform ( 0 . 5∗ i a t , 1 .5∗ i a t )
95 #choose packet s i z e s at random in each range
96 packet 200 = r random . randrange (0 ,200)
97 packet 400 = r random . randrange (200 ,400)
98 packet 600 = r random . randrange (400 ,600)
99 packet 800 = r random . randrange (600 ,800)
100 packet 1000 = r random . randrange (800 ,1000)
101 packet 1200 = r random . randrange (1000 ,1200)
102 packet 1400 = r random . randrange (1200 ,1400)
103 packet 1600 = r random . randrange (1400 ,1441)
104 p a c k e t l i s t = [ packet 200 , packet 400 , packet 600 ,
packet 800 ,
105 packet 1000 , packet 1200 , packet 1400 ,
packet 1600 ]
106 #number o f r epea t s o f the segment
107 repeat = r random . randrange (1 ,10 ) #PARAMETER
108 n packets = i n t ( durat ion / i a t )
109 s p o o f l i s t = n random . cho i c e ( p a c k e t l i s t , n packets , p =
d e v i c e d i s t )
110 d e v i c e i n f o = dev i ce + s + s t r ( d i r e c t i o n )
111 t = thread ing . Thread ( t a r g e t=spoof , a rgs=(repeat , i a t ,
s p o o f l i s t , d i r e c t i o n , dev i c e ) )
112 sub threads . append ( t )
113 #s t a r t subthreads at the same time
114 f o r t in sub threads :
115 t . s t a r t ( )
114
116 #j o i n threads
117 f o r t in sub threads :
118 t . j o i n ( )
119 seed += 1
120 #s l e e p f o r a random durat ion between 5−10 seconds
121 time . s l e e p ( r random . randrange (5 ,10 ) )
122
123 de f main ( ) :
124 #read in AGPS f i l e
125 i n f i l e = sys . argv [ 1 ]
126 with open ( i n f i l e , ” r ” ) as i n f i l e :
127 f i n p u t = csv . reader ( i n f i l e )
128 t a r g e t d i s t = [ rows f o r rows in f i n p u t ]
129 devicenames = [ name [ 0 ] f o r name in t a r g e t d i s t ] [ 1 : ]
130 f o r row in t a r g e t d i s t :
131 de l row [ 0 ]#remove header
132 #d i c t i o n a r y conta in ing the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f each sample
133 g l o b a l DIST
134 DIST = d i c t ( z ip ( devicenames , t a r g e t d i s t [ 1 : ] ) )
135
136 #r o t a t e random number seeds during loop
137 seed = 42 #PARAMETER
138 main threads = [ ]
139 #c r e a t e a thread f o r each sample being spoofed
140 f o r device name in devicenames :
141 m = thread ing . Thread ( t a r g e t=genera te packet s , a rgs=(device name ,
seed ) )
142 main threads . append (m)
143 m. s t a r t ( )
144 seed += 100
145 f o r m in main threads :
146 m. j o i n ( )
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147
148 i f name == ” main ” :
149 main ( )
Code/spoofer.py
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Appendix E. Raw Packet Parsing Code
1 # Parse r e c e i v e d packet from an i n t e r f a c e to e x t r a c t header in fo rmat ion
and payload
2 # source :
3 # github . com/koehlma/ sn ippe t s / blob / master /python/network/ s n i f f e r . py
4 # github . com/vduddu/Malware/ blob / master / S n i f f e r / Ethernet /




8 import s t r u c t
9
10 #parse l i n k l a y e r
11 de f e the rne t f rame ( data ) :
12 dst mac , src mac , p ro to co l=s t r u c t . unpack ( ’ ! 6 s 6 s H ’ , data [ : 1 4 ] )
13 re turn dst mac , src mac , socke t . htons ( p ro to co l ) , data [ 1 4 : ]
14
15 #r e t r i e v e mac address from ethe rne t frame
16 de f get mac address ( bytes addr ) :
17 b y t e s s t r=map( ’ { : 02 x} ’ . format , bytes addr )
18 mac addr=’ : ’ . j o i n ( b y t e s s t r ) . upper ( )
19 re turn mac addr
20
21 #parse IP l a y e r
22 de f ipv4 packet ( data ) :
23 v e r s i o n h e a d e r l e n g t h=data [ 0 ]
24 ve r s i o n=v e r s i o n h e a d e r l e n g t h >> 4
25 header l ength = ( v e r s i o n h e a d e r l e n g t h & 15) ∗ 4
26 t t l , p rotoco l , s r c i p , d s t i p=s t r u c t . unpack ( ’ ! 8x B B 2x 4 s 4 s ’ , data
[ : 2 0 ] )
117
27 return vers ion , header l ength , t t l , p rotoco l , s r c i p , d s t ip , data [
header l ength : ]
28
29 #r e t r i e v e IP address from IP datagram
30 de f ipv4 ( addr ) :
31 re turn ’ . ’ . j o i n (map( s t r , addr ) )
32
33 #parse UDP packet
34 de f udp packet ( data ) :
35 s r c po r t , d s t por t , s i z e=s t r u c t . unpack ( ’ ! H H H 2x ’ , data [ : 8 ] )
36 re turn s r c po r t , d s t por t , s i z e , data [ 8 : ]
37
38 #parse TCP packet
39 de f t cp packet ( data ) :
40 s r c po r t , d s t por t , seq , ack , f l a g s=s t r u c t . unpack ( ’ ! H H L L H ’ , data
[ : 1 4 ] )
41 o f f s e t =( f l a g s >> 12) ∗ 4
42 f l a g u r g =( f l a g s & 32) >> 5
43 f l a g a c k =( f l a g s & 16) >> 4
44 f l a g p s h =( f l a g s & 8) >> 3
45 f l a g r s t =( f l a g s & 4) >> 2
46 f l a g s y n =( f l a g s & 2) >> 1
47 f l a g f i n =( f l a g s & 1)
48 re turn s r c po r t , d s t por t , seq , ack , f l a g u r g , f l a g ac k , f l ag p sh , f l a g r s t
, f l a g syn , f l a g f i n , o f f s e t , data [ o f f s e t : ]
49
50 #c r e a t e checksum from packet
51 de f checksum ( data ) :
52 checksum = 0
53 data l en = len ( data )
54 i f ( da ta l en % 2) :
55 da ta l en += 1
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56 data += s t r u c t . pack ( ’ !B ’ , 0)
57
58 f o r i in range (0 , data len , 2) :
59 w = ( data [ i ] << 8) + ( data [ i + 1 ] )
60 checksum += w
61
62 checksum = ( checksum >> 16) + ( checksum & 0xFFFF)
63 checksum = ˜checksum & 0xFFFF
64 return checksum
65
66 #parse contents o f r e c e i v e d packet and pr in t header in fo rmat ion
67 #t h i s i s used f o r debugging purpose
68 de f parse ( sock ) :
69 raw data , addr=sock . recvfrom (65536)
70 dst mac , src mac , eth proto , data = etherne t f rame ( raw data )
71 p r i n t ( ”\nEthernet Frame : ” )
72 p r i n t ( ” Des t ina t i on : {} , Source : {} , Protoco l : {}” . format (
get mac address ( dst mac ) , get mac address ( src mac ) , e th pro to ) )
73
74 #check f o r IP packets
75 i f e th pro to ==8:
76 vers ion , header l ength , t t l , ip proto , s r c i p , d s t ip , data=
ipv4 packet ( data )
77 p r i n t ( ”IPv4 Packet : ” )
78 p r i n t ( ” Vers ion : {} , Src IP : {} , Dst IP : {} , Protoco l : {}” . format
( vers ion , ipv4 ( s r c i p ) , ipv4 ( d s t i p ) , i p p r o t o ) )
79
80 #check f o r UDP packets
81 i f i p p r o t o == 17 :
82 s r c po r t , d s t por t , length , data = udp packet ( data )
83 p r i n t ( ”UDP Segment : ” )
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84 p r i n t ( ” Source Port : {} , Des t ina t i on Port {} , Length : {}” .
format ( s r c po r t , d s t por t , l ength ) )
85 p r i n t ( data )
86
87 #check f o r TCP packets
88 e l i f i p p r o t o == 6 :
89 s r c po r t , d s t por t , seq , ack , f l a g u r g , f l a g ac k , f l ag p sh ,
f l a g r s t , f l a g syn , f l a g f i n , o f f s e t , data = tcp packet ( data )
90 p r i n t ( ”TCP Segment : ” )
91 p r i n t ( data )
92
93 de f main ( ) :
94 s = socket . socke t ( socke t .AF PACKET, socke t .SOCK RAW, socket . ntohs (3 )
)
95 whi l e True :
96 parse ( s )
97
98 i f name == ’ ma in ’ :
99 main ( )
Code/parse.py
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Appendix F. Code for Proof-of-Concept Experiment Testing
Encryption Functionality of IoTAMU
1 #c l i e n t code used during proo f o f concept encrypt ion t e s t





7 sock = socket . socke t ( socke t . AF INET , socket .SOCK DGRAM)
8
9 s e r v e r a d d r e s s = ( ” 1 7 2 . 1 6 . 0 . 2 ” , 12345)
10 c l i e n t a d d r e s s = ( ” 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 7 ” , 12345)
11 sock . bind ( c l i e n t a d d r e s s )
12 #send message to RI
13 message = b” t h i s i s a s e c r e t message 1234567”
14 sock . sendto ( message , s e r v e r a d d r e s s )
15 p r i n t ( ’ C l i en t sent : ’ + s t r ( message ) )
16 #wait f o r re sponse from the RI
17 whi l e True :
18 data , address = sock . recvfrom (4096)
19 p r i n t ( ’ C l i en t r e c e i v e d : ’ + s t r ( data ) )
Code/encryption client.py
1 #s e r v e r code used during proo f o f concept encrypt ion t e s t




6 import p roxy se rve r
7
8 sock = socket . socke t ( socke t . AF INET , socket .SOCK DGRAM)
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9
10 s e r v e r a d d r e s s = ( ” 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 4 ” , 12345)
11 c l i e n t a d d r e s s = ( ” 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 7 ” , 12345)
12 sock . bind ( s e r v e r a d d r e s s )
13
14 encryptor , decryptor = proxy se rve r . i n i t i a l i z e e n c ( )
15 message = ” This i s a s e c r e t re sponse 123456”
16 whi l e True :
17 data , address = sock . recvfrom (4096)
18 i f data :
19 p r i n t ( ” Received encrypted message : ” + s t r ( data ) )
20 #decrypt encrypted message
21 decrypted = proxy se rve r . dec data ( data , decryptor )
22 #encrypt re sponse
23 encrypted = proxy se rve r . enc data ( message , encryptor )
24 p r i n t ( ”Message decrypted : ” + s t r ( decrypted ) )
25 p r i n t ( ” Sending response . . . ” )
26 #send encrypted response to c l i e n t
27 sock . sendto ( encrypted , address )
Code/encryption server.py
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Appendix G. Preprocessor Code
1 import pyshark as ps
2 import b i n a s c i i
3 import sys
4
5 IoT = {
6 ”Camera1” : ”EC: 1A: 5 9 : E4 :FD:41 ” ,
7 ”CameraTest” : ”EC: 1A: 5 9 : E5 : 0 2 : 0D” ,
8 ”Camera2” : ” 30 :8C:FB: 3A: 1A:AD” ,
9 ”Camera3” : ” 28 :AD: 3E: 3 8 : 6F : B6” ,
10 ” Lightbulb1 ” : ”D0 : 7 3 : D5 : 2 6 : B8 : 4C” ,
11 ” LightbulbTest ” : ”D0 : 7 3 : D5 : 2 6 : C9 :27 ” ,
12 ” Lightbulb2 ” : ”B0 : 4E : 2 6 : C5 : 2A:41 ” ,
13 ” Switch1 ” : ” 1 4 : 9 1 : 8 2 :CD:DF: 3D” ,
14 ” SwitchTest ” : ”B4 : 7 5 : 0E: 0D: 9 4 : 6 5 ” ,
15 ” Switch2 ” : ” 6 0 : 3 8 : E0 :EE: 7C: E5” ,
16 ” Switch3 ” : ” 70 :4F : 5 7 : F9 : E1 : B8”
17 }
18 IoTMU = ”A4 : C4 : 9 4 : 3E: 2 0 : 9C”
19
20 de f main ( ) :
21 i f l en ( sys . argv ) != 4 :
22 p r i n t ( ”python i o t t a b l e . py [ i n p u t f i l e ] [ o u t p u t f i l e ] [ Type ]\n” )
23 sys . e x i t ( )
24 f i n p u t = sys . argv [ 1 ]
25 f output = sys . argv [ 2 ]
26 f t y p e = sys . argv [ 3 ]
27
28 cap = ps . Fi leCapture ( f i nput , d i s p l a y f i l t e r=’ frame conta in s %s &&
frame conta in s %s ’ % ( IoT [ f t y p e ] , IoTMU) )
29
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30 f = open ( f output , ”w” )
31 f . wr i t e ( ’No . , Time , Di rect ion , Length , IAT\n ’ )
32 lastOutPacket = 0
33 la s t InPacke t = 0
34 f o r packet in cap :
35 #i f the d e s t i n a t i o n MAC addr i s IoTAMU, then the packet i s an
outgoing packet
36 i f ” 80 :2A: A8 : 9E: 4 5 : 5A” in packet . wlan . da . upper ( ) :
37 d i r e c t i o n = ”OUTGOING”
38 i a t = f l o a t ( packet . sn i f f t ime s tamp ) − f l o a t ( lastOutPacket )
39 lastOutPacket = packet . sn i f f t ime s tamp
40 e l s e :
41 d i r e c t i o n = ”INCOMING”
42 i a t = f l o a t ( packet . sn i f f t ime s tamp ) − f l o a t ( l a s t InPacke t )
43 l a s t InPacke t = packet . sn i f f t ime s tamp
44 f . wr i t e ( ’%s ,%s ,%s ,%s ,%s \n ’ % ( packet . number , packet .
sn i f f t imes tamp , d i r e c t i o n , packet . length , ’ { : . 2 0 f } ’ . format ( i a t ) ) )
45 f . c l o s e ( )
46
47 i f name == ’ ma in ’ :
48 main ( )
Code/preprocess.py
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Appendix H. Classifier Code Used During Initial Setup
1 #s c r i p t used during p i l o t study to c r e a t e network d i s t r i b u t i o n graphs ,
2 #i d e n t i f y a c t i v e pa s s i v e s t a t e s , PCA, and c a l c u l a t e SS
3 #
4 #The s c r i p t takes as input the csv f i l e s c r ea ted a f t e r the p r e p r o c e s s i n g
step
5
6 l i b r a r y ( p ly r )
7 l i b r a r y ( dplyr )
8 l i b r a r y ( purrr )
9 l i b r a r y ( ggp lot2 )
10 l i b r a r y ( ggthemes )
11 l i b r a r y ( broom )
12 l i b r a r y ( s t a t s )
13 l i b r a r y ( RColorBrewer )
14 l i b r a r y ( s c a t t e r p l o t 3 d )
15 l i b r a r y (DMwR)
16
17 setwd ( ”C:\\ Users \\Youngjun Park\\Desktop\\IoTMU\\Captures2 ” )
18
19 #f l a g to enable p l o t s (1 to enable )
20 p l o t s = 0
21
22 d e v i c e s . df <− NULL
23 d e v i c e s . s t a t s <− NULL
24 d e v i c e l i s t = c ( ”Camera1” , ”CameraTest” , ”Camera3” , ” LightBulb1 ” , ”
LightBulbTest ” , ” LightBulb2 ” , ” Switch1 ” , ” SwitchTest ” , ” Switch3 ” )
25 f o r ( dev i c e in d e v i c e l i s t ) {
26 devicename <− read . csv ( paste ( device , ” . csv ” , sep = ”” ) )
27 devicename$Name <− dev i c e
28 devicename$Time <− devicename$Time − min ( devicename$Time)
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29 i f ( p l o t s == 1) {
30 #c r e a t e s c a t t e r p l o t o f l eng th s o f packets sent vs time
31 p <− ggp lot ( devicename , aes ( x = Time , y = Length ) ) + geom point (
co l our = ” s t e e l b l u e ” )
32 p <− p + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
33 p <− p + g g t i t l e ( paste ( ” Lengths o f Packets Sent Over Time” , device ,
sep=” − ” ) )
34 p l o t (p)
35 ggsave ( f i l e=paste ( device , ” time length . png” , sep = t r i a l ) , he ight =
4 , width = 6)
36
37 #c r e a t e histogram of number o f packets sent vs time
38 p <− ggp lot ( devicename , aes (Time) ) + geom histogram ( binwidth = 0 . 5 ,
f i l l = ’ s t e e l b l u e ’ )
39 p <− p + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
40 p <− p + g g t i t l e ( paste ( ”Number o f Packets Sent Over Time” , device ,
sep=” − ” ) )
41 p l o t (p)
42 ggsave ( f i l e=paste ( device , ” time h i s t . png” , sep = t r i a l ) , he ight =
4 , width = 6)
43 }
44
45 #determine breaks f o r histogram
46 break . time <− seq (0 , round any (max( devicename$Time) , 0 . 5 , c e i l i n g ) ,
0 . 5 ) ###
47 break . l ength <− seq (0 , 1600 , 200)
48
49 # determine a c t i v e and pa s s i v e s t a t e s
50 devicename . h i s t = h i s t ( devicename$Time , breaks = break . time , p l o t =
FALSE)
51 #The o u t l i e r s in the number o f packets sent w i l l r e p r e s e n t the a c t i v e
s t a t e
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52 #For a given cont inuous var i ab l e , o u t l i e r s are those ob s e rva t i on s that
l i e ou t s i d e 1 .5 ∗IQR,
53 # where IQR, the ’ I n t e r Quar t i l e Range ’ i s the d i f f e r e n c e between 75
th and 25 th q u a r t i l e s .
54 #e x t r a c t o u t l i e r s
55 devicename . t imes <− devicename . h i s t $ breaks [ −1 ] [ ( devicename . h i s t $ counts
>= min ( boxplot . s t a t s ( devicename . h i s t $ counts ) $out ) ) ]#remove [−1]
56 i f ( l ength ( devicename . t imes ) == 0) { devicename . t imes <− devicename .
h i s t $ breaks [−1] }
57
58 #########################
59 # a c t i v a t i o n window graph
60 #########################
61 i f ( p l o t s == 1) {
62 s t a t e <− rep ( ’#4682b4 ’ , l ength ( break . time )−1)
63 s t a t e [ break . time [−1] %in% devicename . t imes ] <− ’#f f 3 2 3 2 ’
64
65 p <− ggp lot ( devicename , aes (Time) ) + s t a t bin ( boundary = 0 . 5 ,
binwidth = 0 . 5 , f i l l = s t a t e ) ###
66 p <− p + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
67 p <− p + g g t i t l e ( ”Number o f Packets Sent Over Time” )
68 p l o t (p)
69 ggsave ( f i l e=paste ( device , ” a c t i v e pa s s i v e . png” , sep = t r i a l ) ,
he ight = 4 , width = 6)
70 }
71 ##################################
72 # Divide a c t i v e and pa s s i v e s t a t e s
73 ##################################
74 # remove edge ca s e s
75 devicename <− devicename [−1 , ]
76 devicename <− devicename [ ! devicename$IAT > max( devicename$Time) , ]
77
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78 devicename$ State <− ” Pass ive ”
79 devicename [ round any ( devicename$Time , 0 . 5 , c e i l i n g ) %in% devicename .
times , ] $ State <− ” Active ” ### f l o o r
80
81 #remove edge case
82 devicename . a c t i v e <− devicename [ devicename$ State == ” Active ” , ]
83 devicename . pa s s i v e <− devicename [ devicename$ State == ” Pass ive ” , ]
84 ########################
85 # c r e a t e d i s t r i b u t i o n p l o t s
86 # 1 : dens i ty o f packets o f s i z e x f o r each s t a t e
87 # 2 : mean incoming IAT
88 # 3 : mean outgoing IAT
89 devicename . d i s t <− data . frame ( c ( h i s t ( devicename . a c t i v e [ devicename .
a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” , ] $Length , breaks = break . length , p l o t
= FALSE) $ counts / ( nrow ( devicename . a c t i v e [ devicename . a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on
== ”OUTGOING” , ] ) ) ,
90 h i s t ( devicename . a c t i v e [ devicename .
a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” , ] $Length , breaks = break . length , p l o t
= FALSE) $ counts / ( nrow ( devicename . a c t i v e [ devicename . a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on
== ”INCOMING” , ] ) ) ,
91 mean( devicename . a c t i v e $IAT [ devicename .
a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” ] ) ,
92 mean( devicename . a c t i v e $IAT [ devicename .
a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” ] ) ,
93 h i s t ( devicename . pa s s i v e [ devicename .
pa s s i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” , ] $Length , breaks = break . length ,
p l o t = FALSE) $ counts / ( nrow ( devicename . pa s s i v e [ devicename . p a s s i v e $
Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” , ] ) ) ,
94 h i s t ( devicename . pa s s i v e [ devicename .
pa s s i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” , ] $Length , breaks = break . length ,
p l o t = FALSE) $ counts / ( nrow ( devicename . pa s s i v e [ devicename . p a s s i v e $
Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” , ] ) ) ,
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95 mean( devicename . pa s s i v e $IAT [ devicename
. pa s s i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” ] ) ,
96 mean( devicename . pa s s i v e $IAT [ devicename
. pa s s i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” ] )
97 ) )
98
99 rownames ( devicename . d i s t ) <− c (map( h i s t ( devicename . a c t i v e $Length ,
breaks = break . length , p l o t = FALSE) $ breaks [−1] , paste , ”ActiveOut” ,
sep = ”” ) ,
100 map( h i s t ( devicename . a c t i v e $Length ,
breaks = break . length , p l o t = FALSE) $ breaks [−1] , paste , ” Act iveIn ” ,
sep = ”” ) ,
101 ”ActiveOutIAT” ,
102 ”ActiveInIAT” ,
103 map( h i s t ( devicename . pa s s i v e $Length ,
breaks = break . length , p l o t = FALSE) $ breaks [−1] , paste , ” PassiveOut ”
, sep = ”” ) ,
104 map( h i s t ( devicename . pa s s i v e $Length ,
breaks = break . length , p l o t = FALSE) $ breaks [−1] , paste , ” Pass ive In ” ,
sep = ”” ) ,
105 ”PassiveOutIAT” ,
106 ” PassiveInIAT ”
107 ) %>% u n l i s t
108
109 colnames ( devicename . d i s t ) <− dev i c e
110 devicename . d i s t [ apply ( devicename . d i s t , 1 , i s . nan ) , ] <− 0
111 i f ( i s . n u l l ( d e v i c e s . df ) ) {
112 d e v i c e s . df <− devicename . d i s t
113 d e v i c e s . s t a t s <− cbind ( devicename$Time , devicename$Length , dev i c e )
114 d e v i c e s . h i s t <− cbind ( devicename . h i s t $ counts , dev i c e )
115 }
116 e l s e {
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117 d e v i c e s . df <− cbind ( d e v i c e s . df , devicename . d i s t )
118 d e v i c e s . s t a t s <− rbind ( d e v i c e s . s t a t s , cbind ( devicename$Time ,
devicename$Length , dev i c e ) )
119 d e v i c e s . h i s t <− rbind ( d e v i c e s . h i s t , cbind ( devicename . h i s t $ counts ,




123 t a b l e . out <− s i g n i f ( d ev i c e s . df , 4)
124 wr i t e . csv ( t ab l e . out , paste ( ” tab l eout ” , ” . csv ” , sep = t r i a l ) , quote =
FALSE)
125
126 #remove f e a t u r e s with only 0 f o r PCA
127 d e v i c e s . f i l t e r e d . df <− d e v i c e s . df [ apply ( d e v i c e s . df , 1 , sum) != 0 , ]
128 wr i t e . csv ( t ( d e v i c e s . df ) , ” dev i c e d i s t r i b u t i o n s . csv ” , quote = FALSE)
129
130 #perform PCA
131 pca <− prcomp ( t ( d e v i c e s . f i l t e r e d . df ) , s c a l e = TRUE)
132
133 ## make a s c r e e p l o t
134 pca . var <− pca$ sdev ˆ2
135 pca . var . per <− round ( pca . var /sum( pca . var ) ∗ 100 , 1)
136
137 pca . var . per . df <− as . data . frame ( pca . var . per )
138 i f ( p l o t s == 0)
139 {
140 p <− ggp lot ( pca . var . per . df , aes ( x=as . i n t e g e r ( rownames ( pca . var . per . df ) )
, y=pca . var . per ) ) +
141 geom bar ( s t a t=” i d e n t i t y ” , f i l l = ” s t e e l b l u e ” )+
142 geom text ( aes ( l a b e l=pca . var . per ) , p o s i t i o n=” stack ” , v ju s t =−0.5)+
143 g g t i t l e ( ” Percent Var ia t ion from Each P r i n c i p a l Component” )+
144 theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )+
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145 l ab s ( y=” Percent Var ia t ion (%)” , x = ” P r i n c i p a l Component” )+
146 s c a l e x cont inuous ( breaks=seq (1 , 9 , 1 ) )
147 p l o t (p)




151 pca . data <− data . frame ( Sample=rownames ( pca$x ) ,
152 Type=d e v i c e l i s t ,
153 X=pca$x [ , 1 ] ,
154 Y=pca$x [ , 2 ] ,
155 Z=pca$x [ , 3 ] )
156
157 #################
158 #GRAPH 1ST 3 PC #
159 #################
160 i f ( p l o t s == 0) {
161 shapes = c (17 , 17 , 16 , 17 , 17 , 16 , 17 , 17 , 16)
162 c o l o r s <− c ( ”#E69F00” , ”#E69F00” , ”#E69F00” , ”#56B4E9” , ”#56B4E9” , ”
#56B4E9” , ”#999999” , ”#999999” , ”#999999” )
163 graph i c s . o f f ( )
164 png ( f i l ename = paste ( ”PCA” , ” . png” , sep = ”” ) , width = 8 , he ight =
5 . 9 , un i t s = ” in ” , r e s = 300)
165
166 p <− s c a t t e r p l o t 3 d ( pca . data [ 3 : 5 ] ,
167 pch = shapes ,
168 type = ”h” ,
169 c o l o r = co l o r s ,
170 main=” F i r s t Three P r i n c i p a l Components” ,
171 xlab = paste ( ”PC1 − ” , pca . var . per [ 1 ] , ”%” , sep=”” )
,
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172 ylab = paste ( ”PC2 − ” , pca . var . per [ 2 ] , ”%” , sep=”” )
,
173 z lab = paste ( ”PC3 − ” , pca . var . per [ 3 ] , ”%” , sep=”” )
,
174 box = FALSE)
175 legend ( ”bottom” , legend = c ( ”Camera” , ” Light Bulb” , ” Switch ” , ”Same
Model” , ” D i f f e r e n t Model” ) ,
176 c o l = c ( ”#E69F00” , ”#56B4E9” , ”#999999” , ”#000000” , ”#000000” )
, pch = c (16 , 16 , 16 , 17 ,16) ,
177 i n s e t = −0.25 , xpd = TRUE, h o r i z = TRUE)
178 dev . o f f ( )
179 }
180
181 #f i n d the number o f p r i n c i p a l components needed to meet minimum %
v a r i a t i o n
182 #pca . per <− l i s t with % v a r i a t i o n f o r each p r i n c i p a l component
183 #value <− minimum thre sho ld to meet ( e . g . , 0 . 8 f o r 80%)
184 f i n d . th r e sho ld <− f unc t i on ( pca . per , va lue ) {
185 i <− 1
186 whi l e ( i <= length ( pca . per ) ) {
187 s co r e <− sum( pca . per [ 1 : i ] )
188 i f ( s c o r e > value ) {break}
189 i <− i + 1
190 }
191 return ( i )
192 }
193 th re sho ld <− f i n d . th r e sho ld ( pca . var . per , 80)
194 d e v i c e s . d i s t <− d i s t ( pca$x [ , 1 : th r e sho ld ] )
195
196 #measure the d i s t ance between po in t s −> determine SS
197 #c a l c u l a t e SS
198 d i s t . out <− 1 − d e v i c e s . d i s t /max( d e v i c e s . d i s t )
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199 d i s t . out <− s i g n i f ( d i s t . out , 4)
200 wr i t e . csv ( as . matrix ( d i s t . out ) , paste ( ” s imscore ” , ” . csv ” , sep = t r i a l ) ,
quote = FALSE)
201
202 #wr i t e PCA r e s u l t
203 pca . out <− s i g n i f ( pca$x , 4)




Appendix I. Artificial Packet Signature Generation Code
1 #Generate AGPS from network d i s t r i b u t i o n o f d e v i c e s
2 #source : https : // s t a t s . stackexchange . com/ que s t i on s /164471/ generat ing−a−
s imulated−dataset−from−a−c o r r e l a t i o n−matrix−with−means−and−standard
3
4 l i b r a r y (MASS)
5
6 #read network s i g n a t u r e d i s t r i b u t i o n f i l e
7 setwd ( ”C: / Users /Youngjun Park/Desktop/IoTMU/ Captures3 ” )
8 d i s t r i b u t i o n <− read . csv ( ” dev i c e d i s t r i b u t i o n s 3 . csv ” , row . names = 1)
9 #r e p l a c e 0 with NA so they are not used in ana ly s e s
10 d i s t r i b u t i o n [ c (17 ,18 ,35 ,36) ] [ d i s t r i b u t i o n [ c (17 ,18 ,35 ,36 ) ] == 0 ] <− NA
11 d i s t r i b u t i o n [ c (17 ,18 ,35 ,36) ] <− l og ( d i s t r i b u t i o n [ c (17 ,18 ,35 ,36 ) ] ) #log
s c a l e IAT
12 d i s t r i b u t i o n . means <− apply ( d i s t r i b u t i o n , 2 , mean , na . rm = TRUE)
13 #c r e a t e covar iance matrix from the d i s t r i b u t i o n
14 d i s t r i b u t i o n . cov <− cov ( d i s t r i b u t i o n , use=” complete . obs” )
15 #sample 120 t imes from m u l t i v a r i a t e normal d i s t r i b u t i o n
16 no i s e <− mvrnorm(n = 120 , mu = d i s t r i b u t i o n . means , Sigma = d i s t r i b u t i o n .
cov ) %>% data . frame
17
18 #undo log s c a l e
19 no i s e [ c (17 ,18 ,35 ,36 ) ] <− exp ( no i s e [ c (17 ,18 ,35 ,36 ) ] )
20
21
22 #apply f o r every column
23 #i f the re i s a negat ive number , add 2x the magnitude o f minimum value to
the column
24 r e s c a l e . c o l <− f unc t i on ( d i s t ) {
25 d i s t [ abs ( d i s t ) < 0 . 0 0 0 1 ] <− 0
26 i f (TRUE %in% ( d i s t < 0) ) {
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27 d i s t <− d i s t + 2∗abs ( ( min ( d i s t ) ) )
28 }
29 return ( d i s t )
30 }
31
32 #r e c a l c u l a t e percentage f o r each f e a t u r e :
33 #new percentage = value /row t o t a l
34 r e s c a l e . row <− f unc t i on ( d i s t ) {
35 t o t a l <− sum( d i s t [ 1 : 8 ] )
36 d i s t [ 1 : 8 ] <− ( d i s t [ 1 : 8 ] ) / t o t a l
37 t o t a l <− sum( d i s t [ 9 : 1 6 ] )
38 d i s t [ 9 : 1 6 ] <− ( d i s t [ 9 : 1 6 ] ) / t o t a l
39 t o t a l <− sum( d i s t [ 1 9 : 2 6 ] )
40 d i s t [ 1 9 : 2 6 ] <− ( d i s t [ 1 9 : 2 6 ] ) / t o t a l
41 t o t a l <− sum( d i s t [ 2 7 : 3 4 ] )
42 d i s t [ 2 7 : 3 4 ] <− ( d i s t [ 2 7 : 3 4 ] ) / t o t a l
43 re turn ( d i s t )
44 }
45
46 #apply the f u n c t i o n s to the no i s e data
47 new . no i s e <− data . frame ( apply ( no i se , 2 , r e s c a l e . c o l ) )
48 new . no i s e <− data . frame ( t ( apply (new . no i se , 1 , r e s c a l e . row ) ) )
49 o u t f i l e <− cbind ( rep ( rownames ( d i s t r i b u t i o n ) , 46) , new . no i s e )
50 #wr i t e f i l e




Appendix J. Timeline of Device Activation






0:55 Application opened for SwitchTest
1:00 SwitchTest turned on
1:55 Switch3 application opened
2:00 Switch3 turned on
2:55 Camera1 application opened
3:00 Camera1 video feed started
3:15 Camera1 video feed stopped
3:55 LightBulbTest application opened
4:00 LightBulbTest turned on
4:55 CameraTest application opened
5:00 CameraTest video feed started
5:15 CameraTest video feed stopped
5:55 Switch1 application opened
6:00 Switch1 turned on
6:55 LightBulb2 application opened
7:00 LightBulb2 turned on
7:55 Camera3 application opened
8:00 Camera3 video feed started
8:15 Camera3 video feed stopped
8:55 Switch2 application opened
9:00 Switch2 turned on
9:55 Camera2 application opened
10:00 Camera2 video feed started
10:15 Camera2 video feed stopped
10:55 LightBulb1 application opened
11:00 LightBulb1 turned on
12:00 Sniffer stopped
Switch and light bulb device states reset to off
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0:55 LightBulb1 application opened
1:00 LightBulb 1 turned on
1:55 SwitchTest application opened
2:00 SwitchTest turned on
2:55 Camera2 application opened
3:00 Camera2 video feed started
3:15 Camera2 video feed stopped
3:55 LightBulbTest application opened
4:00 LightBulbTest turned on
4:55 Switch3 application opened
5:00 Switch3 turned on
5:55 Camera3 application opened
6:00 Camera3 video feed started
6:15 Camera3 video feed stopped
6:55 LightBulb2 application opened
7:00 LightBulb2 turned on
7:55 Camera1 application opened
8:00 Camera1 video feed started
8:15 Camera1 video feed stopped
8:55 Switch2 application opened
9:00 Switch2 turned on
9:55 Switch1 application opened
10:00 Switch1 turned on
10:55 CameraTest application opened
11:00 CameraTest video feed started
11:15 CameraTest video feed stopped
12:00 Sniffer stopped
Switch and light bulb device states reset to off
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0:55 LightBulb2 application opened
1:00 LightBulb2 turned on
1:55 Switch2 application opened
2:00 Switch2 turned on
2:55 Camera3 application opened
3:00 Camera3 video feed started
3:15 Camera3 video feed stopped
3:55 Switch1 application opened
4:00 Switch1 turned on
4:55 CameraTest application opened
5:00 CameraTest video feed started
5:15 CameraTest video feed stopped
5:55 SwitchTest application opened
6:00 SwitchTest turned on
6:55 LightBulb1 application opened
7:00 LightBulb1 turned on
7:55 LightBulbTest application opened
8:00 LightBulbTest turned on
8:55 Camera1 application opened
9:00 Camera1 video feed started
9:15 Camera1 video feed stopped
9:55 Switch3 application opened
10:00 Switch3 turned on
10:55 Camera2 application opened
11:00 Camera2 video feed started
11:15 Camera2 video feed stopped
12:00 Sniffer stopped
Switch and light bulb device states reset to off
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Appendix K. Classifier Code Used During Experiment
1 #s c r i p t used during the experiment to c r e a t e network d i s t r i b u t i o n graphs
,
2 #i d e n t i f y a c t i v e pa s s i v e s t a t e s , PCA, and c a l c u l a t e SS
3 #
4 #The s c r i p t takes as input the csv f i l e s c r ea ted a f t e r the p r e p r o c e s s i n g
step
5
6 l i b r a r y ( p ly r )
7 l i b r a r y ( dplyr )
8 l i b r a r y ( purrr )
9 l i b r a r y ( ggp lot2 )
10 l i b r a r y ( ggthemes )
11 l i b r a r y ( broom )
12 l i b r a r y ( s t a t s )
13 l i b r a r y ( RColorBrewer )
14 l i b r a r y ( s c a t t e r p l o t 3 d )
15 l i b r a r y (DMwR)
16
17 setwd ( ”C:\\ Users \\Youngjun Park\\Desktop\\IoTMU\\Captures4 ” )
18
19 #f l a g to enable p l o t s
20 p l o t s = 0
21
22 t r i a l = ” COMBINED5”
23 d e v i c e s . df <− NULL
24 d e v i c e s . s t a t s <− NULL
25 d e v i c e l i s t = c ( ”Camera1” , ”CameraTest” , ”Camera2” , ”Camera3” , ”
Lightbulb1 ” , ” LightbulbTest ” , ” Lightbulb2 ” , ” Switch1 ” , ” SwitchTest ” ,
” Switch2 ” , ” Switch3 ” )
26 f o r ( dev i c e in d e v i c e l i s t ) {
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27 devicename <− read . csv ( paste ( device , ” . csv ” , sep = ” 1” ) ) #run 1
28 devicename$Name <− dev i c e
29 devicename$Time <− devicename$Time − min ( devicename$Time)
30 tempdevice <− read . csv ( paste ( device , ” . csv ” , sep = ” 2” ) ) #run 2
31 tempdevice$Name <− dev i c e
32 tempdevice$Time <− tempdevice$Time − min ( tempdevice$Time) + 720 #add
time o f f s e t
33 devicename <− rbind ( devicename , tempdevice )
34 tempdevice <− read . csv ( paste ( device , ” . csv ” , sep = ” 3” ) ) #run 3
35 tempdevice$Name <− dev i c e
36 tempdevice$Time <− tempdevice$Time − min ( tempdevice$Time) + 1440 #add
time o f f s e t
37 devicename <− rbind ( devicename , tempdevice )
38
39 i f ( p l o t s == 1) {
40 #c r e a t e s c a t t e r p l o t o f l eng th s o f packets sent vs time
41 p <− ggp lot ( devicename , aes ( x = Time , y = Length ) ) + geom point (
co l our = ” s t e e l b l u e ” )
42 p <− p + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
43 p <− p + g g t i t l e ( paste ( ” Lengths o f Packets Sent Over Time” , device ,
sep=” − ” ) )
44 p l o t (p)
45 ggsave ( f i l e=paste ( device , ” time length . png” , sep = t r i a l ) , he ight =
4 , width = 6)
46
47 #c r e a t e histogram of number o f packets sent vs time
48 p <− ggp lot ( devicename , aes (Time) ) + geom histogram ( binwidth = 0 . 5 ,
f i l l = ’ s t e e l b l u e ’ )
49 p <− p + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
50 p <− p + g g t i t l e ( paste ( ”Number o f Packets Sent Over Time” , device ,
sep=” − ” ) )
51 p l o t (p)
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52 ggsave ( f i l e=paste ( device , ” time h i s t . png” , sep = t r i a l ) , he ight =
4 , width = 6)
53 }
54
55 #determine breaks f o r histogram
56 break . time <− seq (0 , round any (max( devicename$Time) , 0 . 5 , c e i l i n g ) ,
0 . 5 ) ###
57 break . l ength <− seq (0 , 1600 , 200)
58
59 # determine a c t i v e and pa s s i v e s t a t e s
60 devicename . h i s t = h i s t ( devicename$Time , breaks = break . time , p l o t =
FALSE)
61 #The o u t l i e r s in the number o f packets sent w i l l r e p r e s e n t the a c t i v e
s t a t e
62 #For a given cont inuous var i ab l e , o u t l i e r s are those ob s e rva t i on s that
l i e ou t s i d e 1 .5 ∗IQR,
63 # where IQR, the ’ I n t e r Quar t i l e Range ’ i s the d i f f e r e n c e between 75
th and 25 th q u a r t i l e s .
64 #e x t r a c t o u t l i e r s
65 o u t l i e r s <− boxplot . s t a t s ( devicename . h i s t $ counts ) $out
66 o u t l i e r s <− o u t l i e r s [ o u t l i e r s > 0 ]
67 devicename . t imes <− devicename . h i s t $ breaks [ −1 ] [ ( devicename . h i s t $ counts
>= min ( o u t l i e r s ) ) ]#remove [−1]
68 i f ( l ength ( devicename . t imes ) == 0) { devicename . t imes <− devicename .
h i s t $ breaks [−1] }
69
70 #########################
71 # a c t i v a t i o n window graph
72 #########################
73 i f ( p l o t s == 1) {
74 s t a t e <− rep ( ’#4682b4 ’ , l ength ( break . time )−1)
75 s t a t e [ break . time [−1] %in% devicename . t imes ] <− ’#f f 3 2 3 2 ’
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76 p <− ggp lot ( devicename , aes (Time) ) + s t a t bin ( boundary = 0 . 5 ,
binwidth = 0 . 5 , f i l l = s t a t e ) ###
77 p <− p + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
78 p <− p + coord c a r t e s i a n ( xlim=c (0 , 2160) , yl im=c (0 , 25) )
79 p <− p + g g t i t l e ( ”Number o f Packets Sent Over Time” )
80 p l o t (p)
81 ggsave ( f i l e=paste ( device , ” a c t i v e pa s s i v e . png” , sep = t r i a l ) ,
he ight = 4 , width = 6)
82 }
83 ##################################
84 # Divide a c t i v e and pa s s i v e s t a t e s
85 ##################################
86 # remove edge ca s e s
87 devicename <− devicename [−1 , ]
88 devicename <− devicename [ ! devicename$IAT > max( devicename$Time) , ]
89
90 devicename$ State <− ” Pass ive ”
91 devicename [ round any ( devicename$Time , 0 . 5 , c e i l i n g ) %in% devicename .
times , ] $ State <− ” Active ” ### f l o o r
92
93 #remove edge case
94 devicename . a c t i v e <− devicename [ devicename$ State == ” Active ” , ]
95 devicename . pa s s i v e <− devicename [ devicename$ State == ” Pass ive ” , ]
96 ########################
97 # c r e a t e d i s t r i b u t i o n p l o t s
98 # 1 : dens i ty o f packets o f s i z e x f o r each s t a t e
99 # 2 : mean incoming IAT
100 # 3 : mean outgoing IAT
101 devicename . d i s t <− data . frame ( c ( h i s t ( devicename . a c t i v e [ devicename .
a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” , ] $Length , breaks = break . length , p l o t
= FALSE) $ counts / ( nrow ( devicename . a c t i v e [ devicename . a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on
== ”OUTGOING” , ] ) ) ,
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102 h i s t ( devicename . a c t i v e [ devicename .
a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” , ] $Length , breaks = break . length , p l o t
= FALSE) $ counts / ( nrow ( devicename . a c t i v e [ devicename . a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on
== ”INCOMING” , ] ) ) ,
103 mean( devicename . a c t i v e $IAT [ devicename .
a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” ] ) ,
104 mean( devicename . a c t i v e $IAT [ devicename .
a c t i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” ] ) ,
105 h i s t ( devicename . p a s s i v e [ devicename .
pa s s i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” , ] $Length , breaks = break . length ,
p l o t = FALSE) $ counts / ( nrow ( devicename . pa s s i v e [ devicename . p a s s i v e $
Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” , ] ) ) ,
106 h i s t ( devicename . p a s s i v e [ devicename .
pa s s i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” , ] $Length , breaks = break . length ,
p l o t = FALSE) $ counts / ( nrow ( devicename . pa s s i v e [ devicename . p a s s i v e $
Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” , ] ) ) ,
107 mean( devicename . pa s s i v e $IAT [ devicename
. pa s s i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”OUTGOING” ] ) ,
108 mean( devicename . pa s s i v e $IAT [ devicename
. pa s s i v e $ Dir e c t i on == ”INCOMING” ] )
109 ) )
110
111 rownames ( devicename . d i s t ) <− c (map( h i s t ( devicename . a c t i v e $Length ,
breaks = break . length , p l o t = FALSE) $ breaks [−1] , paste , ”ActiveOut” ,
sep = ”” ) ,
112 map( h i s t ( devicename . a c t i v e $Length ,
breaks = break . length , p l o t = FALSE) $ breaks [−1] , paste , ” Act iveIn ” ,
sep = ”” ) ,
113 ”ActiveOutIAT” ,
114 ”ActiveInIAT” ,
115 map( h i s t ( devicename . pa s s i v e $Length ,
breaks = break . length , p l o t = FALSE) $ breaks [−1] , paste , ” PassiveOut ”
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, sep = ”” ) ,
116 map( h i s t ( devicename . pa s s i v e $Length ,
breaks = break . length , p l o t = FALSE) $ breaks [−1] , paste , ” Pass ive In ” ,
sep = ”” ) ,
117 ”PassiveOutIAT” ,
118 ” PassiveInIAT ”
119 ) %>% u n l i s t
120
121 colnames ( devicename . d i s t ) <− dev i c e
122 devicename . d i s t [ apply ( devicename . d i s t , 1 , i s . nan ) , ] <− 0
123 i f ( i s . n u l l ( d e v i c e s . df ) ) {
124 d e v i c e s . df <− devicename . d i s t
125 d e v i c e s . s t a t s <− cbind ( devicename$Time , devicename$Length , dev i c e )
126 d e v i c e s . h i s t <− cbind ( devicename . h i s t $ counts , dev i c e )
127 }
128 e l s e {
129 d e v i c e s . df <− cbind ( d e v i c e s . df , devicename . d i s t )
130 d e v i c e s . s t a t s <− rbind ( d e v i c e s . s t a t s , cbind ( devicename$Time ,
devicename$Length , dev i c e ) )
131 d e v i c e s . h i s t <− rbind ( d e v i c e s . h i s t , cbind ( devicename . h i s t $ counts ,




135 #wr i t e d i s t r i b u t i o n s
136 i f ( p l o t s == 1) {
137 t a b l e . out <− s i g n i f ( d e v i c e s . df , 4)




141 #remove f e a t u r e s with only 0 f o r PCA
144
142 d e v i c e s . f i l t e r e d . df <− d e v i c e s . df [ apply ( d e v i c e s . df , 1 , sum) != 0 , ]
143
144 #perform PCA
145 pca <− prcomp ( t ( d e v i c e s . f i l t e r e d . df ) , s c a l e = TRUE)
146
147 ## make a s c r e e p l o t
148 pca . var <− pca$ sdev ˆ2
149 pca . var . per <− round ( pca . var /sum( pca . var ) ∗ 100 , 1)
150
151 pca . var . per . df <− as . data . frame ( pca . var . per )
152 i f ( p l o t s == 1)
153 {
154 p <− ggp lot ( pca . var . per . df , aes ( x=as . i n t e g e r ( rownames ( pca . var . per . df ) )
, y=pca . var . per ) ) +
155 geom bar ( s t a t=” i d e n t i t y ” , f i l l = ” s t e e l b l u e ” )+
156 geom text ( aes ( l a b e l=pca . var . per ) , p o s i t i o n=” stack ” , v ju s t =−0.5)+
157 g g t i t l e ( ” Percent Var ia t ion from Each P r i n c i p a l Component” )+
158 theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )+
159 l ab s ( y=” Percent Var ia t ion (%)” , x = ” P r i n c i p a l Component” )
160 p l o t (p)




164 pca . data <− data . frame ( Sample=rownames ( pca$x ) ,
165 Type=d e v i c e l i s t ,
166 X=pca$x [ , 1 ] ,
167 Y=pca$x [ , 2 ] ,
168 Z=pca$x [ , 3 ] )
169
170 #################
171 #GRAPH 1ST 3 PC #
145
172 #################
173 i f ( p l o t s == 1) {
174 shapes = c (17 , 17 , 16 , 16 , 17 , 17 , 16 , 17 , 17 , 16 , 16)
175 c o l o r s <− c ( ”#E69F00” , ”#E69F00” , ”#E69F00” , ”#E69F00” , ”#56B4E9” , ”#56
B4E9” , ”#56B4E9” , ”#999999” , ”#999999” , ”#999999” , ”#999999” )
176 graph i c s . o f f ( )
177 png ( f i l ename = paste ( ”PCA” , ” . png” , sep = t r i a l ) , width = 8 , he ight =
5 . 9 , un i t s = ” in ” , r e s = 300)
178
179 p <− s c a t t e r p l o t 3 d ( pca . data [ 3 : 5 ] ,
180 pch = shapes ,
181 type = ”h” ,
182 c o l o r = co l o r s ,
183 main=” F i r s t Three P r i n c i p a l Components” ,
184 xlab = paste ( ”PC1 − ” , pca . var . per [ 1 ] , ”%” , sep=”” )
,
185 ylab = paste ( ”PC2 − ” , pca . var . per [ 2 ] , ”%” , sep=”” )
,
186 z lab = paste ( ”PC3 − ” , pca . var . per [ 3 ] , ”%” , sep=”” )
,
187 box = FALSE)
188 legend ( ”bottom” , legend = c ( ”Camera” , ” Light Bulb” , ” Switch ” , ”Same
Model” , ” D i f f e r e n t Model” ) ,
189 c o l = c ( ”#E69F00” , ”#56B4E9” , ”#999999” , ”#000000” , ”#000000” )
, pch = c (16 , 16 , 16 , 17 ,16) ,
190 i n s e t = −0.25 , xpd = TRUE, h o r i z = TRUE)
191 dev . o f f ( )
192 }
193
194 #f i n d the number o f p r i n c i p a l components needed to meet minimum %
v a r i a t i o n
195 #pca . per <− l i s t with % v a r i a t i o n f o r each p r i n c i p a l component
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196 #value <− minimum thre sho ld to meet ( e . g . , 0 . 8 f o r 80%)
197 f i n d . th r e sho ld <− f unc t i on ( pca . per , va lue ) {
198 i <− 1
199 whi l e ( i <= length ( pca . per ) ) {
200 s co r e <− sum( pca . per [ 1 : i ] )
201 i f ( s c o r e > value ) {break}
202 i <− i + 1
203 }
204 return ( i )
205 }
206 th re sho ld <− f i n d . th r e sho ld ( pca . var . per , 80)
207 d e v i c e s . d i s t <− d i s t ( pca$x [ , 1 : th r e sho ld ] )
208
209 #measure the d i s t ance between po in t s −> determine SS
210 #c a l c u l a t e SS
211 d i s t . out <− 1 − d e v i c e s . d i s t /max( d e v i c e s . d i s t )
212 d i s t . out <− s i g n i f ( d i s t . out , 4)
213
214 wr i t e . csv ( as . matrix ( d i s t . out ) , paste ( ” s imscore ” , ” . csv ” , sep = t r i a l ) ,
quote = FALSE)
215
216 #wr i t e PCA r e s u l t
217 pca . out <− s i g n i f ( pca$x , 4)




Appendix L. Network Congestion Measure Server/Client
Code
1 # Server code responding to UDP messages during conges t i on t e s t i n g
2
3 import socket , sys
4
5 sock = socket . socke t ( socke t . AF INET , socket .SOCK DGRAM)
6
7 s e r v e r a d d r e s s = ( ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 7 ’ , 12346)
8 c l i e n t a d d r e s s = ( ’ 1 7 2 . 1 6 . 0 . 2 ’ , 12345)
9 sock . bind ( s e r v e r a d d r e s s )
10 #l i s t e n f o r messages from c l i e n t and respond with same payload
11 whi l e True :
12 data , address = sock . recvfrom (512)
13 p r i n t ( data )
14 sock . sendto ( data , c l i e n t a d d r e s s )
Code/congestion srv.py
1 # Cl i en t code to send s e r i e s o f UDP messages during conge s t i on t e s t i n g
2 # Measures NL and PD
3
4 import socket , sys , time
5
6 sock = socket . socke t ( socke t . AF INET , socket .SOCK DGRAM)
7
8 c l i e n t a d d r e s s = ( ’ l o c a l h o s t ’ , 12345)
9 s e r v e r a d d r e s s = ( ” 1 7 2 . 1 6 . 0 . 2 ” , 12345)
10 sock . bind ( c l i e n t a d d r e s s )
11 #send 50 UDP messages with payload from ”0” to ”49”
12 f o r x in range (50) :
13 message = s t r ( x )
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14 s t a r t = time . time ( )
15 sock . sendto ( message . encode ( ’ ut f−8 ’ ) , s e r v e r a d d r e s s )
16 sock . s e t t imeout (2 ) #s e t 2 seconds timeout whi l e wa i t ing f o r a
re sponse
17 data , address = sock . recvfrom (512)
18 i f data == s t r ( x ) : #ensure that re sponse i s f o r the message sent
19 p r i n t ( time . time ( ) − s t a r t ) #p r i n t NL time
Code/congestion cli.py
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Appendix M. Performance Metric Analysis Code
1 #Calcu la te performance s t a t i s t i c s
2
3 l i b r a r y ( ggp lot2 )
4
5 #c a l c u l a t e p r e c i s i o n
6 p r e c i s i o n <− f unc t i on ( tp , fp ) {
7 return (100 ∗ tp/ ( tp+fp ) )
8 }
9 #c a l c u l a t e r e c a l l
10 r e c a l l <− f unc t i on ( tp , fn ) {
11 return (100 ∗ tp/ ( tp+fn ) )
12 }
13 #c a l c u l a t e s p e c i f i c i t y
14 s p e c i f i c i t y <− f unc t i on ( tn , fp ) {




19 # EXP 1
20 #######################
21
22 #thre sho ld 0 .9 r e s u l t s
23 tp = 3
24 tn = 52
25 fp = 0
26 fn = 0
27 p r e c i s i o n ( tp , fp )
28 r e c a l l ( tp , fn )
29 s p e c i f i c i t y ( tn , fp )
30
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31 #thre sho ld 0 .8 r e s u l t s
32 tp = 3
33 tn = 51
34 fp = 1
35 fn = 0
36 p r e c i s i o n ( tp , fp )
37 r e c a l l ( tp , fn )
38 s p e c i f i c i t y ( tn , fp )
39
40 #thre sho ld 0 .7 r e s u l t s
41 tp = 3
42 tn = 47
43 fp = 5
44 fn = 0
45 p r e c i s i o n ( tp , fp )
46 r e c a l l ( tp , fn )
47 s p e c i f i c i t y ( tn , fp )
48
49 #######################
50 # EXP 2
51 #######################
52 # 11 samples
53 #thre sho ld 0 .9 r e s u l t s
54 tp = 0
55 tn = 51
56 fp = 1
57 fn = 3
58 p r e c i s i o n ( tp , fp )
59 r e c a l l ( tp , fn )
60 s p e c i f i c i t y ( tn , fp )
61
62 #thre sho ld 0 .8 r e s u l t s
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63 tp = 2
64 tn = 50
65 fp = 2
66 fn = 1
67 p r e c i s i o n ( tp , fp )
68 r e c a l l ( tp , fn )
69 s p e c i f i c i t y ( tn , fp )
70
71 #thre sho ld 0 .7 r e s u l t s
72 tp = 2
73 tn = 46
74 fp = 6
75 fn = 1
76 p r e c i s i o n ( tp , fp )
77 r e c a l l ( tp , fn )
78 s p e c i f i c i t y ( tn , fp )
79
80 # 120 samples
81 #thre sho ld 0 .9 r e s u l t s
82 tp = 0
83 tn = 52
84 fp = 0
85 fn = 3
86 p r e c i s i o n ( tp , fp )
87 r e c a l l ( tp , fn )
88 s p e c i f i c i t y ( tn , fp )
89
90 #thre sho ld 0 .8 r e s u l t s
91 tp = 1
92 tn = 52
93 fp = 0
94 fn = 2
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95 p r e c i s i o n ( tp , fp )
96 r e c a l l ( tp , fn )
97 s p e c i f i c i t y ( tn , fp )
98
99 #thre sho ld 0 .7 r e s u l t s
100 tp = 2
101 tn = 52
102 fp = 0
103 fn = 1
104 p r e c i s i o n ( tp , fp )
105 r e c a l l ( tp , fn )
106 s p e c i f i c i t y ( tn , fp )
107
108 # Calcu la te PSD
109 #exp1 <− d e v i c e s . d i s t #SS matrix from experiment 1
110 s s1 <− s s ( exp1 )
111 #exp2 . 1 <− d e v i c e s . d i s t #SS matrix from experiment 2 with 11 samples
112 s s2 . 1 <− s s ( exp2 . 1 )
113 #exp2 . 2 <− d e v i c e s . d i s t #SS matrix from experiment 2 with 120 samples
114 s s2 . 2 <− s s ( exp2 . 2 )
115
116 #c r e a t e dataframe f o r a n a l y s i s
117 d i s t . d f <− data . frame ( rbind ( cbind ( exp1 , 0) , cbind ( exp2 . 1 , 11) , cbind (
exp2 . 2 , 120) ) )
118 colnames ( d i s t . d f ) <− c ( ” Distance ” , ”Treatment” )
119 d i s t . d f $Treatment <− f a c t o r ( d i s t . d f $Treatment )
120 d i s t . d f $Device <− ”Other”
121 d i s t . d f $Device [ c (1 , 35 , 50 , 56 , 90 , 105 , 111 , 145 , 160) ] <− c ( ”C1 ˜ CT” ,
”LB1 ˜ LBT” , ”S1 ˜ ST” , ”C1 ˜ CT” , ”LB1 ˜ LBT” , ”S1 ˜ ST” , ”C1 ˜ CT
” , ”LB1 ˜ LBT” , ”S1 ˜ ST” )
122 d i s t . d f $Device <− f a c t o r ( d i s t . d f $Device , l e v e l s = c ( ”C1 ˜ CT” , ”LB1 ˜
LBT” , ”S1 ˜ ST” , ”Other” ) )
153
123
124 #perform ANOVA on PSD f o r 0 , 11 , 120 spoofed as treatments
125 d i s t . aov <− aov ( Distance ˜Treatment , d i s t . d f )
126 d i s t . aov %>% TukeyHSD %>% tidy
127 #v e r i f y QQ plo t
128 qqnorm ( d i s t . aov$ r e s i d u a l s )
129 q q l i n e ( d i s t . aov$ r e s i d u a l s )
130 #v e r i f y r e s i d u a l s
131 d i s t . d f $ Res idua l s <− d i s t . aov$ r e s i d u a l s
132 p <− ggp lot ( d i s t . df , aes ( x = Treatment , y = Res idua l s ) ) + geom point (
c o l o r=” s t e e l b l u e ” )
133 p <− p + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
134 p l o t (p)
135
136 #c a l c u l a t e mean PSD f o r each treatment
137 means <− aggregate ( Distance ˜Treatment , d i s t . df , mean)
138
139 #c r e a t e boxplot o f PSD f o r each number o f samples spoofed
140 p <− ggp lot ( d i s t . df , aes ( Treatment , Distance ) ) + geom boxplot ( notch=TRUE
, co l our = ” s t e e l b l u e ” , o u t l i e r . shape = NA) + geom j i t t e r ( width =0.2 ,
aes ( c o l o r = Device ) ) + coord f l i p ( )
141 p <− p + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
142 p <− p + labs ( x = ”Number o f Samples Spoofed ” , y = ” Pai rwi se S ignature
Distance ” ) + s c a l e c o l o r manual ( va lue s=c ( ”#00FF00” , ”#E69F00” , ”#
f f 0 0 0 0 ” , ”#999999” ) )
143 p <− p + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n=”bottom” )
144 p l o t (p)
Code/performance stats.R
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Appendix N. Calculated Principal Component Scores in
Experiments 1 and 2
Table 21: PCS of Each Device (Experiment 1)
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11
C1 -0.2358 -0.3166 1.962 -0.7974 0.4844 0.4182 -1.129 0.3836 0.4825 -5.523e-05 5.915e-16
CT -0.3773 0.01338 2.296 -0.6478 0.5868 0.4621 -1.19 0.3832 -0.4564 0.0005816 4.666e-16
C2 7.323 -2.164 -0.8424 -2.424 0.4358 -0.1927 0.3971 -0.09209 -0.01978 1.924e-06 5.759e-16
C3 1.684 -2.289 -0.6821 3.723 -2.545 0.2876 -0.5118 -0.05957 -0.007274 -0.000231 -3.296e-16
LB1 -1.815 -2.109 1.135 1.374 1.362 -0.4779 0.7996 -0.08883 -0.002258 -0.03723 6.609e-16
LBT -1.808 -2.086 1.108 1.374 1.317 -0.473 0.805 -0.1128 0.005592 0.03749 8.691e-16
LB2 -2.586 -0.2939 -3.564 -0.9611 0.1987 2.758 0.3753 0.2216 -0.01067 -5.45e-06 7.303e-16
S1 -0.8089 2.257 1.713 -1.395 -2.137 -0.6311 1.243 0.6667 -0.001804 1.958e-05 1.475e-16
ST -0.5543 2.417 1.797 -0.9598 -0.656 0.8351 -0.00733 -1.252 0.01095 -0.0005287 -2.619e-16
S2 2.424 5.162 -1.783 2.504 1.375 -0.5522 -0.07437 0.1588 0.01396 6.546e-05 4.372e-16
S3 -3.246 -0.5915 -3.141 -1.789 -0.4219 -2.434 -0.7077 -0.2089 -0.01473 -0.0001096 6.748e-16
PC: principal component
Table 22: PCS of Each Device (Experiment 2: 11 Spoofed Samples)
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11
C1 -1.602 0.7789 -0.8602 1.402 -1.45 0.4368 -1.323 0.1924 -0.5632 -1.655 -1.037e-15
CT -2.572 0.0459 -0.6834 0.925 -1.744 0.1966 -1.919 -0.1536 1.151 1.13 -4.372e-16
C2 -4.245 -2.194 0.7138 -2.514 -1.761 -1.322 1.68 0.3788 0.007035 -0.1404 -6.661e-16
C3 -1.897 -0.7473 1.163 -2.801 3.135 1.45 -1.098 -0.2711 0.3396 -0.2715 5.829e-16
LB1 4.563 2.278 -2.732 -3.068 -1.36 0.8026 0.3593 -0.2033 0.0879 0.06841 8.049e-16
LBT 2.089 0.5446 -0.8295 0.3353 1.766 -2.912 -0.6033 1.577 0.4234 -0.101 4.302e-16
LB2 3.75 -6.053 -0.3768 1.337 -0.08834 0.6218 0.1184 -0.2551 -0.09288 0.01884 1.055e-15
S1 -0.9929 0.7215 -0.4738 0.247 0.6634 -0.7885 -0.4007 -1.041 -2.118 0.8045 2.776e-16
ST -1.289 1.328 -0.387 1.816 0.6928 1.995 1.532 2.012 -0.2447 0.4257 5.829e-16
S2 -0.7836 1.487 -0.9124 1.967 1.164 -0.4386 1.645 -2.078 0.9644 -0.3054 8.292e-16
S3 2.98 1.811 5.379 0.3536 -1.016 -0.04139 0.01081 -0.1578 0.04478 0.02634 1.055e-15
PC: principal component
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Table 23: PCS of Each Device (Experiment 2: 120 Spoofed Samples)
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11
C1 -0.1095 3.317 -0.09739 0.85 0.3488 -1.782 1.629 -1.621 0.09608 -1.191 8.57e-16
CT -1.034 4.103 -1.64 1.937 -1.698 -1.016 -1.744 0.9828 0.9196 0.561 1.632e-17
C2 -4.746 -0.4199 3.015 2.901 -0.492 2.722 0.2309 0.1562 -0.1999 -0.2685 4.645e-16
C3 -5.129 -0.8696 -3.192 -4.246 0.5024 0.572 -0.1495 0.0651 0.2544 -0.2516 3.886e-16
LB1 1.184 -0.7671 2.296 -1.134 1.175 0.03561 1.161 -0.6103 2.045 0.9245 8.704e-16
LBT 4.161 1.095 1.136 -1.29 1.928 1.602 -2.249 0.379 0.07361 -0.8199 -4.817e-16
LB2 3.283 0.4331 0.3204 -2.384 -3.867 1.299 0.9084 -0.2936 -0.68 0.1653 1.055e-15
S1 0.275 0.4703 -1.361 1.027 1.694 0.3133 -0.5271 -1.869 -1.526 1.123 9.506e-16
ST 1.159 0.5888 -0.5428 0.346 1.613 -0.4471 2.017 2.706 -0.8569 0.2044 1.648e-16
S2 -1.285 -2.86 3.234 -0.984 -0.6161 -3.25 -1.241 0.2359 -0.714 -0.03304 1.627e-15















































































































































































































































































































Appendix P. Calculated Pairwise Signature Distances for
Experiment 2
Table 24: Summary of PSD for Baseline Network
C1 CT C2 C3 LB1 LBT LB2 S1 ST S2
CT 0.5125
C2 8.4300 8.7770
C3 5.9160 6.1250 8.3440
LB1 3.3320 3.4650 10.0900 4.5920
LBT 3.3240 3.4570 10.0800 4.5780 0.03551
LB2 6.0080 6.2780 10.5500 7.2430 5.6060 5.5770
S1 2.7150 2.4740 9.6570 7.6690 5.2990 5.2820 6.1400
ST 2.7610 2.4810 9.5990 7.4310 5.2870 5.2700 6.3420 0.5359
S2 7.8750 7.8060 10.1400 7.6650 8.9790 8.9490 8.3700 6.8050 6.4200
S3 6.0140 6.2820 10.9500 7.9760 5.7130 5.6890 1.1790 6.1450 6.4320 9.2480
Table 25: Summary of PSD for Network with 10 Spoofed Samples
C1 CT C2 C3 LB1 LBT LB2 S1 ST S2
CT 1.3500
C2 5.8080 4.6470
C3 6.7230 6.4950 5.6450
LB1 7.9850 8.7280 10.4800 9.2910
LBT 5.0160 5.8870 8.4000 5.7650 5.8400
LB2 8.7990 8.9540 9.8810 9.4830 9.8300 7.1370
S1 2.5150 3.0410 5.8300 4.5880 7.3130 3.2980 8.3760
ST 2.3210 3.1800 6.8650 5.8620 8.2900 3.9450 8.9850 1.7110
S2 2.8860 3.8560 7.5380 6.0950 8.0160 3.4890 8.9250 2.0080 0.8952
S3 7.8920 8.4590 9.9400 8.6770 8.9640 6.9780 9.8690 7.3530 7.5340 7.8240
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Table 26: Summary of PSD for Network with 120 Spoofed Samples
C1 CT C2 C3 LB1 LBT LB2 S1 ST S2
CT 3.1310
C2 8.3870 8.5010
C3 9.1560 9.4600 9.7760
LB1 5.6570 7.9310 7.8790 8.9660
LBT 6.5740 8.6110 10.4800 10.9900 4.0900
LB2 7.5980 8.0430 10.6700 10.3900 6.1910 6.0620
S1 4.0100 5.3930 7.6980 7.9770 4.5550 5.3680 7.4440
ST 3.5890 5.6720 8.3390 8.4870 3.5380 4.3660 6.7690 1.5850
S2 7.5550 9.3270 8.2920 9.3020 5.0380 8.9340 8.5690 7.5320 6.8360
S3 9.6980 10.0400 10.8000 11.2200 8.3490 9.3680 9.2250 6.8700 7.2290 9.1850
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Appendix Q. Network Congestion Analysis Code
1 # Graph the network latency , number o f packets , and throughput
2 # perform ANOVA on network la t ency t imes f o r i n c r e a s i n g number o f
samples spoofed
3
4 l i b r a r y ( ggp lot2 )
5 l i b r a r y ( dplyr )
6 l i b r a r y ( broom )
7 l i b r a r y ( g tab l e )
8 l i b r a r y ( g r id ) # low−l e v e l g r id f u n c t i o n s are r equ i r ed
9
10 setwd ( ”C:\\ Users \\Youngjun Park\\Desktop\\IoTMU\\Captures5 ” )
11
12 #he lpe r func t i on to r e t r i e v e packet l ength in fo rmat ion from preproce s s ed
csv f i l e s
13 get i n f o <− f unc t i on ( treatment ) {
14 setwd ( paste ( ”C:\\ Users \\Youngjun Park\\Desktop\\IoTMU\\ conges t i on2 \\” ,
treatment , sep=”” ) )
15 d e v i c e s . df <− NULL
16 d e v i c e l i s t = c ( ”Camera1” , ”CameraTest” , ”Camera2” , ”Camera3” , ”
Lightbulb1 ” , ” LightbulbTest ” , ” Lightbulb2 ” , ” Switch1 ” , ” SwitchTest ” ,
” Switch2 ” , ” Switch3 ” )
17 #combine data from three t r i a l s
18 f o r ( dev i c e in d e v i c e l i s t ) {
19 devicename <− read . csv ( paste ( device , ” . csv ” , sep = ” 1” ) )
20 tempdevice <− read . csv ( paste ( device , ” . csv ” , sep = ” 2” ) )
21 devicename <− rbind ( devicename , tempdevice )
22 tempdevice <− read . csv ( paste ( device , ” . csv ” , sep = ” 3” ) )
23 devicename <− rbind ( devicename , tempdevice )
24
25 i f ( i s . n u l l ( d e v i c e s . df ) ) {
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26 d e v i c e s . df <− devicename
27 }
28 e l s e {
29 d e v i c e s . df <− rbind ( d e v i c e s . df , devicename )
30 }
31 }
32 return ( d e v i c e s . df )
33 }
34 #c a l c u l a t e throughput in kbps
35 t base <− get i n f o ( ”Base” )
36 t base <− 8 ∗ sum( t base $Length ) /90/1000
37 t 10 <− get i n f o ( ”10” )
38 t 10 <− 8 ∗ sum( t 10$Length ) /90/1000
39 t 20 <− get i n f o ( ”20” )
40 t 20 <− 8 ∗ sum( t 20$Length ) /90/1000
41 t 30 <− get i n f o ( ”30” )
42 t 30 <−8 ∗ sum( t 30$Length ) /90/1000
43 t 40 <− get i n f o ( ”40” )
44 t 40 <−8 ∗ sum( t 40$Length ) /90/1000
45 t 50 <− get i n f o ( ”50” )
46 t 50 <−8 ∗ sum( t 50$Length ) /90/1000
47 t 60 <− get i n f o ( ”60” )
48 t 60 <−8 ∗ sum( t 60$Length ) /90/1000
49 t 70 <− get i n f o ( ”70” )
50 t 70 <−8 ∗ sum( t 70$Length ) /90/1000
51 t 80 <− get i n f o ( ”80” )
52 t 80 <−8 ∗ sum( t 80$Length ) /90/1000
53 t 90 <− get i n f o ( ”90” )
54 t 90 <−8 ∗ sum( t 90$Length ) /90/1000
55 t 100 <− get i n f o ( ”100” )
56 t 100 <−8 ∗ sum( t 100$Length ) /90/1000
57 t 110 <− get i n f o ( ”110” )
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58 t 110 <−8 ∗ sum( t 110$Length ) /90/1000
59 t 120 <− get i n f o ( ”120” )
60 t 120 <−8 ∗ sum( t 120$Length ) /90/1000
61
62 #read network la t ency f i l e s and c r e a t e a dataframe with columns network
la t ency time , treatment , throughput
63 setwd ( ”C:\\ Users \\Youngjun Park\\Desktop\\IoTMU\\ conges t i on2 \\ l a t ency ” )
64 s1 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t i on0 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read .
csv ( ” conges t i on0 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ” conges t i on0
2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 0 , t base )
65 s2 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion10 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read .
csv ( ” conges t ion10 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion10 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 10 , t 10)
66 s3 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion20 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read .
csv ( ” conges t ion20 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion20 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 20 , t 20)
67 s4 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion30 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read .
csv ( ” conges t ion30 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion30 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 30 , t 30)
68 s5 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion40 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read .
csv ( ” conges t ion40 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion40 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 40 , t 40)
69 s6 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion50 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read .
csv ( ” conges t ion50 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion50 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 50 , t 50)
70 s7 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion60 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read .
csv ( ” conges t ion60 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion60 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 60 , t 60)
71 s8 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion70 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read .
csv ( ” conges t ion70 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion70 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 70 , t 70)
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72 s9 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion80 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read .
csv ( ” conges t ion80 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion80 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 80 , t 80)
73 s10 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion90 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read
. csv ( ” conges t ion90 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion90 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 90 , t 90)
74 s11 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion100 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ,
read . csv ( ” conges t ion100 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion100 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 100 , t 100)
75 s12 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion110 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ,
read . csv ( ” conges t ion110 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion110 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 110 , t 110)
76 s13 <− cbind ( c ( read . csv ( ” conges t ion120 0 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ,
read . csv ( ” conges t ion120 1 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] , read . csv ( ”
conges t ion120 2 . txt ” , header = FALSE) [ −1 , ] ) , 120 , t 120)
77
78 #change column names f o r r e a d a b i l i t y
79 colnames ( s1 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
80 colnames ( s2 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
81 colnames ( s3 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
82 colnames ( s4 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
83 colnames ( s5 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
84 colnames ( s6 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
85 colnames ( s7 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
86 colnames ( s8 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
87 colnames ( s9 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
88 colnames ( s10 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
89 colnames ( s11 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
90 colnames ( s12 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
91 colnames ( s13 ) <− c ( ”Time” , ”Treatment” , ”Throughput” )
92
93 #combine dataframes in to one and perform ANOVA
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94 s . a l l <− data . frame ( rbind ( s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s5 , s6 , s7 , s8 , s9 , s10 , s11 ,
s12 , s13 ) )
95 s . a l l $Treatment <− f a c t o r ( s . a l l $Treatment )
96 s . aov <− aov (Time ˜ Treatment , s . a l l )
97 summary( s . aov )
98 qqnorm ( s . aov$ r e s i d u a l s )
99
100 #turn data in to log s c a l e
101 s . a l l $Time <− l og ( s . a l l $Time)
102 s . aov <− aov (Time ˜ Treatment , s . a l l )
103 summary( s . aov )
104
105 #v e r i f y Q−Q plo t and r e s i d u a l s
106 qqnorm ( s . aov$ r e s i d u a l s )
107 q q l i n e ( s . aov$ r e s i d u a l s )
108 s . a l l $ Res idua l s <− s . aov$ r e s i d u a l s
109 #r e s i d u a l p l o t
110 p <− ggp lot ( s . a l l , aes ( x = Treatment , y = Res idua l s ) ) + geom point ( c o l o r
=” s t e e l b l u e ” )
111 p <− p + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
112 p l o t (p)
113
114 #c r e a t e boxplot o f network la t ency f o r each treatment
115 p1 <− ggp lot ( s . a l l , aes ( x = Treatment , y = Time) ) + geom boxplot ( c o l o r=”
s t e e l b l u e ” )
116 p1 <− p1 + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) , a x i s .
t i t l e . x=element blank ( ) )
117 p1 <− p1 + labs ( y = ”Network Latency ( sec ) ” , x = ”” )
118
119 #c r e a t e l i n e graph o f number o f packets observed f o r each treatment
120 Packets = c (881 , 1457 , 1464 , 1947 , 2038 , 2151 , 2731 , 2848 , 2933 , 3234 ,
3961 , 3729 , 4181)
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121 Treatment = c (0 , 10 , 20 , 30 , 40 , 50 , 60 , 70 , 80 , 90 , 100 , 110 , 120)
122 packets . df <− data . frame ( cbind ( Packets , Treatment ) )
123 p2 <− ggp lot ( packets . df , aes ( x = Treatment , y = Packets ) ) + geom l i n e (
c o l o r=” s t e e l b l u e ” )
124 p2 <− p2 + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) , a x i s .
t i t l e . x=element blank ( ) )
125 p2 <− p2 + s c a l e x cont inuous ( breaks=seq (0 ,120 ,10) )
126 p2 <− p2 + labs ( y = ”Number o f Packets Observed” )
127
128 #c r e a t e l i n e graph o f throughput f o r each treatment
129 Throughput = c ( t base , t 10 , t 20 , t 30 , t 40 , t 50 , t 60 , t 70 , t 80 , t
90 , t 100 , t 110 , t 120)
130 Treatment = c (0 , 10 , 20 , 30 , 40 , 50 , 60 , 70 , 80 , 90 , 100 , 110 , 120)
131 tp . df <− data . frame ( cbind ( Throughput , Treatment ) )
132 p3 <− ggp lot ( tp . df , aes ( x = Treatment , y = Throughput ) ) + geom l i n e (
c o l o r=” s t e e l b l u e ” )
133 p3 <− p3 + theme bw( ) + theme ( panel . g r i d . minor = element blank ( ) )
134 p3 <− p3 + s c a l e x cont inuous ( breaks=seq (0 ,120 ,10) )
135 p3 <− p3 + labs ( y = ”Throughput ( kbps ) ” , x = ”Number o f Samples Spoofed ”
)
136
137 #stack the three p l o t s toge the r
138 g1 <− ggplotGrob ( p1 )
139 g2 <− ggplotGrob ( p2 )
140 g3 <− ggplotGrob ( p3 )
141 g <− rbind ( g1 , g2 , g3 , s i z e=” f i r s t ” ) # stack the three p l o t s
142 g$widths <− uni t . pmax( g1$widths , g2$widths , g3$widths ) # use the l a r g e s t
widths
143 # cente r the legend v e r t i c a l l y
144 g$ l ayout [ g r ep l ( ” guide ” , g$ l ayout $name) , c ( ” t ” , ”b” ) ] <− c (1 , nrow ( g ) )
145 g r id . newpage ( )
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